Synopses & Reviews
This book offers a unified collection of published and unpublished papers by Robert Audi, a renowned defender of the rationalist position in ethics. Taken together, the essays present a vigorous, broadly-based argument in moral epistemology and a related account of reasons for action and their bearing on moral justification and moral character. Part I details Audi's compelling moral epistemology while Part II offers a unique vision of ethical concepts and an account of moral explanation, as well as a powerful model of moral realism. Part III extends this account of moral explanation to moral responsibility for both actions and character and to the relation between virtue and the actions that express it. Part IV elaborates a theory of reasons for action that locates them in relation to three of their traditionally major sources: desire, moral judgment, and value.
Clear and illuminating, Audi's introduction outlines and interconnects the self-contained but cumulatively arranged essays. It also places them in relation to classical and contemporary literature, and directs readers to large segments of thematically connected material spread throughout the book. Audi ends with a powerfully synthetic final essay.
Review
"In these lively and wide-ranging essays, Robert Audi develops the most sophisticated, subtle, and detailed version of moral intuitionism since W. D. Ross. Audi also explores connections between his moral epistemology and moral psychology, the metaphysics of action, and a general theory of rationality. This book should be not only read but also carefully studied by everyone interested in moral theory."--Walter Sinnott-Armstrong,
Dartmouth College"In defending ethical intuitionism, objective values and objective reasons for action, Audi swims against the stream. People interested in ethical theory should read this book to make sure they are headed in the right direction."--Bruce Russell, Wayne State University
"This extremely ambitious book reconfirms Audi's status as one of the most prominent philosophers writing about ethics and its relationship to other fields, especially epistemology....Important not only for Audi's sophisticated intuitionist theory, but also for its clarification of major alternatives to intuitionism."--Bernard Gert, Dartmouth College>
"Significant, carefully argued, broad in scope."--Roger Crisp, St. Anne's College, Oxford
Synopsis
This book presents an ethical theory that uniquely integrates naturalistic and rationalistic elements. Robert Audi develops his theory in four areas: moral epistemology, the metaphysics of ethics, moral psychology, and the foundations of ethics. Comprising both new and published work, the book sets forth a moderate intuitionism, clarifies the relation between reason and motivation, constructs a theory of intrinsic value and its place in moral obligation, and presents a sophisticated account of moral justification. The concluding chapter articulates a new normative framework built from both Kantian and intuitionist elements.
Connecting ethics in novel ways to both the theory of value and the philosophy of action, the essays explore topics such as ethical intuition, reason and judgement, and virtue. Audi also considers major views in the history of ethics, including those of Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Mill, Moore, and W. D. Ross, and engages contemporary work on autonomy, responsibility, objectivity, reasons, and other issues. Clear and conceptually rich, this book makes vital reading for students and scholars of ethics.