Legislative Deferrals

United States judges are criticized for making law when they should be following the laws made by elected officials. This book argues that much of the blame for judicial policymaking lies with elected officials. Legislators sometimes deliberately allow judges to make policy decisions because they want to avoid blame for making difficult choices. To demonstrate the importance of legislative deference, this study reexamines dramatic confrontations between Congress and the Supreme Court over labor policy in the early twentieth century.

This book argues for a fundamental shift in the way scholars think about judicial policymaking.

Acknowledgements; Preface; 1. Rethinking judicial policy making in a separation of powers system; 2. False victories: labor, congress, and the courts, 1898-1935; 3. 'As harmless as an infant': the Erdman Act in Congress and the courts; 4. Killing with kindness: legislative ambiguity, judicial policy making, and the Clayton Act; 5. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, for once: learning what to learn from the past; 6. Legislative deferrals and judicial policy making in the administrative state: a brief look at the Wagner Act; 7. Conclusion; Reference list; References; Index.