Synopses & Reviews
In the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, questions persisted about how theand#160;potential cataclysmand#160;had been allowed to develop. A subsequent congressional investigation focused on what came to be known as the andldquo;photo gapandrdquo;: five weeks during which intelligence-gathering flights over Cuba had been attenuated.
In Blind over Cuba, David M. Barrett and Max Holland challenge the popular perception of the Kennedy administrationandrsquo;s handling of the Soviet Unionandrsquo;s surreptitious deployment of missiles in the Western Hemisphere. Rather than epitomizing it as a masterpiece of crisis management by policy makers and the administration, Barrett and Holland make the case that the affair was, in fact, a close call stemming directly from decisions made in a climate of deep distrust between key administration officials and the intelligence community.
Because of White House and State Department fears of andldquo;another U-2 incidentandrdquo; (the infamous 1960 Soviet downing of an American U-2 spy plane), the CIA was not permitted to send surveillance aircraft on prolonged flights over Cuban airspace for many weeks, from late August through early October. Events proved that this was precisely the time when the Soviets were secretly deploying missiles in Cuba. When Director of Central Intelligence John McCone forcefully pointed out that this decision had led to a dangerous void in intelligence collection, the president authorized one U-2 flight directly over western Cubaandmdash;thereby averting disaster, as the surveillance detected the Soviet missiles shortly before they became operational.
The Kennedy administration recognizedand#160;that theirand#160;failure to gather intelligence was politically explosive, and their subsequent efforts to influence the perception of events form the focus for this study. Using recently declassified documents, secondary materials, and interviews with several key participants, Barrett and Holland weave a story of intra-agency conflict, suspicion, and discord that undermined intelligence-gathering, adversely affected internal postmortems conducted after the crisis peaked, and resulted in keeping Congress and the public in the dark about what really happened.
Fifty years after the crisis that brought the superpowers to the brink, Blind over Cuba: The Photo Gap and the Missile Crisisand#160;offers a new chapter in our understanding of that pivotal event, the tensions inside the US government during the cold war, and the obstacles Congress faces when conducting an investigation of the executive branch.
In Blind over Cuba, David M. Barrett and Max Holland challenge the popular perception of the Kennedy administrationandrsquo;s handling of the Soviet Unionandrsquo;s surreptitious deployment of missiles in the Western Hemisphere.
About the Author
DAVID M. BARRETT, a professor of political science at Villanova University, is the editor of Lyndon B. Johnsonandrsquo;s Vietnam Papers: A Documentary Collection (Texas AandM University Press, 1997) and the author of The CIA and Congress: The Untold Story from Truman to Kennedy (University Press of Kansas, 2005).MAX HOLLAND is the editor of Washington Decoded, an independent, online monthly magazine. He also serves on the editorial board of the International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence and is a contributing editor for Wilson Quarterly and The Nation. He previously served for five years as a research fellow at the University of Virginiaandrsquo;s Miller Center of Public Affairs.