"Stephen Biddle's "Military Power" is one of the most important contributions to strategic studies in recent decades. Presenting a very powerful case for a very surprising argument on a very important question, it will be controversial in some quarters, but critics will be hard-pressed to refute the case."--Richard K. Betts, Columbia University, author of "Military Readiness"<P>"Fascinating, precisely written, indeed, brilliant, "Military Power" is among the most important books ever published on modern warfare. Stephen Biddle fundamentally rethinks the causes of victory and defeat in modern war and challenges almost the entire corpus of scholarship on assessing force capability and the role of offense and defense in determining war outcomes. Presenting his argument with power, balance, and subtlety, he synthesizes many partial historical explanations and provides a basis for understanding why so many 'rules of thumb' and other explanations are misleading. A landmark work."--Lynn Eden, Stanford University, author of "Whole World on Fire"<P>"Steve Biddle may be the best American defense analyst of his generation, and this book is quite possibly his career masterpiece to date. Few are as well qualified as Biddle to weave together vivid descriptions of the modern battlefield, clear explanations of historical lessons, a detailed understanding of defense technology, and a sophisticated use of military models and war games. Biddle does all these things, helping the reader understand modern warfare more than does any other book on the market. His argument about trends in warfare transcends the popular theory that a revolution in military affairs is now underway. He replaces this theory witha more convincing, more historical, and less technology-obsessed view of the modern battlefield."--Michael O'Hanlon, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution

Superlatives hardly do this book justice. It simultaneously makes major contributions in political science, military history, social science methodology, and contemporary policy debates. Stephen Biddle comprehensively and convincingly dismantles two of the most important literatures in international relations theory in the United States: realism and the offence-defense balance.

Stephen Biddle has written perhaps the best volume on the causes of battlefield victory and defeat in a generation. . . . . This is a seminal work on an issue of critical importance.

Stephen Biddle has written a worthy book on the never-ending debate over why land wars are won and lost. It contributes to the academic literature, and his policy judgments deserve attention. . . . It is well worth reading, owning, and remembering.

Stephen Biddle's is one of the most important contributions to strategic studies in recent decades. Presenting a very powerful case for a very surprising argument on a very important question, it will be controversial in some quarters, but critics will be hard-pressed to refute the case.

Steve Biddle may be the best American defense analyst of his generation, and this book is quite possibly his career masterpiece to date. Few are as well qualified as Biddle to weave together vivid descriptions of the modern battlefield, clear explanations of historical lessons, a detailed understanding of defense technology, and a sophisticated use of military models and war games. Biddle does all these things, helping the reader understand modern warfare more than does any other book on the market. His argument about trends in warfare transcends the popular theory that a revolution in military affairs is now underway. He replaces this theory with a more convincing, more historical, and less technology-obsessed view of the modern battlefield.

Stephen Biddle's deserves serious attention from military historians. makes a powerful argument that has redefined thinking within political science and policy circles on why armies win battles. . . . Biddle has produced an outstanding work that addresses a question central to historians, political scientists, and policy-makers.

Stephen Biddle is Senior Fellow in Defense Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. He has published extensively in defense policy and international relations, and he has held teaching and research positions in both academic political science and official defense policy analysis.

Preface ix

Abbreviations xiii

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction 1

CHAPTER TWO

A Literature Built on Weak Foundations 14

CHAPTER THREE

The Modern System 28

CHAPTER FOUR

The Modern System, Preponderance, and Changing Technology 52

CHAPTER FIVE

Operation MICHAEL-The Second Battle of the Somme, March 21-April 9, 1918 78

CHAPTER SIX

Operation GOODWOOD-July 18-20, 1944 108

CHAPTER SEVEN

Operation DESERT STORM-January 17-February 28, 1991 132

CHAPTER EIGHT

Statistical Tests 150

CHAPTER NINE

Experimental Tests 181

CHAPTER TEN

Conclusion 190

APPENDIX

A Formal Model of Capability 209

Notes 240

Index 325