Warning Signs
U.S. officials, especially those in the Bush administration, have repeatedly insisted that they had no evidence that Osama bin Laden was planning an attack inside the U.S. For example, President Bush insists, "Had I known there was going to be an attack on America I would have moved mountains to stop the attack." [New York Times, 4/18/04] Officials claim that hints of an attack -- to the extent they existed -- always pointed overseas, and also claim that no one thought that terrorists would use airplanes as flying weapons against U.S. symbols. For example, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice said in mid-2002 that, "Even in retrospect," the Bush administration had no hints of such a form of attack. [White House, 5/16/02] What are the facts as we know them today? What did U.S. government officials know, and when did they know it? Understanding these warning signs -- and the U.S. government's response to the signs -- is paramount to understanding how 9/11 could have happened and, equally important, whether it can happen again. This chapter chronicles, based on the current public record, what people in our government did know and when they knew it. (Even more warning signs are detailed elsewhere in the book, as in chapter 3 on counterterrorism efforts before 9/11, chapter 7 on hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, and chapter 10 on Zacarias Moussaoui.) The seeds of 9/11 were planted long before the Bush administration came to power. In its quest to win the Cold War, the U.S. spent billions of dollars funding the mujahedeen resistance in Afghanistan, seeking, literally, to spend the Soviet Union to death. Focused on victory, the U.S. directly and indirectly transformed the ill-armed and overwhelmed Afghan freedom fighters into a well-armed, increasingly effective international "army." That many in this "army" were anti-Western, fundamentalist Islamists seemed irrelevant at the time, as they were fighting a common enemy.
The U.S. eventually won the Cold War -- but at what price? In Afghanistan, the communist government was eventually replaced with the tyrannical Taliban. Many from the mujahedeen resistance reconstituted into al-Qaeda and similar organizations. Their guerilla-style jihad, so effective against the Soviets, morphed into terrorist jihad against the U.S. and other Western countries. By the time Bill Clinton became president in 1993, bin Laden had already sponsored a number of successful attacks on American targets. During the Clinton administration, he sponsored more. After the simultaneous bombing of two U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998, and the U.S.'s failed retaliation attempt against him, Osama bin Laden became a household name around the world.
Each successive attack bin Laden perpetrated was a warning sign -- that his primary target was the U.S., that his primary weapon was terrorism, and that he had the resources necessary to wage his war. Each successive attack foiled was yet another warning sign -- of what he planned to do, how he planned to do it, and what he likely would try to do again.
One might fairly argue that hindsight is always 20/20, that Monday morning quarterbacking is simply unfair. Thus, in reviewing these warning signs, one should consider at least the following: How reliable would the warning have sounded at the time? From whom did the information originate -- from an anonymous stranger, a friendly foreign government, or our own governmental surveillance? How, if at all, was the new information matched up with other facts known at the time? Who received the information, and what did they do with it; how far up the chain-of-command did the information travel, and was that information shared with other relevant parties or agencies?
Unfortunately, some of these questions cannot be answered at this time. All too often, the information that is available only raises more questions than it answers. The Bush administration's continued secrecy in the name of "national security" only exacerbates this problem, leading many to cry cover-up, others to charge criminal negligence, and still others to consider conspiracy.
The purpose of this book is not to speculate or to theorize, but to compile what is known today. And what is known is quite troubling. The warning signs were innumerable, the U.S. government's response often inexplicable.
December 26, 1979: Soviet Forces, Lured in by the CIA, Invade Afghanistan
The Soviet Union invades Afghanistan. They will withdraw in 1989 after a brutal ten-year war. It has been commonly believed that the invasion was unprovoked. However, in a 1998 interview, Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter's National Security Adviser, will reveal that the CIA began destabilizing the pro-Soviet Afghan government six months earlier in a deliberate attempt to get the Soviets to invade and have their own Vietnam-type costly war: "What is most important to the history of the world? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some stirred-up Moslems or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the Cold War?" [Le Nouvel Observateur, 1/98; Mirror, 1/29/02] The U.S. and Saudi Arabia give a huge amount of money (estimates range up to $40 billion total for the war) to support the mujahedeen guerrilla fighters opposing the Russians. Most of the money is managed by the ISI, Pakistan's intelligence agency. [Nation, 2/15/99]
Early 1980: Osama bin Laden, with Saudi Backing, Supports Afghan Rebels
Osama bin Laden begins providing financial, organizational, and engineering aid for the mujahedeen in Afghanistan, with the advice and support of the Saudi royal family. [New Yorker, 11/5/01] Some, including Richard Clarke, counterterrorism "tsar" during the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, believe he was handpicked for the job by Prince Turki al-Faisal, head of Saudi Arabia's secret service. [Sunday Times, 8/25/02; New Yorker, 11/5/01] The Pakistani ISI want a Saudi prince as a public demonstration of the commitment of the Saudi royal family and as a way to ensure royal funds for the anti-Soviet forces. The agency fails to get royalty, but bin Laden, with his family's influential ties, is good enough for the ISI. [Miami Herald, 9/24/01] (Clarke will argue later that the Saudis and other Muslim governments used the Afghan war in an attempt to get rid of their own misfits and troublemakers.) This multinational force later coalesces into al-Qaeda. [Against All Enemies, by Richard Clarke, 3/04, p. 52]
19841994: U.S. Supports Militant Textbooks for Afghanistan The U.S., through USAID and the University of Nebraska, spends millions of dollars developing and printing textbooks for Afghan schoolchildren. The textbooks are filled with violent images and militant Islamic teachings, part of covert attempts to spur resistance to the Soviet occupation. For instance, children are taught to count with illustrations showing tanks, missiles, and land mines. Lacking any alternative, millions of these textbooks are used long after 1994; the Taliban are still using them in 2001. In 2002, the U.S. will start producing less violent versions of the same books, which President Bush says will have "respect for human dignity, instead of indoctrinating students with fanaticism and bigotry." (He will fail to mention who created those earlier books. [Washington Post, 3/23/02; Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 5/6/02]