Synopses & Reviews
Why do politicians sometimes make unpopular or contested policies that could damage their electoral prospects? This is the question Takayuki Sakamoto tries to answer. Political scientists have long claimed that political behavior can be explained as actors' self-interested goal-seeking behavior. By using the case-study of Japan, Sakamoto demonstrates that politicians sometimes show behavior that goes beyond the narrow confines of self-interest and that "policy legitimacy" is the factor that can preempt or override the forces of self-interest and therefore makes possible the implementation of contested policies.
Synopsis
Dissecting why politicians sometimes make unpopular policies that seem to sabotage their self-interest and electoral prospects, Sakamoto (political science, Nanzan U., Nagoya, Japan) hypothesizes policy legitimacy -- defined as a degree of support, acceptance, or tolerance accorded by relevant actors to a particular policy -- as a factor that can preempt self-interest. Tax and electoral reform in Japan from 1979-1994 serve as the author's test application of his thesis, and as the anchor of his discussion on the limits of electoral incentives theory and factors that facilitate or impede policy formation.
Description
Includes bibliographical references (p. 189-200) and index.
About the Author
Takayuki Sakamoto is Assistant Professor of Political Science with the Faculty of Law at Nanzan University, Japan.
Table of Contents
Part I: The Theoretical Framework * Introduction: Policy Legitimacy, Unpopular Legislation, and the Limits of Self-Interest * Policy Legitimacy as a Determinant of Policy Outputs *
Part II: Applications * The Politics of Consumption Tax * The Politics of a Consumption Tax Increase * The Politics of Electoral Reform * Conclusion
Part I: The Theoretical Framework * Introduction: Policy Legitimacy, Unpopular Legislation, and the Limits of Self-Interest * Policy Legitimacy as a Determinant of Policy Outputs * Part II: Applications * The Politics of Consumption Tax * The Politics of a Consumption Tax Increase * The Politics of Electoral Reform * Conclusion