Synopses & Reviews
The first comprehensive account in English of how the Portuguese Armed Forces prepared for and conducted a distant counterinsurgency campaign in its African possessions with very limited resources, choosing to stay and fight despite the small odds for success. The Portuguese military crafted its doctrine and implemented it to match the guerrilla strategy of protracted war, and in doing so, followed the lessons gleaned from the British and French experiences in small wars. The Portuguese approach to the conflict was distinct in that it sought to combine the two-pronged national strategy of containing the cost of the war and of spreading the burden to the colonies with the solution on the battlefield. It describes how Portugal defined and analyzed its insurgency problem in light of the available knowledge on counterinsurgency, how it developed its military policies and doctrines in this context, and how it applied them in the African colonial environment. The uniqueness of its approach is highlighted through a thematic military analysis of the Portuguese effort and a comparison with the experiences of other governments fighting similar contemporaneous wars.
Review
A fascinating and comprehensive account on the Portuguese-African Campaigns...Through careful research and a balanced presentation of oral history, Captain Dr. Cann shows how a counterinsurgency war could be fought. To my knowledge, this is the best book in English on the subject.Brigadier-General Renato F. Marques Pinto Former Chief of Military Intelligence, Angola and former Army Chief of Staff, Mozambique
Synopsis
The Portuguese planning for and conduct of its 1961-1974 counterinsurgency campaign in Africa.
Synopsis
The Portuguese planning for and conduct of its 1961-1974 counterinsurgency campaign in Africa.
About the Author
JOHN P. CANN, a former naval flight officer and retired captain, served both on the staff of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and subsequently on that of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Table of Contents
Foreword by General Bernard E. Trainor
A Remarkable Feat of Arms
Commitment to the Ultramar
O Exercito na Guerra Subversiva: Portuguese Counterinsurgency Doctrine on the Eve of War
Portuguese Organization, Education, and Training for Counterinsurgency
Portuguese Africanization of Counterinsurgency
Portuguese Intelligence Network in Counterinsurgency
Portuguese Approach to Mobility in Counterinsurgency
Portuguese Social Operations and Aldeamentos
Selected Aspects of Logistical Operations
The Portuguese Way
Selected Bibliography
Index