Armies are invariably accused of preparing to fight the last war. Nagl examines how armies learn during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared in organization, training, and mindset. He compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 with that developed in the Vietnam Conflict from 1950-1975, through use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both conflicts. In examining these two events, he argues that organizational culture is the key variable in determining the success or failure of attempts to adapt to changing circumstances. Differences in organizational culture is the primary reason why the British Army learned to conduct counterinsurgency in Malaya while the American Army failed to learn in Vietnam. The American Army resisted any true attempt to learn how to fight an insurgency during the course of the Vietnam Conflict, preferring to treat the war as a conventional conflict in the tradition of the Korean War or World War II. The British Army, because of its traditional role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics that its history and the national culture created, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. This is the first study to apply organizational learning theory to cases in which armies were engaged in actual combat.

U.S. Army major Nagl applies an organizational learning approach to explaining the different abilities of the British army in Malaya and the U.S. army in Vietnam to change their approaches when encountering unexpected "asymmetrical" counterinsurgency warfare. He argues that the British had an organizational culture, while the American army preferred to continue fighting a conventional war. Before he examines the specific cases, he reviews the history of guerilla warfare in order to properly evaluate the respective performances of the two armies and examines their learning cultures prior to 1945.
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[J]ohn Nagl's book is a valuable asset for identifying key aspects of a succesful counterinsurgency strategy. Lessons from the Malaya insurgency and the Vietnam conflict should be beneficial for American political and military leaders.Parameters

[An] excellent stud[y]....very important.Royal United Services Institute Journal

[N]agl provides an in-depth analysis of the military institutions and how they adapted to effectively combat an unconventional enemy....Impeccably researched and well written, Nagl has chosen a subject critical to today's Army, namely, how to defeat an insurgent enemy. He contends that to succeed in future "savage wars of peace," the Army must adapt as an organization and step away from the preoccupation with solely waging conventional warfare against other nation states. Overall, this is a great book and must be read.Armor

John Nagl takes a fresh look at the differences in the organizational culture of the British and U.S. armies, how this difference affected their respective approaches to Malaya and Vietnam, and how it contributed to victory for one and failure for the other. The volume is strongly recommended for students of counterinsurgency, as it is well crafted, draws on extensive primary sources and secondary research, and is lucidly written. The lessons could not be more poignant....[s]mall wars are not going away, and the U.S. Army had better learn how to fight them.The Journal of Military History

[A]ttempts to shake up the Army by getting it to seriously consider the neglected field of counterinsurgency. For this, Nagl deserves kudos....[t]his is an important book because it raises the need to reconsider the Army's readiness to conduct counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency should not be the exclusive realm of the SOF community because many of the tools for counterinsurgency belong to the conventional force. Insurgency is likely in the current operating enviornment. The force needs to prepare to meet it; the debate on how best to do it should begin now.Military Review

As the author ably points out, the U.S Army in its arrogance thought that it had nothing to learn from the British or French experince or even from the success of the U.S Marine Corps Combined Action Program. This narrow vision and self-inflicted blindness persisted, and finally the U.S Army found the fight that fit its view in the 1991 Gulf War. A victory in the Gulf was all well and good, but as the author concludes, small wars are not going away, and the U.S Army had better learn how to fight them.The Journal of Military History

[O]f timely interest....[s]eeks to explain how conventionally trained armed forces can learn to adapt to unconventional problems in the course of a conflict.The International History Review

Pentagon insiders say that the Army chief of staff, Gen. Peter Schoomaker, has distributed copies of Nagl's book to all Army generals. Whether they will learn Lawrence's lessons remains to be seen.The Washington Post

[B]rutal in its criticism of the Vietnam-era Army as an organization that failed to learn from its mistakes and tried vainly to fight guerrilla insurgents the same way it fought World War II....[c]ontrasts the U.S. Army's failure with the British experience in Malaya in the 1950s. The difference: The British, who eventually prevailed, quickly saw the folly of using massive force to annihilate a shadowy communist enemy....Col. Nagl's book is one of a half dozen Vietnam histories--most of them highly critical of the U.S. military in Vietnam--that are changing the military's views on how to fight guerrilla wars.The Wall Street Journal

Do Armies really learn from their experiences, or does military bureaucracy reign supreme? As citizens, we should fervently hope the former is the real case; but, alas, as John Nagl shows in this brilliant analysis, foreign armies can on occasion learn more rapidly and thoroughly on their own. As now it attempts a massive transformation, the future of America's Army rests significantly on its ability to absorb and act on the rich insights of its younger generation of leaders, one of whom produced this incisive analysis.Don M. Snyder Professor of Political Science, Department of Social Science, USMA West Point

This book is a powerful examination of the learning cultures of two of the world's most prominent and capable fighting forces. John Nagl sheds much new light on why the British Army recovered from early failures in the Malayan Emergency and, even more importantly, why the US Army did not profit to the same extent from its early experiences in the Vietnam War. Nagl couples extensive historical analysis with a dedicated soldier's eye as to what is practical. The book has both reassuring and disturbing lessons for us today.Robert O'Neill Chichele Professor of the History of War Emeritus, University of Oxford

If you're interested in the intellectual arguments that are shaping the "surge" and changes in military doctrine brought on by the failures so far in Iraq, this is a great place to start.Christian Science Monitor

[A]n acclaimed book on counterinsurgency.The New York Times Sunday Magazine

Armies are invariably accused of preparing to fight the last war. Nagl examines how armies learn during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared in organization, training, and mindset. He compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 with that developed in the Vietnam Conflict from 1950-1975, through use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both conflicts. In examining these two events, he argues that organizational culture is the key variable in determining the success or failure of attempts to adapt to changing circumstances.

Compares performances of the British and U.S. Armies in Southeast Asia to isolate key variables that allowed or prevented successful adaptation to events on the ground.

JOHN A. NAGL is Commander of the 1st Battalion, 34th Armor at Fort Riley, Kansas. He holds an M.Phil. and a D.Phil. in international relations from Oxford University.

Preface

Introduction

Setting the Stage

How Armies Learn

The Hard Lesson of Insurgency

The British and American Armies: Separated by a Common Language

Malaya

The Malayan Emergency, 1948-1951

The Empire Strikes Back, 1952-1957

Vietnam

The Advisory Years, 1950-1964

The Fighting Years, 1965-1972

Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam

Comparing British and American Counterinsurgency Learning

Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife

Bibliography

Index