Synopses & Reviews
This book argues that American strategists in the Joint Chiefs of Staff were keenly aware of the inseparability of political and military aspects of strategy in the fight against Japan in World War II. They understood that war not only has political sources, it also has political purposes that establish the war's objectives and help to define the nature of the peace to follow. They understood that policy was the "guiding intelligence" for war, in Clausewitzian terms, and that to attempt to approach strategic problems was nonsensical.
About the Author
Charles F. Brower is a professor of History and International Affairs at Virginia Military Institute, , where he teaches courses in American foreign policy and strategy and holds the Henry King Burgwyn Chair in Military History.
Table of Contents
Political Considerations and the War against Japan
'One Part of the Larger Whole': Pacific War Strategy to the Trident Conference
'A Most Critical Summer': From Trident to Quadrant, 1943
Strategic Reconciliation at Sextant
Lengthening Political Shadows: Strategy in the Pacific, 1944
Assault versus Siege: The Debate over the Final Strategy for the Defeat of Japan