Scientific Inquiry: Readings in the Philosophy of Science features an impressive collection of classical and contemporary readings on a wide range of issues in the philosophy of science. The volume is organized into six sections, each with its own introduction, and includes a general introduction that situates the philosophy of science in relation to other areas of intellectual inquiry. The selections focus on the main issues in the field, including the structure of scientific theories, models of scientific explanation, reductionism, historicist challenges to the objectivity of science, and the dispute over the ontological interpretation of mature scientific theories. Both the positivist model of science and its competitors, including contemporary social constructivist models, are included. Ideal for introductory philosophy of science courses, Scientific Inquiry strives to provide students and other readers with a thorough knowledge of the philosophical complexity of modern science and an appreciation of its authoritative intellectual standing in contemporary life.

Acknowledgments

Introduction

Part I: The Positivist Model of Scientific Theories and Its Problems

Section 1. Logic, Language, and the Observational/Theoretical Distinction

1. Alexander Rosenberg, The Rise of Logical Positivism

2. Frederick Suppe, The Positivist Model of Scientific Theories

3. Hilary Putnam, Problems with the Observational/Theoretical Distinction

4. Grover Maxwell, Theoretical Entities

5. Bas Van Fraassen, A Defense of the Observational/Theoretical Distinction

6. Technical Interlude: Carl Hempel, A Critique of Operationalism

Section 2. The Underdetermination of Theory and Holism

7. Pierre Dunhem, Physical Theory and Experiment

8. Sir Karl Popper, Falsification

9. W.V. Quine, Holism, Part 1: Two Dogmas of Empiricism

10. W.V. Quine, Holism, Part 2: Posits and Reality

11. Technical Interlude: Larry Laudan, A Critique of Underdetermination

Section 3. Reductionism, Antireductionism, and Scientific Explanation

12. Ernest Nagel, A Model of Intertheoretic Reduction

13. Paul Oppenheim and Hilary Putnam, Unity of Science

14. Jerry Fodor, A Critique of Physiological Reductionism

15. Technical Interlude: Jaegwon Kim, The Nature of Supervenience

16. Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, The Deductive-Nomological Model of Scientific Explanation

17. Philip Kitcher, The Unification Model of Scientific Explanation

18. Technical Interlude: Paul Humphreys, The Aleatory Model of Scientific Explanation

Part II: Historicism and Its Aftermath

Section 4. The Kuhnian Model of Science

19. Thomas Kuhn, The Nature of Normal Science

20. Thomas Kuhn, The Nature of Revolutionary Science

21. Ian Hacking, The Rationality of Science After Kuhn

22. Polemical Interlude: Paul Feyerabend, An Argument Against Method

Section 5. Social Constructivism and Feminism

23. David Bloor, The Strong Programme in the Sociology of Science

24. Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, A Social Constructivist Field Study

25. James Robert Brown, A Critique of Social Constructivism

26. Polemical Interlude: Paul Boghossian, The Sokal Hoax

27. Sandra Harding, Feminist Science Criticism

28. Cassandra Pinnick, Problems with Feminist Epistemology

29. Polemical Interlude: Paul R. Gross and Norman Levitt, A Critique of Feminist Science Criticism

Section 6. Realism and Antirealism

30. Hilary Putnam, Realism in Mathematics and Elsewhere

31. Bas van Fraassen, Alternatives to Realism

32. Philip Kitcher, Realism and Scientific Progress

33. James Robert Brown, Realism, Antirealism, and NOA

34. Polemical Interlude: Alan Musgrave, Idealism and Antirealism