Many instructors of microeconomic theory have been waiting for a text that provides balanced and in-depth analysis of the essentials of microeconomics. Masterfully combining the results of years of teaching microeconomics at Harvard University, Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael Whinston, and Jerry Green have filled that conspicuous vacancy with their groundbreaking text, Microeconomic Theory.

The authors set out to create a solid organizational foundation upon which to build the effective teaching tool for microeconomic theory. The result presents unprecedented depth of coverage in all the essential topics, while allowing professors to "tailor-make" their course to suit personal priorities and style. Topics such as noncooperative game theory, information economics, mechanism design, and general equilibrium under uncertainty receive the attention that reflects their stature within the discipline. The authors devote an entire section to game theory alone, making it "free-standing" to allow instructors to return to it throughout the course when convenient. Discussion is clear, accessible, and engaging, enabling the student to gradually acquire confidence as well as proficiency. Extensive exercises within each chapter help students to hone their skills, while the text's appendix of terms, fully cross-referenced throughout the previous five sections, offers an accessible guide to the subject matter's terminology. Teachers of microeconomics need no longer rely upon scattered lecture notes to supplement their textbooks. Deftly written by three of the field's most influential scholars, Microeconomic Theory brings the readability, comprehensiveness, and versatility to the first-year graduate classroom that has long been missing.

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Never HIGHLIGHT a Book Again! Virtually all testable terms, concepts, persons, places, and events are included. Cram101 Textbook Outlines gives all of the outlines, highlights, notes for your textbook with optional online practice tests. Only Cram101 Outlines are Textbook Specific. Cram101 is NOT the Textbook.

Part I: INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING

Introduction to Part I

1. Preference and Choice

A. Introduction

B. Preference Relations

C. Choice Rules

D. The Relationship between Preference Relations and Choice Rules

Exercises

2. Consumer Choice

A. Introduction

B. Commodities

C. The Consumption Set

D. Competitive Budgets

E. Demand Functions and Comparartive Statics

F. The Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference and the Law of Demand

Exercises

3. Classical Demand Theory

A. Introduction

B. Preference Relations: Basic Properties

C. Preference and Utility

D. The Utility Maximization Problem

E. The Expenditure Minimization Problem

F. Duality: A Mathematical Introduction

G. Relationships between Demand, Indirect Utility, and Expenditure Functions

H. Integrability

I. Welfare Evaluation of Economic Changes

J. The Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference

Appendix: Continuity and Differentiability Properties of Walrasian Demand

Exercises

4. Aggregate Demand

A. Introduction

B. Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Wealth

C. Aggregate Demand and the Weak Axiom

D. Aggregate Demand and the Existence of a Representative Consumer

Appendix: Regularizing Effects of Aggregation

Exercises

5. Production

A. Introduction

B. Production Sets

C. Profit Maximization and Cost Minimization

D. The Geometry of Cost and Supply in the Single Output Case

E. Aggregation

F. Efficient Production

G. Remarks on the Objectives of the Firm

Appendix: The Linear Activity Model

Exercises

6. Choice under Uncertainty

A. Introduction

B. Expected Utility Theory

C. Money Lotteries and Risk Aversion

D. Comparison of Payoff Distributions in Terms of Return and Risk

E. State Dependent Utility

F. Subjective Probability Theory

Exercises

Part II: GAME THEORY

Introduction to Part II

7. Basic Elements of Non-Cooperative Games

A. Introduction

B. What is a Game?

C. The Extensive Form Representation of a Game

D. Strategies and the Normal Form Representation of a Game

E. Randomized Choices

Exercises

8. Simultaneous-Move Games

A. Introduction

B. Dominant and Dominated Strategies

C. Rationalizable Strategies

D. Nash Equilibrium

E. Games of Incomplete Information: Bayesian Nash Equilibrium

F. The Possibility of Mistakes: Trembling-Hand Perfection

Appendix: Existence of Nash Equilibrium

Exercises

9. Dynamic Games

A. Introduction

B. Sequential Rationality, Backwards Induction, and Subgame Perfection

C. Sequential Rationality and Out-of-Equilibrium Beliefs

D. Reasonable Beliefs, Forward Induction, and Normal Form Refinements

Appendix A: Finite and Infinite Horizon Bilateral Bargaining

Appendix B: Extensive Form Trembling-Hand Perfection

Exercises

Part III: MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AND MARKET FAILURE

Introduction to Part III

10. Competitive Markets

A. Introduction

B. Pareto Optimality and Competitive Equilibria

C. Partial Equilibrium Competitive Analysis

D. The Fundamental Welfare Theorems in a Partial Equilibrium Context

E. Welfare Analysis in the Partial Equilibrium Model

F. Free-Entry and Long-Run Competitive Equilibria

G. Concluding Remarks on Partial Equilibrium Analysis

Exercises

11. Externalities and Public Goods

A. Introduction

B. A Simple Bilateral Externality

C. Public Goods

D. Multilateral Externalities

E. Private Information and Second-Best Solutions

Appendix: Non-Convexities and the Theory of Externalities

Exercises

12. Market Power

A. Introduction

B. Monopoly Pricing

C. Static Models of Oligopoly

D. Repeated Interaction

E. Entry

F. The Competitive Limit

G. Strategic Precommitments to Affect Future Competition

Appendix A: Infinitely Repeated Games and the Folk Theorem

Appendix B: Strategic Entry Deterrence and Accommodation

Exercises

13. Adverse Selection, Signalling, and Screening

A. Introduction

B. Informational Asymmetries and Adverse Selection

C. Signalling

D. Screening

Appendix: Reasonable-Beliefs Refinements in Signalling Games

Exercises

14. The Principal-Agent Problem

A. Introduction

B. Hidden Actions (Moral Hazard)

C. Hidden Information (and Monopolistic Screening)

D. Hidden Actions and Hidden Information: Hybrid Models

Appendix A: Multiple Effort Levels in the Hidden Action Model

Appendix B: A Formal Solution of the Principal-Agent Problem with Hidden Information

Exercises

Part IV: GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM

Introduction to Part IV

15. General Equilibrium Theory: Some Examples

A. Introduction

B. Pure Exchange: The Edgeworth Box

C. The One Consumer-One Producer Economy

D. The 2x2 Production Model

E. General versus Partial Equilibrium Theory

Exercises

16. Equilibrium and Its Basic Welfare Properties

A. Introduction

B. The Basic Model and Definitions

C. The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics

D. The Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics

E. Pareto Optimality and Social Welfare Optima

F. First-Order Conditions for Pareto Optimality

G. Some Applications

Appendix: Technical Properties of the Set of Feasible Allocations

Exercises

17. The Positive Theory of Equilibrium

A. Introduction

B. Equilibrium: Definitions and Basic Equations

C. Existence of Walrasian Equilibrium

D. Local Uniqueness and the Index Theorem

E. Anything Goes: The Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu Theorem

F. Uniqueness of Equilibria

G. Comparative Statics Analysis

H. Tatonnement Stability

I. Large Economies and Non-Convexities

Appendix A: Characterizing Equilibrium through Welfare Equations

Appendix B: A General Approach to the Existence of Walrasian Equilibrium

Exercises

18. Some Foundations for Competitive Equilibria

A. Introduction

B. Core and Equilibria

C. Non-Cooperative Foundations of Walrasian Equilibria

D. The Limits to Redistribution

E. Equilibrium and the Marginal Productivity Principle

Appendix: Cooperative Game Theory

Exercises

19. General Equilibrium under Uncertainty

A. Introduction

B. A Market Economy with Contingent Commodities: Description

C. Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium

D. Sequential Trade

E. Asset Markets

F. Incomplete Markets

G. Firm Behavior in General Equilibrium Models under Uncertainty

H. Imperfect Information

Exercises

20. Equilibrium and Time

A. Introduction

B. Intertemporal Utility

C. Intertemporal Production and Efficiency

D. Equilibrium: The One-Consumer Case

E. Stationary Programs, Interest Rates, and Golden Rules

F. Dynamics

G. Equilibrium: Several Consumers

H. Overlapping Generations

I. Remarks on Non-Equilibrium Dynamics: Tatonnement and Learning

Exercises

Part V: WELFARE ECONOMICS AND INCENTIVES

Introduction to Part V

21. Social Choice Theory

A. Introduction

B. A Special Case: Social Preferences over Two Alternatives

C. The General Case: Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

D. Some Possibility Results: Restricted Domains

E. Social Choice Functions

Exercises

22. Elements of Welfare Economics and Axiomatic Bargaining

A. Introduction

B. Utility Possibility Sets

C. Social Welfare Functions and Social Optima

D. Invariance Properties of Social Welfare Functions

E. The Axiomatic Bargaining Approach

F. Coalitional Bargaining: The Shapley Value

Exercises

23. Incentives and Mechanism Design

A. Introduction

B. The Mechanism Design Problem

C. Dominant Strategy Implementation

D. Bayesian Implementation

E. Participation Constraints

F. Optimal Bayesian Mechanisms

Appendix A: Implementation and Multiple Equilibria

Appendix B: Implementation in Environments with Complete Information

Exercises

Mathematical Appendix

A. Introduction

B. Homogeneous Functions and Euler's Formula

C. Concave and Quasiconcave Functions

D. Matrices: Negative (Semi)Definiteness and Other Properties

E. The Implicit Function Theorem

F. Continuous Functions and Compact Sets

G. Convex Sets and Separating Hyperplanes

H. Correspondences

I. Fixed Point Theorems

J. Unconstrained Maximization

K. Constrained Maximization

L. The Envelope Theorem

M. Linear Programming

N. Dynamic Programming