The author of the groundbreaking New York Times bestseller The Pentagonas New Map brings us a remarkable analysis of the post-Bush world, and Americaas leadership role in it.

In civilian and military circles alike, The Pentagonas New Map became one of the most talked about books of 2004. aA combination of Tom Friedman on globalization and Carl von Clausewitz on war, it is] the red-hot book among the nationas admirals and generals, a wrote David Ignatius in The Washington Post. Barnettas second book, Blueprint for Action, demonstrated how to put the first bookas principles to work. Now, in Great Powers, Barnett delivers his most sweepinga and importantabook of all.

For eight years, the current administration has done much to disconnect or alienate America from the world, but the world has certainly not been standing still. Now, with a chance to start over, what do we do? Whereas the world going now, and how do we not only rejoin it but become a leader again in what has become the most profound reordering of the globe since the end of World War II?

In Great Powers, Barnett offers a tour de force analysis of the grand realignments that are both already here and coming up fast in the spheres of economics, diplomacy, defense, technology, security, the environment, and much more. The agreat powersa are no longer just the worldas major nation-states but the powerful forces, past, present, and future, moving with us and past us like a freight train. It is not a simple matter of a course correction but of a complete recalibration, and the opportunities it presents are far greater than the perils. Barnett gives us a fundamental understanding of both, showing us not only how the world is now but how it will be.

There are those writing now who say America is in decline . . . and we just have to deal with it. Barnett says no. Globalization as it exists today was built by Americaaand now itas time for America to shape and redefine what comes next. Great Powers shows us how. Bibliography. Notes. Index.

"Barnett (The Pentagon's New Map) offers a comprehensive catalogue of the failings of the Bush administration and a strategic roadmap for American foreign policy in this sweeping text. The author takes a broad approach to the contemporary political landscape, surveying U.S. history from the Revolution through the end of the Cold War and applying lessons from that history to the present. Drawing on a variety of secondary sources and his personal and professional experiences as a national security specialist and consultant, Barnett argues in favor of cooperation with rising powers such as China and India and continued movement in the direction of globalization; he distills his central thesis down to the contention that 'America must dramatically realign its own post-9/11 trajectory with that of the world at large.' Barnett writes in a conversational style. Despite the text's vast scope, it has a clear, straightforward structure, even featuring a glossary of key terms, and it provides an accessible and engaging foray into global grand strategy." Publishers Weekly (Copyright Reed Business Information, Inc.)

These are salad days for strategists.

To begin with, the challenges facing the United States are formidable: More than 180,000 troops deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea, an awkward rival in Russia, a rising competitor in China, a fractured Middle East peace process, a financial crash, and an economy that is cooling down just as the planet is... Washington Post Book Review (read the entire Washington Post review) heating up.

Furthermore, the country's most recent strategic doctrine — a shotgun marriage of freedom and force, attended by the bridesmaids of unilateralism, pre-emption and regime change — was tried under George W. Bush and found wanting.

Now Barack Obama sits in the Oval Office with unusually thick connections to the world beyond U.S. shores: He is linked to Africa through his ancestry, to the Middle East through his name, to Asia through his upbringing. He will be on the lookout for new global perspectives.

So this is a good time to be writing on how the United States should comport itself in the world. But expounding a grand strategy is hard. It requires a broad view, a deep understanding of history and a fluent writing style.

Thomas P.M. Barnett, a consultant to the Pentagon and private corporations, certainly has the requisite analytical breadth. He has a magpie's eye for shiny things, citing all the recent big-think books and opining on all manner of topics. His main argument, however, is that states fall into two groups: those that are integrating into the world economy (the "Functioning Core") and those that are not (the "Non-Integrated Gap"). At the core of the Core is the United States, "the source code for today's globalization." To achieve security and prosperity, he argues, the United States should "go slow on the politics (multiparty democracy) while getting our way on the economics (expanding world middle class)." This may involve further interventions, which would require the U.S. military to beef up what Barnett calls its "SysAdmin" capabilities (for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, counterinsurgency and the like) rather than its "Leviathan" force (warfighting capacity).

Barnett's breezy pronouncements are not wholly convincing, however. He largely ignores the historical roots of democracy promotion in U.S. foreign policy. He remains a supporter of the decision to invade Iraq, stating that "George W. Bush was right to lay a Big Bang on the Middle East's calcified political landscape." His reasoning is that the invasion locked the United States "into real, long-term ownership of strategic security in the Gulf" and transformed our interest in obtaining Mideast oil into a broader "commitment to bodyguard globalization's ongoing transformation of those traditional societies." But the exact opposite is more likely true: The war has had a chilling effect on the U.S. use of force and ruined the public's appetite for foreign interventions.

Barnett is overly sanguine about the impossibility of great-power conflict and positively Pollyanna-ish about the prospects for great-power cooperation. He suggests, for example, that the United States should "lock in China as soon as possible as the land-power anchor of an East Asian NATO" so that "we can draw down our military in the region and better employ them in hotter spots around the world." I wonder how the Chinese feel about this? For that matter, how about Washington's old allies in Asia?

Some of these analytical sins could be forgiven if Barnett were a better stylist. But the book reads like a PowerPoint presentation, featuring self-help gobbledygook, frequent colloquialisms ("Who's your daddy now?") and wearying lists. We learn the "Seven Deadly Sins of Bush-Cheney"; embark on a "Twelve-Step Recovery Program for American Grand Strategy"; and recite "Barnett's 14 Points." Inevitably, the grand coalition that the United States is urged to engineer is dubbed a "team of rivals."

There are some interesting insights in "Great Powers," but this is not grand strategy we can believe in.

Michael Fullilove is director of the global issues program at the Lowy Institute in Australia and a visiting fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution.

Reviewed by Michael Fullilove, Washington Post Book World (Copyright 2006 Washington Post Book World Service/Washington Post Writers Group)
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