Synopses & Reviews
The 49 reproduced articles and chapters cover game theory andinternational environmental cooperation from the perspectives of foundations; technical advances; compliance; negotiations,second-best designs, and institutions; transfers, sharing, and fairness; multiple coalitions; uncertainty, risk and catastrophicevents; and dynamic coalition formation. Among the topics are the core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities,consensus treaties, optimal transfers and participation decisions in international environmental agreements, providing global public goodsunder uncertainty, and a dynamic model for international environmental agreements. The foundation papers are all from the1980s and 1990s, but nearly all the rest were first published during the 21st century.Annotation ©2015 Ringgold, Inc., Portland, OR (protoview.com)
Key environmental issues, such as biodiversity and climate change, have in recent years become more pressing than ever. Where the critical papers in the early 1990s explained the difficulties of cooperation in tackling transboundary environmental problems, later works have analyzed the various alternatives, and increased our understanding of various institutional designs and negotiation protocols' impact on the success of cooperation. This collection brings together the most important articles on the game theoretic analysis of international environmental cooperation to both confront the cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to this, and demonstrate the diversity of methods used to analyze international environmental agreements.