Synopses & Reviews
James McGill Buchanan (1919 - 2013) was an American economist best known as a pioneer of public choice theory. A founder of the new Virginia school of political economy, he made extensive contributions to the theory of public finance, constitutional economics, rent-seeking, and the economic analysis of politics. Buchanans work offered a scientific basis for conservative and libertarian political endeavors such as a constitutional amendment to balance the federal budget. He was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1986.
Synopsis
<br /> >
Synopsis
This is volume 17 in the Major Conservative and Libertarian Thinkers series.
Synopsis
<br /> >
Synopsis
James McGill Buchanan (1919 - 2013) was an American economist best known as a pioneer of public choice theory. A founder of the new Virginia school of political economy, he made extensive contributions to the theory of public finance, constitutional economics, rent-seeking, and the economic analysis of politics. Buchanans work offered a scientific basis for conservative and libertarian political endeavors such as a constitutional amendment to balance the federal budget. He was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1986.
About the Author
Dr. John Meadowcroft is Senior Lecturer in Public Policy and Head of the Department of Political Economy at King's College London, UK. He is the author of The Ethics of the Market (2005) and co-author of Rescuing Social Capital from Social Democracy (2007).
Table of Contents
Series IntroductionAcknowledgementsThe Referencing of Buchanan's Work in this BookChapter 1: Buchanan's Intellectual BiographyIntroductionEarly Years and War YearsChicago Frank Knight Knut WicksellKnoxville, Tallahassee and the Italian YearVirginia Political Economy Charlottesville UCLA and ‘academia in anarchy' Blacksburg FairfaxNobel Prize and BeyondChapter 2: Buchanan's IdeasIntroductionThe Individualist PostulateThe Problems of AnarchyRightsPolitical Agreement and Constitutional Choice: Enter the StatePublic Goods, the Productive State and Non-Unanimous DecisionsConstitutional Democracy: Procedural not SubstantiveThe Problems of Non-contractarian Politics: Re-entering Anarchy Individual preferences and ‘democratic' outcomes Exploitation or the implementation of external costs Rent-seeking The state: the threat of LeviathanConstitutionalism: Solving the Problems of Politics A fiscal constitution Qualified majority decision-making Federalism Constitutional revolutionConclusionChapter 3: The Reception and Influence of Buchanan's WorkIntroductionThe Intellectual Impact and Influence of Public Choice TheoryThe Critics of Buchanan and Public Choice Theory Methodological individualism Self-interest Rationality Unanimity PowerThe Development of Public Choice as an Academic CommunityChapter 4: The Continuing and Future Relevance of Buchanan's IdeasBibliographyIndex