The most important issue rarely mentioned on the campaign trail this year is the gap between rich and poor in America. It is important for two reasons: The gap has been growing, and the choice between John McCain and Barack Obama likely will affect whether it narrows or expands.

That is the conclusion of "Unequal Democracy," a provocative new book by Princeton professor Larry M. Bartels,... Washington Post Book Review (read the entire Washington Post review) one of the country's leading political scientists. His most significant finding is that there is a partisan pattern to the size of the gap between the rich and the poor. Over the past half-century, he concludes, Republican presidents have allowed income inequality to expand, while Democratic presidents generally have not.

Lest anyone think this book is a partisan hit job by a left-wing academic, Bartels goes to great pains in his introduction to preempt the counterattack he expects from critics on the right. "I began the project as an unusually apolitical political scientist," he writes, noting that the last time he voted was in 1984, "and that was for Ronald Reagan." He adds that in doing this work, "I was quite surprised to discover how often and how profoundly partisan differences in ideologies and values have shaped key policy decisions and economic outcomes. I have done my best to follow my evidence where it led me."

In Bartels' analysis, the period from the late 1940s to the early '70s was one of "rapid and remarkably egalitarian" growth in real incomes: Every group, from the richest to the poorest, experienced growth of between 2.4 percent and 2.7 percent per year. Since 1974, the pattern has skewed significantly toward the rich. Overall income growth has slowed, and it has slowed far more for those at the bottom than at the top.

Bartels acknowledges that there can be many explanations for growing income inequality, from globalization and structural changes in the U.S. economy to technological and demographic shifts. But he argues that it is wrong to assume there is no cause-and-effect relationship between government policies and income distribution. In fact, he asserts, "economic inequality is, in substantial part, a political phenomenon."

Bartels comes to this conclusion by examining what happened to income inequality from President Truman to President George W. Bush. "Under Democratic presidents," he writes, "poor families did slightly better than richer families (at least in proportional terms), producing a modest net decrease in income inequality; under Republican presidents, rich families did vastly better than poorer families, producing a considerable net increase in income inequality."

He concludes that the income gap increased under Presidents Eisenhower, Nixon, Ford, Reagan and both Bushes, while it declined under four of the five Democratic presidents who have served during this period — all except Jimmy Carter. That pattern, he asserts, "seems hard to attribute to a mere coincidence in the timing of Democratic and Republican administrations." Rather, Democratic and Republican presidents have pursued different economic policies, with Democrats generally focused more on raising employment and output growth, which disproportionately benefit poor and middle-class families. Republicans have worried more about containing inflation, which has "negligible" effects on real income growth near the bottom of the income distribution but "substantial effects at the top," Bartels says. On tax policy, Republican presidents, especially since Reagan, have pushed tax cuts that have disproportionately helped the wealthiest Americans.

Bartels uses the election of 2000 to illustrate, with a hypothetical example, how much difference presidential leadership realistically may make in the distribution of income in America. In Bush's first four years, families in the top 95th percentile of income received a 2-percent cumulative increase in real income. Middle-income families saw a decline of 1 percent, while poorer families saw a decline of 3 percent. Based on historical data for Democratic presidents, Bartels estimates that if Al Gore had been elected instead of Bush, the working poor would have seen an increase of about 6 percent, while the wealthy would have seen essentially no gain.

Why don't voters hold Republican presidential candidates accountable for what appears to be such a clear pattern? Bartels doesn't buy the hypothesis that lower-income Americans vote against their own economic interests because they put more stock in social and cultural issues when they pick a president. He was one of the first to challenge that idea when it was advanced in Thomas Frank's book "What's the Matter with Kansas" four years ago. Bartels argues that, nationally, the white working class has become more loyal to Democratic presidential candidates, not less. He contends that Republican gains have come mainly among middle- and upper-income voters, and that the overall shift away from the Democrats is almost entirely attributable to the partisan transformation of the South over the past 40 years or so.

One of Bartels' most intriguing conclusions is that the political timing of economic growth has influenced voters, and that this has helped Republicans, despite their overall pattern of increasing the gap between rich and poor. Republicans presidents, he concludes, have often generated significant economic growth rates in presidential election years, while Democratic presidents have not. If only election years are counted, families at every income level "turn out to have fared much better under "Republican" presidents than under Democrats," he writes. "Whether through political skill or pure good luck, Republican presidents have been remarkably successful in targeting income growth to coincide with presidential elections."

No political party or administration can be held responsible for the global economic changes that affect income inequality, Bartels acknowledges. But, he goes on to say, "It certainly seems fair — and perhaps even useful — to hold political parties accountable for the profound impact of their policies on the way those structural changes shape the economic fortunes of wealthy, middle-class and poor American families."

Dan Balz is national political correspondent for The Washington Post. A version of this review appeared first on The Post's blog "The Trail."

Reviewed by Dan Balz, Washington Post Book World (Copyright 2006 Washington Post Book World Service/Washington Post Writers Group)
(hide most of this review)

Many Americans know that there are characteristic policy differences between the [Republican and Democratic] parties. But few are aware of two important facts about the post-World War II era, both of which are brilliantly delineated in a new book, , by Larry M. Bartels, a professor of political science at Princeton. Understanding them might help voters see what could be at stake, economically speaking, in November.

is the sort of book to which every political scientist should aspire--it is methodologically rigorous, conceptually serious, and above all, it addresses urgent concerns of our fellow citizens. As Bartels shows, much of what we think we know about the politics of economic inequality is dead wrong. Bartels's perplexing and often unexpected discoveries should help refocus the gathering public debate about inequality and what to do about it.

completes the story of why America's wealthy have become superrich. As Larry Bartels, one of the nation's top political scientists, convincingly demonstrates, the rich get richer when the Republicans are in power and when the less affluent fail to vote. This book is essential reading for anyone who wants answers to why so many of America's working- and middle-class families are struggling to get by.

This is a fantastic book, a real tour de force. It is a hugely important study of increasing economic inequality in America and the failure of the political system to mitigate its effects on poor citizens. It is the best work that has been done on the political economy of income inequality.

[A] provocative new book by Princeton professor Larry M. Bartels, one of the country's leading political scientists. One of Bartels's most intriguing conclusions is that the political timing of economic growth has influenced voters. Republican presidents...have often generated significant economic growth rates in presidential election years, while Democratic presidents have not.

Larry M. Bartels is the Donald E. Stokes Professor of Public and International Affairs and director of the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics at Princeton University.

Preface ix

Chapter 1. The New Gilded Age 1

Escalating Economic Inequality 6

Interpreting Inequality 13

Economic Inequality as a Po litical Issue 19

Inequality and American Democracy 23

Chapter 2. The Partisan Political Economy 29

Partisan Patterns of Income Growth 31

A Partisan Coincidence? 34

Partisan Differences in Macroeconomic Policy 42

Macroeconomic Per for mance and Income Growth 47

Partisan Policies and Post- Tax Income Growth 54

Democrats, Republicans, and the Rise of In equality 61

Chapter 3. Class Politics and Partisan Change 64

In Search of the Working Class 66

Has the White Working Class Abandoned the Democratic Party? 72

Have Working- Class Whites Become More Conservative? 78

Do "Moral Values" Trump Economics? 83

Are Religious Voters Distracted from Economic Issues? 90

Class Politics, Alive and Well 93

Chapter 4. Partisan Biases in Economic Accountability 98

Myopic Voters 99

The Political Timing of Income Growth 104

Class Biases in Economic Voting 110

The Wealthy Give Something Back: Partisan Biases in Campaign Spending 116

Political Consequences of Biased Accountability 120

Chapter 5. Do Americans Care about In equality? 127

Egalitarian Values 130

Rich and Poor 136

Perceptions of Inequality 143

Facts and Values in the Realm of In equality 148

Chapter 6. Homer Gets a Tax Cut 162

The Bush Tax Cuts 164

Public Support for the Tax Cuts 170

Unenlightened Self- Interest 176

The Impact of Political Information 181

Chump Change 186

Into the Sunset 193

Chapter 7. The Strange Appeal of Estate Tax Repeal 197

Public Support for Estate Tax Repeal 198

Is Public Support for Repeal a Product of Misinformation? 205

Did Interest Groups Manufacture Public Antipathy to the Estate Tax? 214

Elite Ideology and the Politics of Estate Tax Repeal 217

Chapter 8. The Eroding Minimum Wage 223

The Economic Effects of the Minimum Wage 227

Public Support for the Minimum Wage 229

The Politics of Inaction 232

Democrats, Unions, and the Eroding Minimum Wage 239

The Earned Income Tax Credit 246

Reversing the Tide 247

Chapter 9. Economic Inequality and Po litical Representation 252

Ideological Representation 254

Unequal Responsiveness 257

Unequal Responsiveness on Social Issues: The Case of Abortion 265

Partisan Differences in Repre sen ta tion 267

Why Are the Poor Unrepresented? 275

10. Unequal Democracy 283

Who Governs? 285

Partisan Politics and the "Have- Nots" 288

Political Obstacles to Economic Equality 294

The City of Utmost Necessity 298

Selected References 305

Index 317