together the best technical work and the most important philosophical reflection on truth and shows how each can illuminate the other.

Investigating such questions as whether we need a truth predicate at all, what theoretical tasks it allows us to accomplish, and how we are to understand the content of any predicate capable of accomplishing these tasks, Soames organizes his discussion into three parts. Part I addresses crucial

foundational issues as it identifies the bearers of truth, provides a basis for distinguishing truth from other notions (like certainty, with which it is often confused), and formulates positive responses to well-known forms of truth-skepticism. Part II explicates the formal theories of Alfred

Tarski and Saul Kripke and evaluates the philosophical significance of their work. It discusses their treatments of the Liar paradox, the relationship between truth and proof, the notion of a partially defined predicate, the concepts of logical truth and logical consequence, and the connection

between truth and meaning. Part III extends important lessons drawn from Tarski and Kripke into new domains: vague predicates, the Sorites paradox, and the development of a larger, deflationary perspective on truth.

Throughout the book, Soames examines a wide range of deflationary theories of truth, and attempts to separate what is correct and worth preserving in them from what is not. In doing so, he seeks to clear up many of the most significant philosophical doubts about truth. Written for a general audience

while offering engaging material to the specialist, this rich study will be profitably read by both.'