Synopses & Reviews
This book explores how the political process in the United States influences the economy and how economic conditions influence electoral results. It explains how the interaction between the President and Congress lead to the formulation of macroeconomic policy and how the American voters achieve moderation by balancing the two institutions. Fluctuations in economic growth are shown to depend on the results of elections and, conversely, electoral results to depend on the state of the economy. The final chapter of the book establishes striking similarities between the American political economy and other industrial democracies.
Review
"...a challenging and important work...in this key area of interdisciplinary research, Alesina and Rosenthal's multi-faceted formal arguments and empirical tests are likely to set the standard for many years." Keith Krehbiel, Stanford University
Review
"Alesina and Rosenthal bring together two major themes in the current study of American politics--divided government and the political business cycle. In so doing, they develop a theoretically innovative, statistically well-grounded model of the United States political economy. A strong round of applause is in order." Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Professor, the University of Iowa
Review
"Alesina and Rosenthal have made what will surely be an enduring contribution....This book represents a genuine advance in the political business cycle literature....This book is accessible and holds value for both economists and political scientists. It should prove very useful to graduate students, but will also be stimulating to readers who are already familiar with the existing literature on political business cycles. This book would make a nice addition to a graduate seminar on applied political economy; any course which covers political business cycles would be incomplete absent this book as a required text." Jeffrey Milyo, Journal of Politics
Synopsis
This book develops an integrated approach to understanding the American economy and national elections. Economic policy is generally seen as the result of a compromise between the President and Congress. Because Democrats and Republicans usually maintain polarized preferences on policy, middle-of-the-road voters seek to balance the President by reinforcing in Congress the party not holding the White House. This balancing leads, always, to relatively moderate policies and, frequently, to divided government. The authors first outline the rational partisan business cycle, where Republican administrations begin with recession, and Democratic administrations with expansions, and next the midterm cycle, where the President's party loses votes in the mid-term congressional election. The book argues that both cycles are the result of uncertainty about the outcome of presidential elections. Other topics covered include retrospective voting on the economy, coat-tails, and incumbency advantage. A final chapter shows how the analysis sheds light on the economies and political processes of other industrial democracies.
Synopsis
This compelling book explores how the political process in the US influences the economy and how economic conditions influence electoral results. It explains how the interaction between the President and Congress lead to the formulation of macroeconomic policy and how the American voters achieve moderation by balancing the two institutions. Fluctuations in economic growth are shown to depend on the results of elections and, conversely, electoral results depend on the state of the economy. The final chapter of the book establishes striking similarities between the American political economy and other industrial democracies.
Synopsis
Exploring how the political process in the United States influences the economy and how economic conditions influence electoral results, this text explains how the interaction between the President and Congress lead to the formulation of macroeconomic policy.
Description
Includes bibliographical references (p. 260-271) and index.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction; 2. Models of policy divergence; 3. A theory of institutional balancing; 4. The midterm cycle; 5. Diversity, persistence, and mobility; 6. Incumbency and moderation; 7. Partisan business cycles; 8. The President, Congress, and the economy; 9. Economic growth and national elections in the United States: 1915-88; 10. Partisan economic policy and divided government in parliamentary democracies.