Synopses & Reviews
Hilary Putnam, who may have been the first philosopher to advance the notion that the computer is an apt model for the mind, takes a radically new view of his own theory of functionalism in this book. Putnam argues that in fact the computational analogy cannot answer the important questions about the nature of such mental states as belief, reasoning, rationality, and knowledge that lie at the heart of the philosophy of mind.Hilary Putnam is Walter Beverly Pearson Professor of Mathematical Logic at Harvard University.
Review
Representation and Reality is one of the most thorough and careful criticisms of reductionism in the philosophy of mind that we have yet seen, and all future discussions of the computerhuman analogy will have to take account of it. The MIT Press
Review
"Representation and Reality is one of the most thorough and careful criticisms of reductionism in the philosophy of mind that we have yet seen, and all future discussions of the computerhuman analogy will have to take account of it."
—Richard Rorty, University of Virginia
Review
"This clear, powerfully argued, and thoroughly accessible book is fascinating, and no one with a serious interest in the philosophy of mind or the philosophy of language can afford not to study it."
—Stephen Schiffer, City University of New York
Review
"With striking candor, Putnam exposes the factors that have shaped his thinking about intentionality. Since that thinking has had a great influence, this book is full of valuable insights into current philosophical methods, foibles, and aspirations. As usual, he sets a hard task for his colleagues: figuring out how to agree with just 90 percent of what he says."
—Daniel Dennett, Tufts University
Synopsis
Hilary Putnam, who may have been the first philosopher to advance the notion that the computer is an apt model for the mind, takes a radically new view of his own theory of functionalism in this book.
Synopsis
Hilary Putnam, who may have been the first philosopher to advance the notion that the computer is an apt model for the mind, takes a radically new view of his own theory of functionalism in this book. Putnam argues that in fact the computational analogy cannot answer the important questions about the nature of such mental states as belief, reasoning, rationality, and knowledge that lie at the heart of the philosophy of mind.
About the Author
Hilary Putnam is Walter Beverly Pearson Professor of Mathematical Logic at Harvard University.