Synopses & Reviews
"Game theory is an intellectual X-ray. It reveals the skeletal structure of those systems where decisions interact, and it reveals, therefore, the essential structure of both conflict and cooperation." — Kenneth Boulding
This fascinating and provocative book presents the fundamentals of two-person game theory, a mathematical approach to understanding human behavior and decision-making, Developed from analysis of games of strategy such as chess, checkers, and Go, game theory has dramatic applications to the entire realm of human events, from politics, economics, and war, to environmental issues, business, social relationships, and even "the game of love." Typically, game theory deals with decisions in conflict situations.
Written by a noted expert in the field, this clear, non-technical volume introduces the theory of games in a way which brings the essentials into focus and keeps them there. In addition to lucid discussions of such standard topics as utilities, strategy, the game tree, and the game matrix, dominating strategy and minimax, negotiated and nonnegotiable games, and solving the two-person zero-sum game, the author includes a discussion of gaming theory, an important link between abstract game theory and an experimentally oriented behavioral science. Specific applications to social science have not been stressed, but the methodological relations between game theory, decision theory, and social science are emphasized throughout.
Although game theory employs a mathematical approach to conflict resolution, the present volume avoids all but the minimum of mathematical notation. Moreover, the reader will find only the mathematics of high school algebra and of very elementary analytic geometry, except for an occasional derivative. The result is an accessible, easy-to-follow treatment that will be welcomed by mathematicians and non-mathematicians alike.
Unabridged Dover (1999) republication of the work published by the University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1970.
Game theory is to games of strategy what probability theory is to games of chance. This nontechnical presentation of the essential ideas of two-person game theory demonstrates how mathematics can be applied to the study of human behavior and decision-making. Readers with a basic knowledge of algebra and simple analytic geometry can easily follow the author's explanations of such concepts as "utility, " "strategy, " "mixed strategy, " and the difference between "non zero" and "zero-sum" games. As they come t understand these and other aspects of game theory, readers will discover fascinating links between amusements like chess and tic-tac-toe and larger issues such as politics, economic struggles, and war -- even the battle of the sexes.
A noted expert presents clearly written discussions of essential ideas related to the highly useful mathematical approach to human behavior and decision-making. His lucid, accessible treatment examines such concepts as "utility," "strategy," and the difference between "non-zero" and "zero-sum" games. A minimum of mathematical prerequisites makes it accessible to non-mathematicians. 1970 edition.
Clear, accessible treatment of mathematical models for resolving conflicts in politics, economics, war, business, and social relationships. Topics include strategy, game tree and game matrix, and much more. Minimal math background required. 1970 edition.
A noted expert presents clearly written discussions of essential ideas related to the highly useful mathematical approach to human behavior and decision-making. His lucid, accessible treatment examines such concepts as utility, strategy, and the difference between non-zero and zero-sum games. A minimum of mathematical prerequisites makes it accessible to non-mathematicians. 1970 edition.
Includes bibliographical references (p. -221) and index.
Table of Contents
4. The Game Tree and the Game Matrix
5. Dominating Strategy and Minimax
6. Mixed Strategy
7. Solving the Two-Person Zero-sum Game
8. The Negotiated Game
9. Nonnegotiable Games
10. An Inductive Theory of Games: Dynamic Models
11. An Example: Inspector vs. Evader
12. Opportunities and Limitations