Synopses & Reviews
“A fine book: meticulous, judicious, incisive. It is a book to which the conventional exaggerations—“must” reading, relevant, if youre only going to read one book on the subject, etc.—actually may be said to apply. . . . It is a study of the interactions of technology, bureaucracy, politics and culture, of how an institution adapts, or fails to adapt, to changing conditions. As such, the book belongs on a lot of desks at the Pentagon.”—Washington Times
“Baer takes what could have been a dry topic—the political history of the modern U.S. Navy—and turns it into interesting reading.”—Library Journal
Review
"Baer takes what could have been a dry topicthe political history of the modern U.S. Navyand turns it into interesting reading."Library Journal
Review
"This is clearly one of the two or three most important works in American naval history published in the last decade; it has the potential to become a classic in the field. Well researched and carefully nuanced, it provides a distinctive perspective on the evolving historical relationship between national interest and national politics on the one hand and naval power on the other. Not only is this a significant contribution to scholarshipone that will critically influence how historians and political scientists think about American naval powerit is an enormously readable work. Baer writes beautifully, and he has organized his material effectively. The book is fully accessible to anyone interested in naval history."Edward Rhodes, Rutgers University
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"A valuable book that stimulates reflection, reconsideration, and debate."International History Review
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"Policy makers will benefit greatly from reading Baer's erudite review of the navy's previous successes and failures in developing strategy. . . . In seeking to educate both the naval and the non-naval communities, Baer admirably fulfills the special obligation of a public historian to convey to several audiences his special understanding of the institution he serves."The Public Historian
Synopsis
A powerfully argued and objective history of the modern US Navy.
Synopsis
This is a history of how the Navy respondedin doctrine, strategy, operations, preparedness, self-awareness, and force structureto radical changes in political circumstance, technological innovation, and national needs and expectations.
Synopsis
A powerfully argued and objective history of the modern US Navy.
Synopsis
Winner of the Theodore Roosevelt and Franklin D. Roosevelt Naval History Prize and the Bonnot Award for Naval History, this powerfully argued and objective history of the modern US Navy explains how the Navy defined its purpose in the century after 1890. It relates in detail how, over the years, the Navy formed and reformed its doctrine of naval force and operations around a concept of offensive sea control by a battleship fleet, and, new to America, the need to build and maintain an offensive battle fleet in peacetime. The author shows how this war-fighting organization responded to radical changes in political circumstance, technological innovation, and national needs and expectations.
Synopsis
A navy is a state's main instrument of maritime force. What it should do, what doctrine it holds, what ships it deploys, and how it fights are determined by practical political and military choices in relation to national needs. Choices are made according to the state's goals, perceived threat, maritime opportunity, technological capabilities, practical experience, and, not the least, the way the sea service defines itself and its way of war. This book is a history of the modern U.S. Navy. It explains how the Navy, in the century after 1890, was formed and reformed in the interaction of purpose, experience, and doctrine.
Table of Contents
Introduction; Part I. On the Sea: 1. Sea power and the fleet Navy, 1890-1910; 2. The new Navy, 1898-1913; 3. Neutrality or readiness? 1913-1917; 4. War without Mahan, 1917-1918; 5. Parity and proportion, 1919-1922; 6. Treaty Navy, 1922-1930; 7. Adapt and innovate, 1931-1938; 8. Are we ready? 1938-1940; 9. Sea control, 1941-1942; 10. Strategic offensives, 1943-1944; 11. Victory drives, 1944-1945; Part II. From the Sea: 12. Why do we need a navy? 1945-1949; 13. Naval strategy, 1950-1954; 14. Containment and the Navy, 1952-1960; 15. The McNamara years, 1961-1970; 16. Disarray, 1970-1980; 17. High tide, 1980-1990; Conclusion.