Preventive war has a long history in international politics, but until it became an instrumental part of the Bush Doctrine, it was mostly overlooked. Renshon argues that the best avenue for understanding decisions to initiate preventive action is through a close examination of the individual leader responsible for such decisions. In this work, he develops a theory of psychological motivations for preventive action. By examining five situations, including the Iraq war, he pinpoints the factors that matter most in decisions to take preventive military action.

Renshon (a doctoral student in the government department at Harvard U.) examines the US invasion of Iraq, President Eisenhower's rejection of preventive war against the USSR, British-French-Israeli war against Egypt in 1956, Israel's bombing of Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981, and two decades of India-Pakistan conflicts to explore why leaders opt for preventive war or not. He investigates the causal weight of five factors that may contribute to a decision for preventive war; declining power in relation to an adversary, an inherent bad faith image of the adversary, a belief that war or serious conflict is inevitable, the belief that there is only a short window in which to fact, and a situation that is believed to favor the offensive. In the end he finds that it is the psychology of the individual leader that will tip the decision the one way or another, even in the presence of all five of the factors.
Annotation ©2006 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

Renshon (a doctoral student in the government department at Harvard U.) examines the US invasion of Iraq, President Eisenhower's rejection of preventive war against the USSR, British-French-Israeli war against Egypt in 1956, Israel's bombing of Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981, and two decades of India-Pakistan conflicts to explore why leaders opt for preventive war or not. He investigates the causal weight of five factors that may contribute to a decision for preventive war; declining power in relation to an adversary, an inherent bad faith image of the adversary, a belief that war or serious conflict is inevitable, the belief that there is only a short window in which to fact, and a situation that is believed to favor the offensive. In the end he finds that it is the psychology of the individual leader that will tip the decision the one way or another, even in the presence of all five of the factors. Annotation ©2006 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

"As timely as today's headlines, Renshon's work will require scholars to reconsider their understanding of the process of preventive military action. In arguing that leaders and their perceptions play an influential role in these choices, this book provides "must reading" for those interested in understanding the complex dynamics of decisions to use force. Scholars and the informed citizen alike have much to learn from this insightful volume." - Douglas C. Foyle Assistant Professor Government Department Wesleyan University

"A remarkable debut book by a young scholar that augurs for an outstanding academic career. Using a sophisticated comparative case study approach, Why Leaders Choose War adds substantially to our understanding of leaders' motivations for preventive war." - Jerrold M. Post Professor of Psychiatry, Political Psychology and International Affairs Director, Political Psychology Program Elliot School of International Affairs, George Washington University

"Jonathan Renshon makes a contribution not only to the current debates about the strategic sense of preventive war but also to the longer term questions of the circumstances in which political leaders consider launching this type of action. The case studies demonstrate just how complex such decisions can be." - Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman Department of War Studies, Kings College London

Jonathan Renshon's purpose in this engaging and useful book is to help us better understand the conditions under which leaders well resort to preventive military action. Correctly noting that this is an understudied yet important question, Renshon methodically sets out to point us in the direction of answers....The case studies are clearly written, well-researched, and efficient. Indeed, readers interested only in the cases themselves will find them very useful as capsule histories....[h]e sets out merely to take the first steps down the road to a comprehensive theory. This he has certainly done. May the journey continue.Political Psychology

[I]t will interest many psychologists (particularly psychologists who are interested in history and politics). Renshon provides an interesting analysis of the choices for and against preventive war and places these events within important historical contexts. Furthermore, he helps the reader appreciate the difficult decisions world leaders face when responding to adversarial actions by other countries....[w]orth reading.PsycCritiques

Provides an understanding of the motivations of leaders--and by extension, the nations they govern--for initiating preventive war.

JONATHAN RENSHON is a doctoral student in the Government department at Harvard University, focusing on international security issues. He holds a master's degree in international relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science and has served on the editorial board of the Millennium Journal of International Relations.

Foreword by Alexander L. George

Preface

Preventive War: An Introduction

Preventing What? The Suez Canal Crisis

Israel's Preventive Strike Against Iraq

How Real Was Dr. Strangelove? American Preventive War Thinking Post World War II

To the Brink... India and Pakistan's Nuclear Standoff

Preventive War as a Grand Strategy? George W. Bush and "Operation Iraqi Freedom"

Preventive War in Perspective

Epilogue: Preventive War in the Age of Terrorism and Rogue States

Notes

Bibliography

Index