A survey of the philosophy of science from positivism to social constr uctivism, this book focuses on the ontological implications of science . An innovative feature is the author's use of immunology as a source of descriptive examples, thus providing lively illustrations from a li fe science with universal appeal and allowing continuity throughout th is volume. The coverage of Quinean holism and supervenience clarify co ncepts which have been often misunderstood, while the discussion of th e Kuhnian model of science rectifies the distortions it underwent due to misuse in the past. Feminist and nonfeminist concepts of science, a s well as social constructivist models are thoroughly investigated by Klee. The book is lavishly illustrated and includes a glossary definin g over eighty key terms.
Preface Introduction
1. The Case of Allergic Disease: From Everyday Observation to Microstructural Explanation
1.1. Experimentation and Research Science
1.1.1. Observable Mysteries
1.1.2. Physical Microstructure
1.2. Mechanism and Testing
1.2.1. Mast Cell Release
1.2.2. Immunoglobulin E
1.3. Intervention and Manipulation
1.3.1. Released Inflammatory Mediator Blockade
1.3.2. Mast Cell Release Blockade
1.3.3. Immunoglobulin E Blockade
1.4. Unification and Explanation
1.4.1. IgE--anthelminthic
1.4.2. Allergy Genes
1.4.3. Determination and Explanation
2. The Positivist Model of Scientific Theories
2.1. Theories as Formal Languages
2.2. A Dummy Scientific Theory to Illustrate the Positivist Model
3. Trouble in Positivist Paradise
3.1. The Point of the Observational/Theoretical Distinction
3.1.1. Ease of Application
3.1.2. Instrumentation
3.1.3. Putnamian Cynicism
3.1.4. Encapsulated Information Processing
3.1.5. Sensory Surface Distance
3.2. Correspondence-Rules
3.2.1. Dispositional Properties
3.2.2. Holism
4. The Underdetermination of Theory
4.1. The Quine-Duhem Thesis
4.2. Popperian Falsificationism
4.3. Is Underdetermination a Myth?
4.4. Pragmatism and Realism
5. Reductionism, Antireductionism, and Supervenience
5.1. Nagel's Model of Reduction
5.2. Kemeny and Oppenheim's Model of Reduction
5.3. The Unity of Science Program
5.4. The Putnam/Fodor Multiple Realization Argument Against the Unity of Science
5.5. Supervenience to the Rescue?
5.5.1. Kim's Model of Supervenience
5.5.2. Modest Physicalism
6. The Structure of Scientific Explanation
6.1. The Deductive-Nomological (D-N) Model of Scientific Explanation
6.1.1. Laws of nature
6.1.2. Standard Counterexamples to the D-N Model
6.2. The Aleatory Model of Scientific Explanation
6.3. The Unification Model of Scientific Explanation
6.4. Natural Kinds, Homeostatic Property Clusters, and the Structural Basis of Reality
7. The Revenge of Historicism
7.1. Anti-Incrementalism
7.2. Paradigms and the Practice of Normal Science
7.3. Puzzle-Solving and the Cautiousness of Normal Science
7.4. Anomalies
7.5. Revolutionary Science
7.6. Antirealism, Relativism, and Their Shadows
7.7. The Case of Modern Immunology
8. The Social Constructivist Challenge
8.1. The Strong Programme
8.2. Roll Over Socrates: Philosophy as the Bad Guy
8.3. The Case Method with a Vengeance
8.4. The View from Deep in the Swamp of History
8.5. The Inequality of Theoretical Alternatives
9. The Politics of Epistemology
9.1. The Genderization of Scientific Knowledge
9.2. Postmodernist Feminism: Sandra Harding
9.3. Feminist Social Activism: Helen Longino
9.4. Feminist Empiricism: Lynn Hankinson Nelson
10. The Actual Way Things Really Are
10.1. What Can or Cannot Happen in the Limit of Inquiry
10.2. The Cosmic Coincidence Argument for Scientific Realism
10.2.1. The Covergence Argument
10.2.2. The Manipulability Argument
10.3. The Case for Scientific Antirealism
10.3.1. Antirealism: Success is Self-Defeating for Realism
10.3.2. Antirealism: Success Needs No Explanation at All
10.3.3. Antirealism: Success isn't What You Think it is
10.3.4. Antirealism: Success May Have Nothing to Do With Truth
10.4. Conclusion
Glossary
Suggested Readings
Index
Each chapter is followed by recommendations for further reading