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25 Remote Warehouse Politics- United States Foreign Policy

This title in other editions

Other titles in the Cambridge Studies in International Relations series:

Cambridge Studies in International Relations #65: The Sanctions Paradox

by

Cambridge Studies in International Relations #65: The Sanctions Paradox Cover

 

Synopses & Reviews

Synopsis:

Argues that, paradoxically, countries are likely to use sanctions under conditions where they will produce the feeblest results.

Synopsis:

The conventional wisdom is that economic sanctions do not work in international affairs. If so, why do countries wield them so often? Daniel Drezner argues that, paradoxically, countries will be most eager to use sanctions under conditions where they will produce the feeblest results. States anticipate frequent conflicts with adversaries, and are therefore more willing to use sanctions. However, precisely because they anticipate more conflicts, sanctioned states will not concede, despite the cost. Economic sanctions are thus far less likely to be effective between adversaries than between allies.

Description:

Includes bibliographical references (p. 322-335) and index.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction; Part I. Theory and Data: 2. A model of economic coercion; 3. Plausibility probes; 4. Statistical tests; Part II. Economic Coercion in the Former Soviet Union: 5. Russian power and preferences; 6. The extent of NIS concessions; 7. Evaluating the evidence; Part III. Choosing Between Carrots and Sticks: 8. Economic statecraft and nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula; 9. Conclusions, implications, speculations.

Product Details

ISBN:
9780521644150
Author:
Drezner, Daniel W.
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Author:
Daniel W., Drezner
Author:
Groom, A. J. R.
Author:
Grieco, Joseph
Author:
Biersteker, Thomas
Author:
Smith, Steve
Author:
Cerny, Phil
Author:
Brown, Chris
Location:
Cambridge England ;
Subject:
International Relations
Subject:
Economic Policy
Subject:
International economic relations
Subject:
Economic sanctions
Subject:
International Relations - General
Subject:
Public Policy - Economic Policy
Subject:
Politics-United States Foreign Policy
Edition Description:
Trade paper
Series:
Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Hardcover)
Series Volume:
8095.65
Publication Date:
20090431
Binding:
TRADE PAPER
Grade Level:
Professional and scholarly
Language:
English
Illustrations:
4 b/w illus. 1 map 37 tables
Pages:
364
Dimensions:
8.99x6.02x.88 in. 1.29 lbs.

Related Subjects

History and Social Science » Politics » General
History and Social Science » Politics » United States » Foreign Policy
Science and Mathematics » Materials Science » General

Cambridge Studies in International Relations #65: The Sanctions Paradox New Trade Paper
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Product details 364 pages Cambridge University Press - English 9780521644150 Reviews:
"Synopsis" by , Argues that, paradoxically, countries are likely to use sanctions under conditions where they will produce the feeblest results.
"Synopsis" by , The conventional wisdom is that economic sanctions do not work in international affairs. If so, why do countries wield them so often? Daniel Drezner argues that, paradoxically, countries will be most eager to use sanctions under conditions where they will produce the feeblest results. States anticipate frequent conflicts with adversaries, and are therefore more willing to use sanctions. However, precisely because they anticipate more conflicts, sanctioned states will not concede, despite the cost. Economic sanctions are thus far less likely to be effective between adversaries than between allies.
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