Synopses & Reviews
A new realist ontology based on the concept of fields of senseMarkus Gabriel presents us with an innovative answer to one of the central questions of philosophy: What is the meaning of 'being' - or, rather, 'existence' - and how does that concept relate to the totality of what there is?
Gabriel argues that there is no all-encompassing totality: that the world, in the traditional sense of a domain of all domains, cannot exist. Yet, he convincingly shows that this does not entail ontological nihilism. Rather, he argues that the non-existence of the world entails an infinity of domains and shows that this motivates a general realism - we can know things in themselves because our knowledge of things in themselves is itself part of these things.
This ontology hinges on Gabriel's concept of fields of sense, which shows that, fundamentally, he opposes the idea that mathematics or the natural sciences could ever replace a richer philosophical understanding of what there is and how we know about it.
Synopsis
Markus Gabriel proposes a radical form of ontological pluralism that divorces ontology from metaphysics, understood as the most fundamental theory of absolutely everything (the world). He argues that the concept of existence is incompatible with the existence of the world and therefore proposes his innovative no-world-view.
Synopsis
It is still a widespread assumption that metaphysics and ontology deal with roughly the same questions. They are supposed to be concerned with the fundamental nature of reality and to give an account of the meaning of 'existence' or 'being' in line with the broadest possible metaphysical assumptions. Against this, Markus Gabriel proposes a radical form of ontological pluralism that divorces ontology from metaphysics, understood as the most fundamental theory of absolutely everything (the world). He argues that the concept of existence is incompatible with the existence of the world and therefore proposes his innovative no-world-view. In the context of recent debates surrounding new realism and speculative realism, Gabriel also develops the outlines of a realist epistemological pluralism. His idea here is that there are different forms of knowledge that correspond to the plurality of fields of sense that must be acknowledged in order to avoid the trap of metaphysics.
Synopsis
A new realist ontology based on the concept of fields of sense
- Read and download the series editor preface by Graham Harman, the preface and the introduction to Fields of Sense for free now (pdf)
Graham Harman interviews Markus Gabriel about
Fields of Sense - Read the interview now on the Edinburgh University Press blog
- Download the pdf
It is still a widespread assumption that metaphysics and ontology deal with roughly the same questions. They are supposed to be concerned with the fundamental nature of reality and to give an account of the meaning of 'existence' or 'being' in line with the broadest possible metaphysical assumptions. Against this, Markus Gabriel proposes a radical form of ontological pluralism that divorces ontology from metaphysics, understood as the most fundamental theory of absolutely everything (the world). He argues that the concept of existence is incompatible with the existence of the world and therefore proposes his innovative no-world-view.
In the context of recent debates surrounding new realism and speculative realism, Gabriel also develops the outlines of a realist epistemological pluralism. His idea here is that there are different forms of knowledge that correspond to the plurality of fields of sense that must be acknowledged in order to avoid the trap of metaphysics.
About the Author
Markus Gabriel is Chair in Epistemology, Modern and Contemporary Philosophy at Bonn University. He is the author of many books and articles in German. His publications in English include
Scepticism and Idealism in Ancient Philosophy, translated by Ryan David Mullins (OUP, forthcoming),
Transcendental Ontology: Essays on German Idealism (Continuum, 2011) and co-author with Slavoj Zizek of
Mythology, Madness and Laughter: Subjectivity in German Idealism (Continuum, 2009).
Table of Contents
Introduction
Part I: Negative Ontology
1. Existence is not a proper property
2. What's wrong with Kant and Frege?
3. Limits of set-theoretical ontology
4. Domains of Objects and Fields of Sense
5. The Sense of Fields
6. The No-World-Thesis
Part II: Positive Ontology
7. Transfinite Fields of Sense
8. How Flat Can Ontology Be?
9. Modalities I: Existence and Possibility
10. Modalities II: Necessity and Contingency
11. Forms of Knowledge
12. Senses as Ways Things Are in Themselves
Conclusion