Synopses & Reviews
Vera Smith's book remains an authoritative and accurate summary of the theoretical arguments for and against free banking, a subject that has recently received renewed attention.
—Milton Friedman, Hoover Institution
The Rationale of Central Banking was first published in England in 1936. Vera Smith spent her professional career in a variety of research positions. She wrote articles and books on money, banking, economic development, and the labor market and translated into English books by Wilhelm Röpke, Oskar Morgenstern, and Fritz Machlup.
This book provides a scholarly review and judicious assessments of the experience and theory that bear on the issues of free banking and central banking. Its wide-ranging discussion identifies both the fallacies in the arguments for central banks and the influential fallacies in the arguments against free banking. Vera Smith's work should play a prominent role in any reappraisal of our monetary institutions.
Leland B. Yeager is Ludwig von Mises Distinguished Professor of Economics at Auburn University.
Synopsis
The Rationale of Central Banking was first published in England in 1936. Vera Smith spent her professional career in a variety of research positions. She wrote articles and books on money, banking, economic development, and the labor market and translated into English books by Wilhelm Ropke, Oskar Morgenstern, and Fritz Machlup.
This book provides a scholarly review and judicious assessments of the experience and theory that bear on the issues of free banking and central banking. Its wide-ranging discussion identifies both the fallacies in the arguments for central banks and the influential fallacies in the arguments against free banking. Vera Smith's work should play a prominent role in any reappraisal of our monetary institutions.
Description
Includes bibliographical references (p. 201-208) and index.
Table of Contents
Preface by Leland B. Yeager xiii
Publisher’s Note xxvii
Foreword by Vera C. Smith xxx I Introduction 3
Universal acceptance of central banking • Lack of dis- cussion in recent times Meaning of “central” and “free banking” • Historical examples • The general problem of the responsibility of banks in trade cycle causation. II The Development of Central Banking in England 8
General remarks on the origin of the note issue; its rela- tion to deposit banking; the priority of the note issue in early banking discussions and policy, and its partial su- persession • Alternative forms of organisation in the note-issuing business • General trend in the evolution of banks of issue in the leading countries • England: early period of freedom • Second period: the circumstances in which the Bank of England was founded; its accumula- tion of privileges in return for financing the Government • The nature and consequences of Government interven- tion in the Napoleonic War period; the Bank acquired more characteristics of the modern central bank; the re- sults of “legal tender” character of notes; gold began to be concentrated in the Bank of England; as early as 1825 the Bank was looked upon as the “lender of last resort” • The agitation for joint stock banking; third period of greater freedom for note issuing in the provinces; deposit banking opened to free competition in London as well as in the country • Increasing tendency to centralisation of gold reserves and then to centralisation of banking reserves • Antagonism towards joint stock note-issuing banks; the Bank’s reluctance to acknowledge its influence on the operations of other banks • Fourth period after 1844; consolidation of the centralised systems. III The Scottish System 25
Monopolistic beginnings • The introduction and success of free banking • Legislative interference in 1845. IV The Development of Central Banking in France 28
Development of banking retarded by the experiences of Law’s notes and then by the assignat régime • Short period of freedom for note-issuing banks • The institution of the monopoly of the Bank of France • Pressure on the Bank to keep discount rates low • Period of increased liberalism; the establishment of departmental banks, but under rigid restrictions • The events of 1848 • Complete centralisation adopted • Treasury pressure on the Bank prolonged the suspension • The extreme lack of banking facilities of all kinds in the provinces The adoption by the Bank of France of a discount policy (the previous inertness of discount rate) • The new policy provoked an attack on the Bank of France • The Bank of Savoy controversy • The Banque Enquête—centralisation upheld. V The Organisation of Banking in America: Decentralisation without Freedom 42
Misleading interpretations • The Bank of North America • Developments in the States; prevalence of restriction and monopoly • Second experiment with a central bank (the First Bank of the U.S.) • The 1814 suspensions • Political influences • The lack of branches and of clearing facilities • The third attempt to maintain a central institution (the Second Bank of the U.S.); the suspensions of 1836 and 1839 • The extreme laxity with which insolvency was treated • Attempts to deal with over-expansions and suspensions (a) the more frequent return of notes secured by the Suffolk bank system and the Massachusetts law; (b) penalties for suspension; (c) special security for note holders; prior liens on assets; double liability; the New York safety fund system • The “free banking” law of New York • The Civil War and the general application of the bond deposit system by the National Bank Act. VI The Development of Central Banking in Germany 57
The late development of modern banking business • The first semi-State bank in Prussia • Competition of private banks • 1833 onwards—Treasury monopoly of the note issue • The policy in Bavaria and Saxony • The growth of the Bankfreiheitspartei in the “forties; the scarcity of capital and the idea that banks possess ‘magic power’ ”; the crédit mobilier idea; the genuine scarcity of note currency • This and the issues of notes by the border States led to a reorganisation of the Royal Bank • The continual agitation secured at last some concessions for private note-issuing banks • Joint stock banks in crédit mobilier business • Slow development of note-issuing banks; the notes of the border States again the motive for slight modifications in the restrictions on private note-issuing banks • The reaction in favour of central banking beginning with the crisis of 1857; the 1866 crisis and emphasis on central bank aid; deposit banking given freedom by the reform of the law on joint stock companies; the realisation of the importance of discount policy • All these factors led up to the foundation of the Reichsbank. Discussions on the Theory of the Subject in England and America Prior to 1848 71
Discussion not prominent in England • Joplin and Liverpool and the campaign for joint stock banking • Discussions at the Political Economy Club • Parnell’s defence of free banking • The clearing mechanism • MacCulloch’s attack on free banking • tendencies to expansion become cumulative because the gold drain affects the non-expanding banks as well as the expanding ones; small note holders should be protected; the advantages of central banks in a crisis and as regards reserve policy • Gallatin emphasised the effectiveness of the frequent exchange of notes • G. W. Norman—this provides no check if all banks expand in step • S. J. Loyd—the banking trade is an exception to the rule that competition is wholly beneficial to the consumer • Tooke, although an adherent of the banking school, opposed free banking • The American writers, Carey and Hildreth, recommended free banking for America; Condy Raguet was not so favourably disposed towards it; Gallatin was also reprehensive • Longfield’s argument that the clearing mechanism is no check to expansion; James Wilson’s recapitulation of the defence of the Scotch system. VIII The Discussions in France and Belgium 92
Influence of literature on the development of banking in America • The royal prerogative argument—Cieszkowski • The rise of free banking agitation—Courcelle-Seneuil, Coquelin, Du Puynode • Debates in the Société d’Economie Politique; the Pamphleteers • The case against plurality; it necessitates interlocal exchanges (Victor Bonnet) • The low discount rate school—the Pereires, Aubry • The multiplicity of notes raises difficulties which provide the real case for unity—Adolphe d’Eichtal; Brasseur’s argument that the difficulties of scrutinising notes had been exaggerated • Competition in banking demanded by Coq, Chevalier, Mannequin • Limited plurality on a departmental basis proposed by Lavergne • The most prominent disputants • Wolowski versus Chevalier • The evidence before the Banque Enquête • The anti-inflation school • Emile de Laveleye attacked the inflationist group of free bankers Cernuschi and Modeste attacked bank notes in general • Summary of the central banking case by Coullet • Summary of the free banking case by Horn • Later publications of Wolowski, Chevalier, Courcelle-Seneuil • Juglar’s argument for a central clearing bank within a competitive system • The connection between the free banking and banking schools. IX The Discussions in Germany 114
Foreign influences via von Gerstner • Rise of German literature in the ’fifties and Hübner’s support of free banking • The 100 percent currency doctrine • Tellkampf: there should be either unity in the note issue or real freedom along Scottish lines • Wagner supported free banking from the banking school standpoint • The Kongress Deutscher Volkswirte and Otto Michaelis; formulation of the legal framework of free banking; emphasis on deposit banking • Michaelis’ automatic mechanism for checking credit expansion • The 100 percent currency doctrine again represented by Geyer; his anticipation of modern trade cycle theories • Nasse’s support of central banking; change of emphasis from argument for central banking merely because it would better control the note issue to argument for the lender of last resort • Critique of the doctrines of Geyer and Tellkampf • Wagner and Knies • Wagner’s change of attitude. X The Post-1848 Discussions in England 132
The absence of discussion in the ’fifties except for R. H. Mills and Herbert Spencer • French influences in the ’sixties • The English reactions to the adoption of a discount policy by the Bank of France; The Economist and Goschen; support of the Pereire doctrines by Patterson; Guthrie’s attack on the Bank of England monopoly; attack on fiduciary issues by Phillips • The general question of unity versus plurality • Bagehot’s evidence and J. S. Mill’s memorandum to the French Commission • Bagehot’s analysis of effects of the single reserve system and the “lender of the last resort” theory of central banking • Table of cross groupings between central versus free banking and banking versus currency school adherents. XI Discussions in America Prior to the Foundation of the Federal Reserve System 146
The American system at the beginning of the twentieth century • Differences between the American system and free banking proper • (a) prohibition of branches; (b) bond deposit system of note issue which encouraged banks to get loans out by deposit credit for preference, with consequent difficulties if the public wanted notes instead of deposits • Long-run trend in the note issue • Short-run inflexibility • Sluggishness of redemption • Crises with suspensions of cash payments • The deficiencies of the American system were attributed to the inelasticity of note issue, to inelastic reserve policy, and to lack of economy in the use of reserves • Attempts to remedy the latter by the clearing house loan certificate, and by Treasury relief • The need for a Government fiscal agent • The high cost of check collection • The 1907 crisis and the Aldrich-Vreeland Act to provide emergency currency • The work of the Monetary Commission • Swing of opinion in favour of a permanent central banking institution. XII The Arguments in Favour of Central Banking Reconsidered 167
The acceptance of central banking • The main differences between central and free banking systems • Monopoly of note issue and centralisation of reserves • Free banking defined • Strict enforcement of obligations precludes a general abandonment of the gold standard, but a central bank can resort to legalised bankruptcy • Free banking keeps the banks’ policy closely dependent on movements in gold reserves • The case for and against—connections with the banking versus currency controversy • The free banking thesis is not necessarily bound up with banking school doctrines • Protection of the small note holder argument • The comparative tendencies to expansion • Arguments of the central bankers that an external drain affects all banks whether they expand or not • Argument of the free bankers that there is an automatic mechanism of control via clearings; how far this can be sustained; argument of central bankers that there are no conservative banks because the profit motive causes all banks to join in an expansion • Argument for a lender of last resort • Application of these arguments to the cases of (a) small notes and (b) deposit banking • Modern arguments for central banking and tendencies in the theory of central banking: (a) pursuit of a rational monetary policy; (b) international co-operation • Final remarks on comparative tendencies of the two systems in causing disturbances • Future policy • Tendencies towards extension of control to deposit banking. Appendix: On the Working of the “Automatic Mechanism” of Credit Control 197
Bibliography 201
Index 209