Synopses & Reviews
<p>This book, reprinted from the original 1991 edition, is still the classic on President Carter's foreign policy.</P><br/><p>"No government can at the same time protect the nation's security and tell its people the truth. All governments seek to bridge the gap to one degree or another, but never succeed completely. The width of the resulting gap between truth and security denotes a government's credibility, or lack of it." Richard C. Thornton</p><br/><p>Although Jimmy Carter came to office fully prepared to carry forward the general strategy of a new global order initiated by Henry Kissinger in 1973, his administration immediately encountered a Soviet Union embarked upon a multi-pronged geopolitical offensive, backed by a major advance in strategic weaponry, which threatened to undermine America's global position. Recognition of the Soviet offensive forced a reconsideration of American strategy, splitting the new administration. </p><br/><p>Secretary of State Cyrus Vance insisted that the strategy of a new global order, whose prerequisite was detente with the Soviet Union, remained viable. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, on the other hand, argued that a temporary return to some modified form of containment was necessary. President Carter, caught between the diametrically conflicting advice of his principal advisers, vacillated-at times supporting the views of one adviser, then the other. Even though Secretary Vance generally prevailed, the result was that indecision and vacillation marked the foreign policy of the Carter years.</p><br/><p>Written by a leading expert in the field of history and international affairs, readers will gain a deeper appreciation for the forces at work during the Carter years and how decisions made during that time influenced US history.</p>>
Synopsis
Although Jimmy Carter came to office fully prepared to carry forward the general strategy of a new global order initiated by Henry Kissinger in 1973, his administration immediately encountered a Soviet Union embarked upon a multi-pronged geopolitical offensive, backed by a major advance in strategic weaponry, which threatened to undermine America's global position. Recognition of the Soviet offensive forced a reconsideration of American strategy, splitting the new administration. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance insisted that the strategy of a new global order, whose prerequisite was detente with the Soviet Union, remained viable. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, on the other hand, argued that a temporary return to some modified form of containment was necessary. President Carter, caught between the diametrically conflicting advice of his principal advisers, vacillated-at times supporting the views of one adviser, then the other. Even though Secretary Vance generally prevailed, the result was that indecision and vacillation marked the foreign policy of the Carter years. Written by a leading expert in the field of history and international affairs, readers will gain a deeper appreciation for the forces at work during the Carter years and how decisions made during that time influenced US history.
Synopsis
This book, reprinted from the original 1991 edition, is still the classic on President Carter's foreign policy.
No government can at the same time protect the nation's security and tell its people the truth. All governments seek to bridge the gap to one degree or another, but never succeed completely. The width of the resulting gap between truth and security denotes a government's credibility, or lack of it. Richard C. Thornton
Although Jimmy Carter came to office fully prepared to carry forward the general strategy of a new global order initiated by Henry Kissinger in 1973, his administration immediately encountered a Soviet Union embarked upon a multi-pronged geopolitical offensive, backed by a major advance in strategic weaponry, which threatened to undermine America's global position. Recognition of the Soviet offensive forced a reconsideration of American strategy, splitting the new administration.
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance insisted that the strategy of a new global order, whose prerequisite was detente with the Soviet Union, remained viable. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, on the other hand, argued that a temporary return to some modified form of containment was necessary. President Carter, caught between the diametrically conflicting advice of his principal advisers, vacillated-at times supporting the views of one adviser, then the other. Even though Secretary Vance generally prevailed, the result was that indecision and vacillation marked the foreign policy of the Carter years.
Written by a leading expert in the field of history and international affairs, readers will gain a deeper appreciation for the forces at work during the Carter years and how decisions made during that time influenced US history.
Table of Contents
Table of Contents
PREFACE PART 1. Toward A New Order
1. The Carter Administration Probes Soviet Intentions The Initial Approach to Moscow The Unanticipated Problem of Minuteman Vulnerability Washington Offers Moscow an Unpalatable Choice The Moscow Meetings and Afterwards Proceeding with Arms Control-Negotiations without Agreement
2.Reinforcing the European Flank-1977-1979 The Alliance Dilemma: Cohesion or Competition? United States-West German Crisis and West European Monetary Unification Franco-German Cooperation-The French Gamble Reinforcing Western Europe-The German Question Washington Shifts from Short to Long German Agreement-With Reservations
3. Contradiction and Conflict in Asia-1977-1978 The Impact of the Soviet Breakthrough on United States Asian Strategy Washington Bluffs to Prod Japan Early Normalization with China and Korean Withdrawal No Normalization and No Withdrawal Moscow Takes the Geopolitical Offensive War in Indochina and Sino-American Normalization United States Negotiating Strategy and Chinese Domestic Politics
4. The Middle East to the Horn of Africa: From Whipsaw to Backlash, 1977 Initial Decisions: The February 23 NSC Meeting Accelerating the Pace of Conflict in the Horn Building the Conditions for Israeli-Egyptian Negotiations Conflict Erupts in the Horn of Africa Menachem Begin Visits Washington Crisis in the Horn, Breakthrough in the Middle East Closing Off the Geneva Track and Going Public Policy Failure in the Middle East Soviet Backlash in the Horn of Africa
5. Growing Strategic Doubt and Policy Vacillation: 1978 Carter Sides with Brzezinski: The Decision to Ride the Whirlwind SALT II Delay, Afghan Coup, and China Card Secretary Vance Regains Control Moscow Presses the Geopolitical Offensive Soviet Policy, SALT II, and American Strategy The Camp David Summit
PART II. Strategic Disintegration and Collapse
6. The Unraveling of American Strategy: SALT II and Iran SALT As Deterrence Diplomacy Moscow Eludes Commitment The Failure of SALT As Deterrence Diplomacy The United States and Iran Containment and Disengagement in Iran The Carter Leadership in Disarray The Failure of Vance's Attempt to "Broaden the Base" Neither Coalition, Military Coup, nor Bakhtiar
7. Crisis and Failure in Asia and the Middle East: 1979 The Struggle to Construct a Foundation in the Middle East Sino-American Normalization and the Road to War Moscow Probes Washington's Intentions War, and Wider War, but No Deterrence The Erosion of Washington's Leverage in the Middle East The Retreat from Camp David The Failure to Win Over Saudi Arabia The Egyptian-Israeli Treaty and Its Costs
8. SALT II, Cuba, and Central America: The Pursuit of Illusion The United States and Central America America's Failure in Nicaragua The Promise of Detente and Nicaragua Policy The Cuban Impediment to Detente The Vienna Summit The Soviet "Combat" Brigade in Cuba Posing the Question to Moscow Moscow's Rejection and Secretary Vance's Response President Carter's Unsatisfactory Compromise
9. No End of Crises: A Strategy in Disarray Replaying the Energy Card: The 1974 Oil Crisis Redux Shortage in a Time of Plenty Carter Attempts to Salvage a Failed Policy Crises in Southwest Asia Hostage Seizure and Washington's Response Moscow Moves Its Queen: The Invasion of Afghanistan
10. After Afghanistan: From Fiasco to Fiasco The Ambivalent Response to Afghanistan The Gamble to Restore United States-Soviet Amity The Consequences of Self-Deception The Failure of the Hostage Rescue Mission The Response to the Mariel Boatlift Nicaragua and El Salvador: Carter's Election Dilemma The Iran-Iraq War, and Begin's Revenge The Response to Continuing Inflation
CONCLUSION INDEX