Synopses & Reviews
Polarization is at an all-time high in the United States. But contrary to popular belief, Americans are polarized not so much in their policy preferences as in their feelings toward their political opponents: To an unprecedented degree, Republicans and Democrats simply do not like one another. No surprise that these deeply held negative feelings are central to the recent (also unprecedented) plunge in congressional productivity. The past three Congresses have gotten less done than any since scholars began measuring congressional productivity.
In Why Washington Wonandrsquo;t Work, Marc J. Hetherington and Thomas J. Rudolph argue that a contemporary crisis of trustandmdash;people whose party is out of power have almost no trust in a government run by the other sideandmdash;has deadlocked Congress. On most issues, party leaders can convince their own party to support their positions. In order to pass legislation, however, they must also create consensus by persuading some portion of the opposing party to trust in their vision for the future. Without trust, consensus fails to develop and compromise does not occur. Up until recently, such trust could still usually be found among the opposition, but not anymore. Political trust, the authors show, is far from a stable characteristic. Itandrsquo;s actually highly variable and contingent on a variety of factors, including whether oneandrsquo;s party is in control, which part of the government one is dealing with, and which policies or events are most salient at the moment.
Political trust increases, for example, when the public is concerned with foreign policyandmdash;as in times of warandmdash;and it decreases in periods of weak economic performance. Hetherington and Rudolph do offer some suggestions about steps politicians and the public might take to increase political trust. Ultimately, however, they conclude that it is unlikely levels of political trust will significantly increase unless foreign concerns come to dominate and the economy is consistently strong.
"A compelling challenge to the prominent view that government participation leads to better government." The Futurist"This wonderfully provocative book uses survey data and interviews to support hypotheses that run against the conventional scholarly wisdom about what is wrong with the US political system.... This excellent contribution to the sociological and political science literature on participation is written in a clear, occasionally witty, and understandable prose that all will appreciate. Essential." Choice
andldquo;Hetherington and Rudolph marshal a massive array of evidence to show that political trust guides American political life, particularly when the public is focused on international affairs. The book is a mammoth contribution, and it is likely to be influential for decades.andrdquo;
andldquo;Why Washington Wonandrsquo;t Work makes a substantial contribution to our understanding of the roots of dysfunction in American government. Hetherington and Rudolph present a highly convincing case that the partisan polarization of the mass public has contributed to the problem by polarizing trust in government. Their creative and persuasive analysis reveals many new insights into the vital role of trust in government for explaining why the public supports or opposes government action and how we might seek solutions.andrdquo;
andldquo;Hetherington and Rudolphandrsquo;s Why Washington Wonandrsquo;t Work zeroes in on the affective component of polarized politics: Republicans and Democrats not only disagree on issues, they also just donandrsquo;t like one another. Mutual antipathy undermines trust, which inhibits the deal-making essential to governing under our Madisonian system. This cogent and well-supported argument helps to explain why gridlock and stalemate have become the new normal.andrdquo;
Stealth Democracy finds the type of democracy Americans prefer: the less participation, the better.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 257-274) and index.
Examining how people want their democratic government to work, this study finds that Americans don't like many of the practices associated with democracy: the conflicts, the debates, the compromises. It finds that Americans don't want to have to see democracy in practice, nor do they want to be involved in politics. If American citizens had their way, political decisions would be made by unselfish decision-makers, lessening the need for monitoring government.
Stealth Democracy examines how people want their democratic government to work. It finds that Americans don't like many of the practices associated with democracy--the conflict, the debates, the compromises. They don't want to have to see democracy in practice and they do not want to be involved in politics. If they had their way, political decisions would be made by decision makers who were not at all selfish because then the people would be free from having to monitor government and could pursue the multitude of interests they find more enjoyable
Major polls all report that andldquo;trust in government is at an all-time lowandrdquo; in the United States. At the same time, polarization is at an all-time high. Hetheringon and Rudolphandrsquo;s timely book demonstrates a direct link between polarization and the decline of political trust in America. And itandrsquo;s not just legislators and party leaders who are polarized, but ordinary Americans. Drawing on a cornucopia of evidence and data, the authors show that since the early 2000s polarization in the electorate has increasingly been rooted not in ideological or policy differences, but, for the first time, in extremely negative feelings toward the other party. To an unprecedented degree, Republicans and Democrats simply do not like each other. These polarized feelings are central to why trust in government has polarized which, in turn, is central to andldquo;why Washington wonandrsquo;t work.andrdquo; On most issues, presidents and other party leaders can convince their own party faithful in the electorate to support their positions. In order to pass legislation, however, a public consensus is needed to push policymakers toward action. Some proportion of the out-party partisans and independents have to have enough trust in government to make an ideological sacrifice and form that consensus. As the authors persuasively explain, this is no longer occurring. Far from being a long-term and relatively stable psychological trait, political trust is highly variable and contingent. Whether or not one trusts government will vary depending on whether oneandrsquo;s party is in control, what part of government one is referring to, and what policies or events are most salient. Political trust increases, for example, when the public identifies international issues as most important (as during the 1950s and 60s). They also find that the effects of economic performance on political trust are asymmetric: weak economies harm trust more than strong economies help it. Ultimately, Hetherington and Rudolph have to conclude that it is unlikely political trust will ever to return to 1960s levels (a high point in the US) for any length of time unless international concerns again dominate politics and, just as important, the economy becomes consistently strong.
About the Author
Marc J. Hetherington is professor of political science at Vanderbilt University. He is the author of Why Trust Matters and coauthor, with Jonathan D. Weiler, of Authoritarianism andPolarization in American Politics.Thomas J. Rudolph is professor of political science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and coauthor of Expression vs. Equality.
Table of Contents
Chapter 1and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160; Why Extreme Leaders Donandrsquo;t Listen to a Moderate Public
Chapter 2and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160; Polarization, Political Trust, and Institutional Responsiveness
Chapter 3and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160; What Moves Political Trust
Chapter 4and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160; How Political Trust Became Polarized
Chapter 5and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160; How Priming Changes the Consequences of Political Trust
Chapter 6and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160; Political Trust Can Help Conservatives, Too
Chapter 7and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160; The Gordian Knot: A Bad Economy, Low Trust, and the Need for More Spending
Chapter 8and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160; Political Trust and Flagging Support for Obamacare
Chapter 9and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160; Can Things Change?
Chapter 10and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160; Things Will Probably Get Better, but We Are Not Sure How