Synopses & Reviews
Based on a four year research project investigating voting behavior,
Topics In Social Choice begins with the well-known premise that different voting procedures may lead to different outcomes. The author then fills a void in present literature by comparing voting procedures in terms of four issues: sophisticated versus sincere voting; sophisticated voters and simultaneous versus sequential voting; voter efficacy in plurality and approval voting; and the use of normative standards to compare outcomes. He proposes both a new model of sophisticated voting and normative standards for proportional representation procedures. This study addresses both the general reader interested in voting issues and the serious student of voting schemes, voting behavior, and social choice theory.
Topics In Social Choice is divided into three parts representing its three themes. It addresses theoretical and experimental aspects of sophisticated voting; the problem of efficacy and correct decision; and it concludes with an investigation of fair proportional representation. The volume represents the first attempt to address sophisticated and yet simultaneous voting. It is also the first to subject various voting models to competitive testing and provide a set of normative criteria for systems evaluation.
Synopsis
This volume begins with the well-known premise that different voting procedures may lead to different outcomes. The author then fills a void in present literature by comparing voting procedures in terms of four issues: sophisticated versus sincere voting; sophisticated voters and simultaneous versus sequential voting; voter efficacy in plurality and approval voting; and the use of normative to compare outcomes. He proposes both a new model of sophisticated voting and normative standards for proportional representation procedures. Written for those interested in voting schemes, voting behavior, and social choice theory.
Description
Includes bibliographical references (p. [195]-201) and index.
About the Author
DAN S. FELSENTHAL is Senior Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Haifa, Israel.
Table of Contents
Preface
Sophisticated Voting under the Plurality and Approval Procedures: Theoretical Models and Experimental Evidence
Sophisticated Voting: Orientation and General Approach
Two Models of Sophisticated Voting: Farquharson and Niemi-Frank
The Social Desirability of Sincere and Sophisticated Voting under the Plurality and Approval Procedures
The Chairman's Paradox and Its Extensions under Sophisticated Plurality and Approval Voting According to Models F and NF
The Condorcet-Efficiency of Sophisticated Voting According to Model F under the Plurality and Approval Procedures
Tacit Cooperation in Three-Alternative Noncooperative Voting Games: A New Model of Sophisticated Behavior under the Plurality and Approval Procedures
Sincere versus Sophisticated Behavior Under PV and AV: A Competitive Test of Four Models
Efficacy and "Correct Decisions"
Efficacy in Small Electorates under the Plurality and Approval Procedures
Is Cumulative Voting Really Different from Plurality Voting?
On Combining Approval with Disapproval Voting
Majority Rule, "Correct Decisions," and the Quorum Paradox
Proportional Representation: Normative Schemes and an Empirical Evaluation of Voting Procedures
Microcosms and Macrocosms: Normative Schemes for Seat Allocation in Proportional Representation Systems
Proportional Representation: An Empirical Evaluation of the Plurality and Approval Procedures
Appendix A: Possible Size Relations Among Four Blocs
Appendix B: Proof of the Propositions in Chapter 6
Appendix C: Detailed Results of Experiments 1 and 2
Bibliography
Author Index
Subject Index