Synopses & Reviews
"This impressive study compels attention from students in international and comparative politics interested in the meeting of theory and case studies. It is admirably conceptualized, crafted, and researched. It raises our understanding of political economy, past, present, and future."
--Peter Gourevitch, University of California, San Diego"The combination of theoretical depth and empirical richness will make this brilliant study stand out for years to come."--Vinod K. Aggarwal, University of California, Berkeley
Review
"Political scientists will love this book and historians will find much in it to hold their attention. Economists are strongly advised to take note of it, lest they are too easily persuaded to dismiss the contribution of political processes to trade policy-making."--Nigel Grimwade, Times Higher Education Supplement
Review
"This is an unusual and possibly a 'mind-changing' book. . . . [It] has the potential to change many well-established perceptions about political economy and its influence on foreign policy."--International Affairs
Review
This is an unusual and possibly a 'mind-changing' book. . . . [It] has the potential to change many well-established perceptions about political economy and its influence on foreign policy. International Affairs
Review
Political scientists will love this book and historians will find much in it to hold their attention. Economists are strongly advised to take note of it, lest they are too easily persuaded to dismiss the contribution of political processes to trade policy-making. Nigel Grimwade
Synopsis
In this ambitious exploration of how foreign trade policy is made in democratic regimes, Daniel Verdier shows that special interests, party ideologues, and state officials and diplomats act as agents of the voters. Constructing a general theory in which existing theories (rent-seeking, median voting, state autonomy) function as partial explanations, he shows that trade institutions are not fixed entities but products of political competition.
Synopsis
In this ambitious exploration of how foreign trade policy is made in democratic regimes, Daniel Verdier shows that special interests, party ideologues, and state officials and diplomats act as agents of the voters. Constructing a general theory in which existing theories (rent-seeking, median voting, state autonomy) function as partial explanations, he shows that trade institutions are not fixed entities but products of political competition.
Synopsis
"This impressive study compels attention from students in international and comparative politics interested in the meeting of theory and case studies. It is admirably conceptualized, crafted, and researched. It raises our understanding of political economy, past, present, and future."--Peter Gourevitch, University of California, San Diego
"The combination of theoretical depth and empirical richness will make this brilliant study stand out for years to come."--Vinod K. Aggarwal, University of California, Berkeley
Table of Contents
| List of Tables and Figures | |
| Preface | |
| Introduction | |
1 | Trade and the Voter: A Survey of the Existing Literature | 3 |
2 | The Electoral Regulation of Access | 9 |
3 | The Trade Policy Process: A Typology | 26 |
4 | Origins of the Trade Policy Process | 36 |
5 | The Making of Trade Policy | 48 |
6 | The Case Studies | 63 |
7 | Descent into Depression, 1860-86 | 69 |
8 | Crisis and Response, 1887-1913 | 106 |
9 | First World War, 1914-18 | 150 |
10 | Tariff-Making and State-Building, 1919-39 | 158 |
11 | Creation of the Cold War Trading Regime, 1940-62 | 201 |
12 | The Rise and Fall of Industrial Policy, 1963-89 | 242 |
| Epilogue: Collapse of the Soviet Union and the Future of Existing Arrangements, 1990 to the Present | 288 |
13 | Conclusion | 290 |
| Appendix One: Mathematical Appendix to Chapter Two | 297 |
| Appendix Two: Tariff Levels | 304 |
| Appendix Three: Partisan Bias in Voting on Trade Bills | 306 |
| Notes | 313 |
| Bibliography | 345 |
| Index | 371 |