- STAFF PICKS
- GIFTS + GIFT CARDS
- SELL BOOKS
- FIND A STORE
Ships in 1 to 3 days
available for shipping or prepaid pickup only
Available for In-store Pickup
in 7 to 12 days
Other titles in the Kluwer International Series in Engineering & Computer Science series:
Legislative Term Limits: Public Choice Perspectivesby Bernard N. Grofman
Synopses & Reviews
In developing Legislative Term Limits, the editor has included material that has explicit and testable models about the expected consequences of term limits that reflect Public Choice perspectives. This book contains the best efforts of economists and political scientists to predict the consequences of legislative term limits.
Book News Annotation:
Political scientists and economists predict the consequences of legislative term limits at the state and national levels, not in order to influence the current debate but allow the next generation of scholars to evaluate the theories and methods of prediction. Excluding discussions of constitutionality, and focusing on Public Choice perspectives, they consider the impact on legislative behavior, electoral responsiveness, legislative turnover, and party balance; voter attitudes and the contemporary movement; and historical and comparative perspectives. Among the comparisons are with term limits for governors, in local governments, and in Costa Rica. A postscript discusses alternatives to term limits. Some of the 20 papers were presented at a May-June 1991 conference in Irvine, California; others have been previously published. No subject index.
Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)
Includes bibliographical references (p. -377) and incex.
Table of Contents
Introduction to the Term Limits Debate: Hypotheses in Search of Data; B. Grofman. I. Predicting the Impact of Term Limits on Legislator Behavior and Electoral Responsiveness. 1. The Varying Impact of Legislative Term Limits; B.E. Cain. 2. How Will Term Limits Affect Legislative Work? A. Glazer, M.P. Wattenberg. 3. Term Limits and Representation; L.R. Cohen, M.L. Spitzer. 4. The Impact of Term Limits on the California Legislature: An Interest Group Perspective; E.A. Capell. 5. Term Limits, Responsiveness and the Failures of Increased Competition; E.R. Gerber, A. Lupia. 6. Impact of Congressional Tenure Restriction on Spending; W.R. Reed, D.E. Schansberg. II. Predicting the Impact of Term Limits on Legislative Turnover and Party Balance. 7. For Whom the Bell Tolls: Term Limits and State Legislatures;G.F. Moncrief. 8. An Analysis of the Impact of Congressional Term Limits on Turnover and Party Balance; W.R. Reed, D.E. Schansberg. 9. Term Limitation in a Dynamic Model of Partisan Balance; J.B. Gilmour, P. Rothstein. 10. The Effect of Term Limits when Competition is Endogenized: A Preliminary Model; B. Grofman, N. Sutherland. III. Voter Attitudes and the Contemporary Movement for Legislative Term Limits. 11. An Analysis of Term Limitation Elections; K. Boeckelman, G. Corell. 12. Term Limits in Oklahoma, California and Colorado in 1990; J.D. Rausch Jr., G.W. Copeland. 13. Reconciling Voters' Behavior with Legislative Term Limits; A.R. Dick, J.R. Lott, Jr. 14. Term Limits as Political Redistribution; D. Friedman, D. Wittman. 15. Term Limits and Political Conflict; A. Tabarrok. IV. Term Limits in Historical and Comparative Perspective. 16. A History of Rotation in Office; M.P. Petracca. 17. Gubernatorial Term Limits and Term Lengths in Historical Perspective, 1790&endash;1990: Geographic Diffusion, Non-Separability, and the Ratchet Effect; B. Grofman, N. Sutherland. 18. The Experience with Municipal Term Limits in Orange County, California; M.P. Petracca, K. Moore O'Brien. 19. Term Limits and Local Governments in California; B.E. Cain. 20. Parties, Incentives, and Term Limits in Costa Rica; J. Carey. Postscript: Alternatives to Term Limits; C.J. Uhlaner. References. Author Index.
What Our Readers Are Saying