Synopses & Reviews
Gerald Brock develops a new theory of decentralized public decisionmaking and uses it to clarify the dramatic changes that have transformed the telecommunication industry from a heavily regulated monopoly to a set of market-oriented firms. He demonstrates how the decentralized decisionmaking process--whose apparent element of chaos has so often invited criticism--has actually made the United States a world leader in reforming telecommunication policy.
Review
I am aware of no work that treats the history of telephone regulation in the United States with such care, at such length, or so evenhandedly. Further, the book is not merely history but economic history, in the sense that the economic incentives giving rise to the behavior described are carefully explored, as are the economic consequences of each policy development. Bruce M. Owen
Review
A factually rich analysis of telecommunication policymaking, Brock's book is the first insider's look at how policymakers struggled to mesh together economic efficiency, politics, markets, and technology to reach their goals--which often conflicted. After reading this carefully researched work by an outstanding academic who actually wound up in the fray, you will wonder how it was all accomplished. Mark S. Fowler, former Chairman, Federal Communications Commission
Review
I am aware of no work that treats the history of telephone regulation in the United States with such care, at such length, or so evenhandedly. Further, the book is not merely history buteconomichistory, in the sense that the economic incentives giving rise to the behavior described are carefully explored, as are the economic consequences of each policy development.
Review
This is a clear, comprehensive, and brilliant analysis of the telecommunication policy process, since 1980, that has dealt with the transistion from monopoly to competition and is now reaching a climax in the pending Congressional legislation on the National Information Infrastructure. Journal of Economic Literature
Review
America's choices of policy toward telecommunication triggered a revolutionary reorganization and gain in this sector's efficiency, first in the United States, but prospectively worldwide. Brock's book carefully traces the decentralized policymaking process that brought this revolution about. It advances the existing literature in many ways, notably in a clear and comprehensive analysis of the role of network externalities. Henry Geller, former administrator, NTIA
Synopsis
A Choice Outstanding Academic Title of 1995
About the Author
Gerald W. Brock is Professor of Telecommunication and Director of the Graduate Telecommunication Program at George Washington University, and was previously Common Carrier Bureau Chief at the Federal Communications Commission.
George Washington University
Table of Contents
Introduction Positive Results of the Decentralized Process
Potential Benefits of a Decentralized Policy Process
Plan of the Book
Perspectives on the Policy Process
Blackstone versus Bentham
Landis versus Stigler
Information Economics and Transaction Costs
Preferences and Principles
A Model of the Decentralized Policy Process
The Coordination of Decentralized Public Policy and of Scientific Research
The Structure of the Decentralized Policy Model
Examples of the Decentralized Policy Model
Institutions of Telecommunication Policy
The Communications Act of 1934
The Structure of the FCC
Non-FCC Policy Institutions
Economic Characteristics of the Telecommunication Industry
The Development of Telephone Monopoly
Regulation and the Sharing of Toll Revenue
The 1956 Consent Decree
Interconnection and the Network Externality
THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION
Competition in Terminal Equipment
Hush-A-Phone
Carterfone
Protective Connecting Arrangements
Opposition to Terminal Competition
Computer II and Detariffing
Initial Long Distance Competition
Bulk Private Service: "Above 890"
MCI Initial Application
Specialized Common Carrier Competition
Interconnection and Long Distance Competition
The Private Line Interconnection Controversy
AT&T's Rate Response to Private Line Competition
Execunet and Switched Services Competition
Interconnection Charges: ENFIA
Competition under the ENFIA Agreement
STRUCTURAL BOUNDARIES
The Divestiture
The Consumer Communications Reform Act
The Antitrust Suit
The Reagan Administration'sPerspectives
The Divestiture Agreement
Implementing the Divestiture
Access Charges: A Confusing Ten Billion Dollar Game
The First Plan: Pre-Divestiture Agreement
The 1982 Access Plan
Separations Reform and High-Cost Subsidy
The Implementation of Access Charges
Congressional Influence on Access Charges
Initial Switched Access Charge
Managed Competition for Political Perceptions
Completion of the Access Charge Plan
ALTERNATIVES TO THE DIVESTITURE MODEL
The Dismantling of Structural Separation
The Third Computer Inquiry
The DOJ and the MFJ Information Services Restriction
Judge Greene and the Information Services Restriction
Competition in Local Service
Network Issues with Local Competition
Local Competition and Interconnection
Price Caps and Regulatory Boundaries The First Plan: Bridge to Deregulation
The Revised Plan: Better Regulation
Political Issues in the AT&T Price Cap Plan
The LEC Price Cap Plan
Conclusion
The Evolution of Telecommunication Policy
Fact Perceptions Incorporated into Policy
Policy Goals
Notes
Index