Theory of Moral Sentiments (76 Edition)

The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith's first and in his own mind most important work, outlines his view of proper conduct and the institutions and sentiments that make men virtuous. Here he develops his doctrine of the impartial spectator, whose hypothetical disinterested judgment we must use to distinguish right from wrong in any given situation. We by nature pursue our self-interest, according to Smith. This makes independence or self-command an instinctive good and neutral rules as difficult to craft as they are necessary. But society is not held together merely by neutral rules; it is held together by sympathy. Smith argues that we naturally share the emotions and to a certain extent the physical sensations we witness in others. Sharing the sensations of our fellows, we seek to maximize their pleasures and minimize their pains so that we may share in their joys and enjoy their expressions of affection and approval.

OF the PROPRIETY of ACTION

SECTION I

Of the SENSE of PROPRIETY p. 9

CHAP. I Of SYMPATHY 9

CHAP. I I Of the Pleasure of mutual Sympathy 13

CHAP. III Of the manner in which we judge of the propriety or impropriety of the Affections of other Men, by their concord or dissonance with our own 16

CHAP. IV The same subject continued 19

CHAP.V Of the amiable and respectable virtues 23 SECTION II

Of the Degrees of the different Passions which are consistent with Propriety 27

CHAP. I Of the Passions which take their origin from the body 27

CHAP. II Of those Passions which take their origin from a particular turn or habit of the Imagination 31

CHAP. III Of the unsocial Passions 34

CHAP. IV Of the social Passions 38

CHAP. V Of the selfish Passions 40 SECTION III

Of the Effects of Prosperity and Adversity upon the Judgment of Mankind with regard to the Propriety of Action; and why it is more easy to obtain their Approbation in the one state than in the other 43

CHAP. I That though our sympathy with sorrow is generally a more lively sensation than our sympathy with joy, it commonly falls much more short of the violence of what is naturally felt by the person principally concerned 43

CHAP. II Of the origin of Ambition, and of the distinction of Ranks 50

CHAP. III Of the corruption of our moral sentiments, which is occasioned by this disposition to admire the rich and the great, and to despise or neglect persons of poor and mean condition 61 PART II

Of MERIT and DEMERIT; or of the Objects of REWARD and PUNISHMENT SECTION I

Of the SENSE of MERIT and DEMERIT 67

CHAP. I That whatever appears to be the proper object of gratitude appear to deserve reward; and that, in the same manner, whatever appears to be the proper object of resentment, appears to deserve punishment 67

CHAP. II Of the proper objects of gratitude and resentment 69

CHAP. III That where there is no approbation of the conduct of the person who confers the benefit, there is little sympathy with the gratitude of him who receives it: and that, on the contrary, where there is no disapprobation of the motives of the person who does the mischief, there is no sort of sympathy with the resentment of him who suffers it 71

CHAP. IV Recapitulation of the foregoing chapters 73

CHAP. V The analysis of the sense of Merit and Demerit 74 SECTION II

Of Justice and Beneficence 78

CHAP. I Comparison of those two virtues 78

CHAP. II Of the sense of Justice, of Remorse, and of the consciousness of Merit 82

CHAP. III Of the utility of this constitution of Nature 85 SECTION III

Of the Influence of Fortune upon the Sentiments of Mankind, with regard to the Merit or Demerit of Actions 92

CHAP. I Of the causes of this Influence of Fortune 94

CHAP. II Of the extent of this Influence of Fortune 97

CHAP. III Of the final cause of this Irregularity of Sentiments 104 PART III

Of the Foundation of our Judgments concerning our own Sentiments and Conduct, and of the Sense of Duty

CHAP. I Of the Principle of Self-approbation and of Self-disapprobation 109

CHAP. II Of the love of Praise, and of that of Praise-worthiness; and of the dread of Blame, and of that of Blame-worthiness 113

CHAP. III Of the Influence and Authority of Conscience 134

CHAP. IV Of the Nature of Self-deceit, and of the Origin and Use of general Rules 156

CHAP. V Of the influence and authority of the general Rules of Morality, and that they are justly regarded as the Laws of the Deity 161

CHAP. VI In what cases the Sense of Duty ought to be the sole principle of our conduct; and in what cases it ought to concur with other motives 171 PART IV

Of the EFFECT of UTILITY upon the Sentiment of Approbation

CHAP. I Of the beauty which the appearance of UTILITY bestows upon all the productions of Art, and of the extensive influence of this species of Beauty 179

CHAP. II Of the beauty which the appearance of Utility bestows upon the characters and actions of men; and how far the perception of this beauty may be regarded as one of the original principles of approbation 187 PART V

Of the INFLUENCE of CUSTOM and FASHION upon the Sentiments of Moral Approbation and Disapprobation

CHAP. I Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon our notions of Beauty and Deformity 194

CHAP. II Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon Moral Sentiments 200 PART VI

Of the CHARACTER of VIRTUE

INTRODUCTION 212 SECTION I

Of the Character of the Individual, so far as it affects his own Happiness; or of Prudence 212 SECTION II

Of the Character of the Individual, so far as it can affect the Happiness of other People

INTRODUCTION 218

CHAP. I Of the Order in which Individuals are recommended by Nature to our Care and Attention 219

CHAP. II Of the Order in which Societies are by Nature recommended to our Beneficence 227

CHAP. III Of universal Benevolence 235 SECTION III

Of Self-command 237

CONCLUSION of the SIXTH PART 262 PART VII

Of SYSTEMS of MORAL PHILOSOPHY SECTION I

Of the Questions which ought to be examined in a Theory of Moral Sentiments 265 SECTION II

Of the different Accounts which have been given of the Nature of Virtue

INTRODUCTION 266

CHAP. I Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Propriety 267

CHAP. II Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Prudence 294

CHAP. III Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Benevolence 300

CHAP. IV Of licentious Systems 306 SECTION III

Of the different Systems which have been formed concerning the Principle of Approbation

INTRODUCTION 314

CHAP. I Of those Systems which deduce the Principle of Approbation from Self-love 315

CHAP. II Of those Systems which make Reason the Principle of Approbation 318

CHAP. III Of those Systems which make Sentiment the Principle of Approbation 321 SECTION IV

Of the Manner in which different Authors have treated of the practical Rules of Morality 327