Synopses & Reviews
As early as the 1920s Adolf Hitler argued that his struggle for dominance would be worldwide. Before war began in Europe, Berlin had already placed contracts for a massive surface navy and four-engine bombers that could cross the Atlantic. Norman J. W. Goda traces the documentary evidence of Germany's long-term plans to extend its conquests to America.
This cogently argued book focuses on Germany's secret efforts to gain base sites for the new navy and long-range bombers in French North West Africa, Spain's Canary Islands, and Portugal's Azores and Cape Verde Islands. During this period Hitler rated the base issue a higher priority than the efficient prosecution of the war against Great Britain and second only to the Eastern Campaign.
In the end, Berlin failed to gain base sites. The effort antagonized Spain and France, pushing them away from a more actively pro-German stance. Germany also misjudged America's capability to capture the sites and consequently left Northwest Africa relatively unprepared for the Allied invasion of 1942.
Goda questions both the traditional notion that Germany operated from an unplanned opportunism and the argument that its territorial demands were limited to the European continent. His close reading of diplomatic and military archives opens new windows on Franco's Spain and Pand#233;tain's France. By focusing on policy formulation and implementation at the political and diplomatic level, he adds evidence for the view that Hitler's ambitions were not just talk but the basis for concrete military plans.
Did Adolf Hitler's Germany have designs on the Western Hemisphere? As early as the 1920s Hitler had repeatedly argued that the Nordic struggle for racial dominance would become worldwide, but his thoughts regarding the United States were sometimes obscured by his aims in Europe. In Tomorrow the World, Norman J. W. Goda retraces the documentary evidence to demonstrate that Germany's long-term strategy, developed early in World War II, pointed toward the United States following the expected conquest of the European continent. Goda questions both the more traditional interpretations that Hitler's Germany operated from unplanned opportunism and that its aims were confined to the European continent. His extremely close reading of the diplomatic and military sources from German, Spanish, and French records also opens new windows on the policies of Franco's Spain and Petain's France. By focusing on policy formulation and implementation at the political and diplomatic level, he adds substantial evidence for the view that Hitler's ambitions were not just grandiose table talk, but formed the basis for concrete military plans and building projects.
About the Author
NORMAN J. W. GODA currently lives in Lancaster, Ohio.