Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions, and U.S. Interests

Peacekeeping is a useful tool to manage international conflict and maintain truces, but it will only work in a narrow range of circumstances. Peacekeepers can order punitive airstrikes, depose elected leaders, destroy infrastructure, and enforce peace accords not drafted by the warring parties. They have overstepped their bounds, and peacekeeping is now often a euphemism for any multilateral military action. A CIA analyst who worked closely with Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administration officials on UN issues, Fleitz examines how peacekeeping works, the rash of peacekeeping failures since 1993, and whether peacekeeping can still play a role in U.S. foreign policy. It is a unique realist assessment destined to become the guide to this very important subject for U.S. policymakers, politicians, and students of international relations.

UN peacekeeping disasters in the 1990s occurred because world leaders failed to recognize the rules and precedents that allowed traditional peacekeeping to succeed during the Cold War. Although failed peacekeeping operations damaged the peacekeeping concept, it can still serve as a viable tool to promote international security and promote American interests abroad if used in the right circumstances. Carefully researched and supported by over two dozen maps, charts, and photos, Fleitz boldly challenges dozens of assumptions of the foreign policy establishment about the nature of the Cold War, post-Cold War peacekeeping, and 1990s peacekeeping deployments.

A Central Intelligence Agency analyst covering the United Nations and peacekeeping for the Reagan and first Bush administrations airs some footage left on the cutting room floor when the optimistic reports of UN peacekeeping efforts were made. Readers looking for a proposed US policy on peacekeeping will be disappointed, he warns, because he believes peacekeeping is not a task for the US.
Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

Peacekeeping is a useful tool to manage international conflict and maintain truces, but it will only work in a narrow range of circumstances. "Peacekeepers" can order punitive airstrikes, depose elected leaders, destroy infrastructure, and enforce peace accords not drafted by the warring parties. They have overstepped their bounds, and "peacekeeping" is now often a euphemism for any multilateral military action. A CIA analyst who worked closely with Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administration officials on UN issues, Fleitz examines how peacekeeping works, the rash of peacekeeping failures since 1993, and whether peacekeeping can still play a role in U.S. foreign policy. It is a unique realist assessment destined to become the guide to this very important subject for U.S. policymakers, politicians, and students of international relations. UN peacekeeping disasters in the 1990s occurred because world leaders failed to recognize the rules and precedents that allowed traditional peacekeeping to succeed during the Cold War. Although failed peacekeeping operations damaged the peacekeeping concept, it can still serve as a viable tool to promote international security and promote American interests abroad if used in the right circumstances. Carefully researched and supported by over two dozen maps, charts, and photos, Fleitz boldly challenges dozens of assumptions of the foreign policy establishment about the nature of the Cold War, post-Cold War peacekeeping, and 1990s peacekeeping deployments.

Unnecessary, avoidable, and predictable, the peacekeeping disasters of the 1990s were the result of world leaders' overeagerness to employ peacekeeping troops for what in fact were belligerent purposes.

FREDERICK H. FLEITZ JR. is Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. His previous positions include President of the Board of Directors with the National Collegiate Conference Association, nongovernmental organization representative for the UN, and analyst of United Nations and UN peacekeeping issues for the Central Intelligence Agency. The views expressed in this book are his alone and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, or the U.S. Government.

Preface

Peacekeeping in Crisis

Traditional Peacekeeping

Roosevelt's Doomed UN Vision

The Genesis of Peacekeeping: The UNEF Model

From Prototype to Doctrine

Peacekeeping Management and Command

Iraq and the UN "Renaissance"

The Post-Cold War Peacekeeping Train Wreck

Expanding Peacekeeping: Theory and Reality

Expanded Peacekeeping Fiascoes

Assessment and Outlook

American Foreign Policy and the Future of Peacekeeping

Appendix: UN Peacekeeping Mission Data, 1947-2000

Bibliography