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The White House and the Middle Eastfrom the Cold War to the War on Terror
The Middle East is the beginning and the end of U.S. foreign policy: events there influence our alliances, make or break presidencies, govern the price of oil, and draw us into war. But it was not always soand as Patrick Tyler shows in this thrilling chronicle of American misadventures in the region, the story of American presidents dealings there is one of mixed motives, skulduggery, deceit, and outright foolishness, as well as of policymaking and diplomacy.
Tyler draws on newly opened presidential archives to dramatize the approach to the Middle East across U.S. presidencies from Eisenhower to George W. Bush. He takes us into the Oval Office and shows how our leaders made momentous decisions; at the same time, the sweep of this narrativefrom the Suez crisis to the Iran hostage crisis to George W. Bushs catastrophe in Iraqlets us see the big picture as never before. Tyler tells a story of presidents being drawn into the affairs of the region against their will, being kept in the dark by local potentates, being led astray by grasping subordinates, and making decisions about the internal affairs of countries they hardly understand. Above all, he shows how each president has managed to undo the policies of his predecessor, often fomenting both anger against America on the streets of the region and confusion at home.
A World of Trouble is the Middle East book we need now: compulsively readable, free of cant and ideology, and rich in insight about the very human challenges a new president will face as he or she tries to restore Americas standing in the region.
Patrick Tyler has reported extensively from both the Middle East and Washington for The New York Times and The Washington Post. A Texan, he lives in Washington, D.C.
The Middle East is the beginning and the end of U.S. foreign policy: events there influence our alliances, make or break presidencies, govern the price of oil, and draw us into war. But it was not always soand as Patrick Tyler shows in this thrilling chronicle of American misadventures in the region, the story of American presidents dealings there is one of mixed motives, skulduggery, deceit, and outright foolishness, as well as of policymaking and diplomacy.
Tyler draws on newly opened presidential archives to dramatize the approach to the Middle East across U.S. presidencies from Eisenhower to George W. Bush. He takes us into the Oval Office and shows how our leaders made momentous decisions; at the same time, the sweep of this narrativefrom the Suez crisis to the Iran hostage crisis to George W. Bushs catastrophe in Iraqlets us see the big picture as never before. Tyler tells a story of presidents being drawn into the affairs of the region against their will, being kept in the dark by local potentates, being led astray by grasping subordinates, and making decisions about the internal affairs of countries they hardly understand. Above all, he shows how each president has managed to undo the policies of his predecessor, often fomenting both anger against America on the streets of the region and confusion at home.
A World of Trouble is the story of the White House and the Middle Eastfrom the Cold War to the War on Terror. It is the Middle East book we need now: compulsively readable, free of cant and ideology, and rich in insight about the very human challenges a new president will face as he or she tries to restore Americas standing in the region.
"An authoritative, richly detailed account of American policy in the Middle East . . . [Tyler] writes vividly, allowing the reader access to White House meetings, huddles in the corridors of power, seats at international summits."Adam LeBor, The New York Times
"An authoritative, richly detailed account of American policy in the Middle East . . . [Tyler] writes vividly, allowing the reader access to White House meetings, huddles in the corridors of power, seats at international summits."Adam LeBor, The New York Times
"Patrick Tyler . . . has written an engaging but idiosyncratic account of U.S. interactions with the Middle East from 1956 onward."Steven Simon, The Washington Post
"If you are going to read just one book about US policy toward the Middle East, Patrick Tyler's new tome should not be it. But if you read about it regularly, out of fascination with its history and religious significance or fear of its terrorists and oilmen, A World of Trouble ought to be on your list. Tyler starts out with a near-overdose of opinions . . . But before this becomes fatal Tyler reverts from policy wonk to what he really isa fine, deep newspaper reporter. Tyler documents not the interest of Israel but the cost in treasure and blood that the United States and the Middle East peoples have paid during decades without a coherent US policy in the region. He shows vividly the damage done by Israeli and Arab leaders alike in persistently bringing too little, too late, to the peace process."Charles A. Radin, The Boston Globe
"In the rush to get books on to the president's bedside table, Tyler's account of how Obama's predecessors and their advisers not only missed their chances but made things worse by an increasing partiality for Israel, a vendetta with Iran and a bungled invasion of Iraq deserves to be on the top of the pile. It is an anthology of cautionary tales for a new presidenta compendium of how not to do it, and, if only obliquely, a guide to how to do better in the future. If Obama ends his first term without registering some considerable success in the Middle East, the last chance for a moderate order in that region may pass. It falls to him, in other words, to turn round the long record of American failure. Success may in many areas come from doing less, from more modest aims, and from retreating from the attempt to control the affairs of others. But if more modesty is the general prescription, the exception is the Israeli-Palestinian impasse, where both sides need American mediation, and where one side, Israel, needs to face the reality that it cannot indefinitely dominate its neighbours by drawing on American weaponry and resources. The great virtue of Tyler's book is that it is so relentlessly personal. It may be criticised by some for the limited attention it pays to underlying causes, such as America's determination to secure oil resources and the constraints of the cold war, or to cultural factors, such as the west's early infatuation with Israel's military successes, and, more recently, the Christian right's beliefs about the end of the world. But Tyler is a reporter, not an academic. He is interested in momentsmoments when confused and angry leaders and their counsellors swear at one another, weep, get drunk, or tell outrageous lies . . . The book is studded with such choice anecdotes, some of them the product of Tyler's research into recently declassified material, some of them culled from his reporting over the years in the Middle East for the Washington Post and the New York Times. Many originate with Prince Bandar bin Sultan of Saudi Arabia, who has clearly been a close contact for Tyler. If there are no massive revelations, there is a lot of vivid and sometimes astounding new detail
Review:
"In this epic, remarkably readable history of U.S. involvement in the Middle East from Eisenhower to Bush II, Washington Post reporter Tyler uses an up-close, journalistic style to depict the power struggles and compromises that have defined the past half-century. Tyler focuses on key turning points in U.S. — Middle East relations and documents the conversations and real-time decision-making processes of the presidents, cabinet members and other key figures. Readers are treated to an intimate view of Eisenhower's careful, steady diplomacy during the Suez crisis, Kissinger's egocentric and fateful decision to fully arm Israel in the October war of 1973 while Nixon struggled through the Watergate scandal, and the tangled web of communication and intentional deceit during the Reagan administration that led to the Iran-Contra scandal. Tyler makes the issues and relationships clear without resorting to oversimplification or ideological grandstanding, and his journalistic instincts steer him toward direct quotation and telling anecdotes rather than generalization. Readers in the market for an examination of how leadership has embroiled the U.S. in the Middle East are well-advised to consult this riveting text." Publishers Weekly (Copyright Reed Business Information, Inc.)
Review:
Patrick Tyler, a former foreign correspondent for the New York Times and The Washington Post, has written an engaging but idiosyncratic account of U.S. interactions with the Middle East from 1956 onward. He sums up this period as "a half century of costly miscalculations in the Middle East" and writes that it is "nearly impossible to discern any overarching approach to the region such as the one that... Washington Post Book Review (read the entire Washington Post review) guided U.S. policy through the cold war." Indeed, he says, "what stands out is the absence of consistency from one president to the next." Many people, even many veteran U.S. diplomats, are likely to agree with this verdict. In 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, echoing George W. Bush, maintained that U.S. policy toward the region was a 60-year record of failure because the United States had mistakenly pursued stability at the expense of freedom. The Bush administration acted on this diagnosis and jettisoned stability — without, unfortunately, fostering freedom. Critics of Washington's Middle East policy tend to fall into distinct camps. Those on the left blame the United States for supporting authoritarian regimes. Neoconservatives point a finger at feckless and often malign leaders in Arab countries. Neorealists argue that Israel has hijacked U.S. policy and redirected it against Israel's adversaries, to the detriment of American interests. Tyler seems to occupy all three positions. Let's take them one at a time. It is true that Washington has often treated the Mideast as a playing field in global conflicts. Until 1989, the United States and the Soviet Union cultivated client states and strove to ensure that their proteges were generously funded and well armed. The United States embraced Israel, Jordan, the conservative monarchies of the Persian Gulf and, until 1979, Iran. By the early 1970s, after Anwar Sadat threw 50,000 Soviet advisers out of his country, Egypt joined the list of U.S. dependencies. After 1980 and the eruption of Iran's Islamic revolution, Iraq was taken on board. Washington's worries about Soviet intentions were understandable. We now know, for example, that the Soviets had contingency plans to invade Iran, take the Khuzestan oil fields and perhaps penetrate the Arabian Peninsula. Still, Tyler is right to suggest that the superpower rivalry obscured a clear view of the Middle East. Both the United States and the USSR missed opportunities to intervene constructively and to stave off conflict in 1967 and 1973. In the 1990s, with the disappearance of the Soviets and emergence of Hezbollah, Hamas and al-Qaeda, battling Islamist extremism replaced the Cold War as the organizing principle for U.S. action. But, as in the previous epoch, extravagant mistakes were made: The United States invaded Iraq and botched the occupation while allowing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to fester. At the same time, the people of the Mideast have been cursed with leaders who rule without governing. For all the blunders of successive U.S. administrations, one wonders how much better they could have done, given the corruption and oppressiveness of many Middle Eastern regimes. Tyler points to these problems but tends to attribute bad outcomes to Washington's mistakes. The idea that Israel has led the United States into successive calamities is also key to Tyler's account. In his retelling of the 1967 war, he portrays the Israeli military as opportunistically plotting a war of conquest, as though Egypt's threatening rhetoric and its closure of the Tiran Strait to Israeli shipping were merely theater. Central to this interpretation is the visit to Washington of an Israeli intelligence official, Meir Amit, who was sent to assess Washington's willingness to muster an international flotilla to reopen the strategic waterway. Tyler argues that Amit falsely reported to the Israeli Cabinet that the United States was doing little, because he wanted to push Israel over the precipice to war. But, in fact, nothing much was going on, partly because the international community was not interested and partly because, as Secretary of State Dean Rusk said, "the Joint Staff has a bad case of (Gulf of) Tonkinitis." Amit's assessment was fundamentally correct, and Tyler fails to note that Amit tried unsuccessfully to persuade Israeli leaders to postpone an attack for yet another week, just to give Washington more time to intervene. Tyler also depicts Soviet behavior in the run-up to the war as sober and constructive, when it was anything but. As Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez explained last year in "Foxbats Over Dimona," the crisis was heightened considerably by Soviet air force flights over Israel's nuclear reactor. Tyler's chapter on the 1973 war also seems off-kilter. Here the villain is Henry Kissinger, whose allegedly strong sense of Jewish identity and emotional commitment to Zionism supposedly led him to press for a resupply of Israeli forces. This in turn empowered Israel to launch new wars of conquest, according to Tyler, such as the 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Tyler seems to misunderstand Kissinger's objectives, which were to ensure that the Soviet-backed combatants would be clearly defeated — but not destroyed — by America's ally and to get a modicum of leverage over Israel after the shooting stopped. Kissinger was a consummate realist and highly unlikely to let sentiment undermine strategy. And as Jeremy Suri showed in his recent "Henry Kissinger and the American Century," Kissinger's attitude toward his Jewish heritage was complicated and apparently untouched by the Zionist dream. His post-Holocaust concern for Israel does not seem to have been any greater than that of his non-Jewish colleagues. Tyler concludes that Kissinger "found it impossible to advocate a course in the Middle East that ran counter to the prevailing consensus of Israel's leaders, even to the detriment of U.S. national interest." This goes well beyond an accusation of dual loyalty. Once he gets to Iran-Contra and the Gulf Wars, Tyler is on firmer and somewhat less eccentric ground. The narrative is also better informed, no doubt because he was a witness to some of the more recent events and his access to sources was direct. Some of his anecdotes are also good, because they illustrate larger themes of cluelessness and frustration: President Ronald Reagan and his national security adviser planning to rope Saudi Arabia's King Fahd into shaking the hand of Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres at a banquet; President Bill Clinton fretting about the possibility that Yasser Arafat might hug him in front of the media; a thoroughly soused CIA director George Tenet in the Saudi Arabian ambassador's swimming pool, railing about being set up by the Bush White House as the fall guy on Iraq. (Tenet denies that the incident took place.) At the end, I was left thinking that, for all the frenetic inconsistency of U.S. policy toward the region, over the past 40 years Washington has steadily pursued two goals that were widely thought to be mutually exclusive: the security of Persian Gulf energy producers and the security of Israel. Each generated its own problems. Our commitment to the Saudis contributed to the rise of al-Qaeda, while support for Israel antagonized many Arabs and provided the rationale for an OPEC oil price hike (though that probably would have happened anyway). As a new administration takes office, there is no external threat to Gulf oil, and the United States has robust military bases on the Arabian Peninsula. Israel, though plagued by perennially weak political leadership and locked in a deadly embrace with the Palestinians, is militarily unassailable. Not everyone would agree that these two, overarching goals were the right ones. But they were the ones that Washington set for itself, and for all the meandering oafishness demonstrated by U.S. policymakers over the years, capped by the Bush administration's manic failures — which Tyler describes so well — we have largely achieved them. The Obama administration will likely adopt them, too. Steven Simon is Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow in Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Reviewed by Steven Simon, Washington Post Book World (Copyright 2006 Washington Post Book World Service/Washington Post Writers Group)
(hide most of this review)
Synopsis:
Tyler draws on newly opened presidential archives to dramatize the approach to the Middle East across U.S. presidencies from Eisenhower to George W. Bush. The author shows how each president has managed to undo the policies of his predecessor, often fomenting anger against America.
Synopsis:
The White House and the Middle East—from the Cold War to the War on Terror
The Middle East is the beginning and the end of U.S. foreign policy: events there influence our alliances, make or break presidencies, govern the price of oil, and draw us into war. But it was not always so—and as Patrick Tyler shows in this thrilling chronicle of American misadventures in the region, the story of American presidents dealings there is one of mixed motives, skulduggery, deceit, and outright foolishness, as well as of policymaking and diplomacy.
Tyler draws on newly opened presidential archives to dramatize the approach to the Middle East across U.S. presidencies from Eisenhower to George W. Bush. He takes us into the Oval Office and shows how our leaders made momentous decisions; at the same time, the sweep of this narrative—from the Suez crisis to the Iran hostage crisis to George W. Bushs catastrophe in Iraq—lets us see the big picture as never before. Tyler tells a story of presidents being drawn into the affairs of the region against their will, being kept in the dark by local potentates, being led astray by grasping subordinates, and making decisions about the internal affairs of countries they hardly understand. Above all, he shows how each president has managed to undo the policies of his predecessor, often fomenting both anger against America on the streets of the region and confusion at home.
A World of Trouble is the Middle East book we need now: compulsively readable, free of cant and ideology, and rich in insight about the very human challenges a new president will face as he or she tries to restore Americas standing in the region.
PATRICK TYLER has reported extensively from both the Middle East and Washington for The New York Times and The Washington Post. A Texan, he lives in Washington, D.C.
"Publishers Weekly Review"
by Publishers Weekly,
"In this epic, remarkably readable history of U.S. involvement in the Middle East from Eisenhower to Bush II, Washington Post reporter Tyler uses an up-close, journalistic style to depict the power struggles and compromises that have defined the past half-century. Tyler focuses on key turning points in U.S. — Middle East relations and documents the conversations and real-time decision-making processes of the presidents, cabinet members and other key figures. Readers are treated to an intimate view of Eisenhower's careful, steady diplomacy during the Suez crisis, Kissinger's egocentric and fateful decision to fully arm Israel in the October war of 1973 while Nixon struggled through the Watergate scandal, and the tangled web of communication and intentional deceit during the Reagan administration that led to the Iran-Contra scandal. Tyler makes the issues and relationships clear without resorting to oversimplification or ideological grandstanding, and his journalistic instincts steer him toward direct quotation and telling anecdotes rather than generalization. Readers in the market for an examination of how leadership has embroiled the U.S. in the Middle East are well-advised to consult this riveting text." Publishers Weekly (Copyright Reed Business Information, Inc.)
"Synopsis"
by Ingram,
Tyler draws on newly opened presidential archives to dramatize the approach to the Middle East across U.S. presidencies from Eisenhower to George W. Bush. The author shows how each president has managed to undo the policies of his predecessor, often fomenting anger against America.
"Synopsis"
by Netread,
The White House and the Middle East—from the Cold War to the War on Terror
The Middle East is the beginning and the end of U.S. foreign policy: events there influence our alliances, make or break presidencies, govern the price of oil, and draw us into war. But it was not always so—and as Patrick Tyler shows in this thrilling chronicle of American misadventures in the region, the story of American presidents dealings there is one of mixed motives, skulduggery, deceit, and outright foolishness, as well as of policymaking and diplomacy.
Tyler draws on newly opened presidential archives to dramatize the approach to the Middle East across U.S. presidencies from Eisenhower to George W. Bush. He takes us into the Oval Office and shows how our leaders made momentous decisions; at the same time, the sweep of this narrative—from the Suez crisis to the Iran hostage crisis to George W. Bushs catastrophe in Iraq—lets us see the big picture as never before. Tyler tells a story of presidents being drawn into the affairs of the region against their will, being kept in the dark by local potentates, being led astray by grasping subordinates, and making decisions about the internal affairs of countries they hardly understand. Above all, he shows how each president has managed to undo the policies of his predecessor, often fomenting both anger against America on the streets of the region and confusion at home.
A World of Trouble is the Middle East book we need now: compulsively readable, free of cant and ideology, and rich in insight about the very human challenges a new president will face as he or she tries to restore Americas standing in the region.
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