No Words Wasted Sale

Special Offers see all

Enter to WIN a $100 Credit

Subscribe to
for a chance to win.
Privacy Policy

Visit our stores

    Recently Viewed clear list

    Original Essays | December 8, 2014

    Marina Warner: IMG How Is Fantasy Different from Fairy Tale?

    Fairy tale is a country of the mind where there are many inhabitants stretching back into deep time, and we're like people before Babel, we speak a... Continue »

Qualifying orders ship free.
New Hardcover
Ships in 1 to 3 days
Add to Wishlist
available for shipping or prepaid pickup only
Available for In-store Pickup
in 7 to 12 days
Qty Store Section
1 Remote Warehouse Philosophy- Aesthetics

The Value of Living Well


The Value of Living Well Cover


Synopses & Reviews

Publisher Comments:

Since the middle of the twentieth century, virtue ethics has enriched the range of philosophical approaches to normative ethics, often drawing on the work of the ancient Greeks, who offered accounts of the virtues that have become part of contemporary philosophical ethics. But these virtue ethical theories were situated within a more general picture of human practical rationality, one which maintained that to understand virtue we must appeal to what would make our lives go well. This feature of ethical theorizing has not become part of philosophical ethics, although the virtue theories dependent upon it have.

This book is an attempt to bring eudaimonism into dialogue with contemporary philosophical work in ethical theory. It does not attempt to replicate the many contributions to normative ethics, in particular to thinking about the virtues. Instead, it attempts to contribute to metaethics — to thinking about what we are doing when we think about normative ethics. In particular, it attempts to contribute to contemporary philosophical debate on the nature of what is good for us, on what we have most reason to do, on what facts about both those ideas consist in, on the nature of values and value facts, and the nature of the reasons for respect for others we might have. Its aim is to mark off space in these debates where a way of thinking about ourselves and our agential, practical, natures as the ancients did can enrich our thinking about those deep and important questions. In this way the book makes a case for what we might call Virtue Eudaimonism.

About the Author

Mark LeBar is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Ohio University.

Table of Contents


Part One

I. Aristotle on Ends

I.1 Human life and agency

I.2 Ends

I.2.1 Ends as constraints

I.2.2 Ends, reasons, and "for the sake of which"

I.3 The Aristotelian framework

I.4 Unhelpful friends

I.5 Scanlon

II. Challenges to the Structure

II.1 No Ultimate End

II.2 Long-chains views

II.3 The looping model

II.4 The real challenge to the Aristotelian framework

II.5 Pseudo pluralism

II.6 Political pluralism

II.7 Telic pluralism

II.8 What the failure of telic pluralism teaches us

II.9 Relative monism

III. Living Well

III.1 Ancient argument about our Ultimate End

III.2 Begin with agency

III.2.1 Subordinating patiency

III.3 First nature

III.4 Second nature

III.5 The VE proposal

IV. Succeeding as Rational and Social Animals

IV.1 The contribution of rationality

IV.1.1 End-setting

IV.1.2 Judgment in action

IV.1.3 Training the passions

IV.2 Sociality

IV.2.1 Sociality and shared ends

IV.2.2 Caring for others

IV.2.3 The agent-relativity of welfare and care

IV.2.4 Living well in community

IV.3 Individual difference

IV.4 Autonomy

IV.5 Objections

IV.5.1 Misconceptions

IV.5.2 Virtue's commitments

Part Two

V. Constructivism

V.1 Motivation for the approach

V.2 Taxonomy: Constructivism and realism

V.3 Recognitionalism: Evidence for and against

V.3.1 Rational recognition

V.3.2 Reversal of values and conditional value

V.3.2.1 RV and CV in Plato

V.3.2.2 RV and CV in the Stoics and Aristotle

V.3.2.3 Constructivism in Aristotle: the Doctrine of the Mean

V.3.3 VR reconsidered

V.3.4 The constructed value of unconditional goods

V.4 Practical rationality, agency and activity

V.4.1 Background: realism

V.4.2 Action guidance

V.4.3 The failure of recognitionalism

V.4.4 Naturalism

V.5 Particularism and recognitionalism

VI. General and Particular

VI.1 The basic argument

VI.2 The problem in Kant

VI.2.1 The problem in Korsgaard

VI.2.2 The problem in Herman

VI.2.3 The problem in O'Neill

VI.3 The problem for generalist Constructivism

VI.4 Recognitionalist Particularism

VII. Fitting Judgment

VII.1 First-person, third-person

VII.1.1 Case in point

VII.2 Constructivism particularism — an overview

VII.3 Conditions of judgment

VII.4 Fittingness

VII.4.1 The fitting in Aristotle

VII.4.2 The fitting in Samuel Clarke

VII.4.3 The fitting in later theorists

VII.5 Fittingness as a normative standard for judgment

VII.5.1 The fittingness relation

VII.5.2 What is fitted to conditions

VII.5.3 Fittingness, the good life, and comparability

VII.5.4 Examples

VIII. Critical Assessment

VIII.1 Evaluation, supervenience, and justification

VIII.1.1 The nature of supervenience in detail

VIII.1.2 Supervenience — explanation

VIII.1.3 Supervenience — application

VIII.2 Publicity

VIII.3 The relation between standpoints

VIII.4 Objectivity and subjectivity

Part Three

IX. Response--Dependent Value

IX.1 Reasons, ends, and value

IX.2 Early response--dependence accounts

IX.2.1 McDowell

IX.2.2 Wiggins

IX.3 Value: Concept vs. Property

IX.4 Response-dependent value

IX.4.1 Responses

IX.4.2 Subjects

IX.4.3 Conditions

X. Objections to Response-Dependent Value

X.1 Subjects of the value relation

X.2 Response--dependent value: backdrop for the problem

X.3 Response--dependent value: the problem motivated

X.4 Floating reference: a cautionary note

X.5 Relativism

XI. Other issues

XI.1 The circularity

XI.2 Cuneo on practical wisdom

XI. 3 Hussain and Shah's dilemma

XI.4 Euthyphro dilemmas

XI.4.1 Shafer-Landau's dilemma

XI.4.2 Timmons' dilemma

XI.5 Timmons on moral symmetry

XI.6 Moral psychology

XII. Respect for Others

XII.1 Expressions of the target idea

XII.2 The problem in a cartoon

XII.3 First step at solution

XII.3.1 Constructing reasons for respect

XII.3.2 Respect and rights

XII.3.3 VE's analysis of claims

XII.3.4 VE's analysis of other rights

XII.3.5 Respect and living well

XII.3.6 THe extent of respect

XII.3.7 Two Kantian notes

XII.4 Revisiting the concern

XII.4.1 Wrong Attitudes

XII.4.2 The two-level structure

XII.4.3 Fit with ordinary practice

Product Details

Lebar, Mark
Oxford University Press, USA
LeBar, Mark
Ethics & Moral Philosophy
PHILOSOPHY / Ethics & Moral Philosophy
Publication Date:
6.4 x 9.4 x 1.5 in 1.4 lb

Related Subjects

Humanities » Philosophy » Aesthetics
Humanities » Philosophy » Ethics
Humanities » Philosophy » General
Sports and Outdoors » Sports and Fitness » Baseball » General

The Value of Living Well New Hardcover
0 stars - 0 reviews
$90.25 In Stock
Product details 384 pages Oxford University Press, USA - English 9780199931118 Reviews:
  • back to top


Powell's City of Books is an independent bookstore in Portland, Oregon, that fills a whole city block with more than a million new, used, and out of print books. Shop those shelves — plus literally millions more books, DVDs, and gifts — here at