"Although more treatise than narrative, and not for skimmers, this book should be on the shelf with the best of the many books about WWI. A professor of international history at the London School of Economics and author of two earlier books on that war, Stevenson analyzes the bankruptcy of reason that precipitated the war and kept it going. According to Stevenson, some regimes saw, in the unifying effects of a popular war, cures for menacing internal turbulence, but, as he shows, the war turned unpredictably on its makers in most nations. Stevenson's close analysis of the political, economic and cultural dimensions of the conflict unravels the reasons why Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Italy, Russia, France and even Britain saw much to gain from a war that each hoped to win in short order, with the help of allies. But the irony of unanticipated outcomes derailed strategies, loyalties, ideals and even governments — which lost control of events. 'Nothing ever seen before,' Stevenson writes, 'compared with such massive concentrations of firepower and of human suffering... and with such meagre results.' The imposed postwar settlement contained 'time bombs' of political instability (such as Yugoslavia) that keep exploding even today. Stevenson is particularly critical of American involvement, which, he says, pushed Germany toward surrender, but was also belated, inefficient, badly led and (with respect to President Wilson) diplomatically unsophisticated in coping with European cynicism. Despite some inconsistencies and contradictions, and its lack of a human dimension to the horror, Cataclysm is a major re-examination of the shaping tragedy of the 20th century. 37 b&w photos. Agent, Andrew Wylie. (June)" Publishers Weekly (Copyright 2004 Reed Business Information, Inc.)

The fundamental argument of Stevenson (international history, London School of Economics, UK), in this history of World War I, is that the tragedy of the outbreak of war and its continuation even as its bloody cost became clear was primarily the result of decisions by the policy makers and military leaders. As such, it is those decisions and their consequences that are the true focus of the work, as opposed to the social and cultural conditions that may have spurred or limited those decisions. Despite these self-imposed limitations, Stevenson is ambitious in his scope, seeking to chronologically describe the all of the important military campaigns how they impacted and were impacted by the political decisions being made in the various capitals.
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