Synopses & Reviews
What is the nature of consciousness? How is consciousness related to brain processes? This volume collects thirteen new papers on these topics: twelve by leading and respected philosophers and one by a leading color-vision scientist. All focus on consciousness in the "phenomenal" sense: on what it's like to have an experience.
Consciousness has long been regarded as the biggest stumbling block for physicalism, the view that the mind is physical. The controversy has gained focus over the last few decades, and phenomenal knowledge and phenomenal concepts-knowledge of consciousness and the associated concepts-have come to play increasingly prominent roles in this debate. Consider Frank Jackson's famous case of Mary, the super-scientist who learns all the physical information while confined in a black-and-white room. According to Jackson, if physicalism is true, then Mary's physical knowledge should allow her to deduce what it's like to see in color. Yet it seems intuitively clear that she learns something when she leaves the room. But then how can consciousness be physical? Arguably, whether this sort of reasoning is sound depends on how phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge are construed. For example, some argue that the Mary case reveals something about phenomenal concepts but has no implications for the nature of consciousness itself. Are responses along these lines adequate? Or does the problem arise again at the level of phenomenal concepts?
The papers in this volume engage with the latest developments in this debate. The authors' perspectives range widely. For example, Daniel Dennett argues that anti-physicalist arguments such as the knowledge argument are simply confused; David Papineau grants that such arguments at least reveal important features of phenomenal concepts; and David Chalmers defends the anti-physicalist arguments, arguing that the "phenomenal concept strategy" cannot succeed.
Review
"As might be expected from the contributors involved, the thirteen papers making up this collection provide an excellent, cutting-edge critique of some of the key arguments in the debates about phenomenal consciousness, or 'what it is like' to have conscious experiences."--Dr. David Wall, Metapsychology Online Reviews
"The issues discussed in the volume range from the nature of phenomenal consciousness and phenomenal concepts to the theory of concepts and the mind-body problem. Alter and Walter have contributed a helpful introduction, and put together an excellent collection that anyone with an interest in the philosophy of mind will find an essential volume to own." --Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
Synopsis
Consciousness has long been regarded as the biggest stumbling block for the view that the mind is physical. This volume collects thirteen new papers on this problem by leading philosophers including Torin Alter, Ned Block, David Chalmers, Daniel Dennett, John Hawthorne, Frank Jackson, Janet Levin, Joseph Levine, Martine Nida-Rümelin, Laurence Nemirow, Knut Nordby, David Papineau, and Stephen White.
About the Author
Torin Alter is Associate Professor at the University of Alabama.
Sven Walter is Assistant Professor at the University of Bielefeld, Germany.
Table of Contents
Introduction Part I: Phenomenal Knowledge
1. What RoboMary Knows, Daniel Dennett, Tufts University
2. So This is What it's Like: A Defense of the Ability Hypothesis, Laurence Nemirow, Davis Graham and Stubbs Income Tax, Benefits and Estate Group
3. The Knowledge Argument, Diaphanousness, Representationalism, Frank Jackson, Australian National University, British Academy, Australian Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, and Fand Institut International de Philosophie
4. Does Representationalism Undermine the Knowledge Argument?, Torin Atler, The University of Alabama
5. What is This Thing You Call Color: Can a Totally Color-Blind Person Know About Color?, Knut Nordby, formerly University of Oslo and Telnor Communications, Research and Development
Part II: Phenomenal Concepts
6. What is a Phenomenal Concept?, Janet Levin, University of Southern California
7. Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts, David Papineau, King's College, Cambridge University
8. Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint, Joseph Levine, The University of Massachusetts at Amherst
9. Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap, David Chalmers, Australian National University
10. Direct Reference and Dancing Qualia, John Hawthorne, Rutgers University
11. Property Dualism, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Semantic Premise, Stephen White, Tufts University
12. Max Black's Ojbection to Mind-Brain Identity, Ned Block, New York University
13. Grasping Phenomenal Properties, Martine Nida-Rümelin, University of Fribourg