Synopses & Reviews
In his foreword, Geoffrey Brennan states, The papers in this volume represent a coherent set of pieces focused on aspects of public-expenditure theory and constitute all of Buchanans papers in this area.”<br><BR><BR><br>Buchanans work on the subject of what governments should do and his insistence on Knut Wicksells ideal that taxation and public expenditure be integrated topics have contributed significantly to the current thinking of most economists on the topic. Geoffrey Brennan summarizes Buchanans central themes in this way, There are two messages that emerge from this work: one is that a proper sense of the <I>extent</I> of market failure, rather than its mere <I>presence,</I> is relevant in all cases; the other is that correcting for such market failure is often a complex multidimensional business not captured by direct public provision at zero price and not necessarily involving expansion of market output.”<br><BR><BR><br>The twenty-nine papers represented in this volume are grouped into these major subject categories:<BR><br>1.Public Services and Collective Action<BR><br>2.Externalities<BR><br>3.Clubs and Joint Supply<BR><br>4.Public Goods Theory<BR><br>5.ApplicationsCity, Health, and Social Security<BR><br>6.Distributive Norms and Collective Action<BR><br><BR><br>This volume also includes what are arguably Buchanans two most famous articles: Externality,” which he wrote with William Stubblebine, and Economic Theory of Clubs.” <br><BR><BR><br><B>James M. Buchanan</B> is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.<br><BR><BR><br><B>ERRATA</B><BR><br>Unfortunately, after this book had been printed and bound, it was discovered that, due to a production error, the index contained some erroneous page numbers. Please click on the pdf file below to obtain the corrected index that should replace the index bound into the back of the book. When this volume goes back to press for a second printing, the index will be updated with the pages in this pdf file, and we will be pleased to send all buyers of the erroneous Volume 15 a corrected copy of the book at no extra charge.<br><a href=http://www.libertyfund.org/images/products/Buchananindexpages.pdf>Click here for a pdf file of the corrected index.</a></p><br><br>The entire series will include:<p/><br><p class="textbasic"><a href="details.asp?displayID=1696">Volume 1</a>: <I>The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty</i> <br><br><a href="details.asp?displayID=1725">Volume 2</a>: <I>Public Principles of Public Debt </i> <br><br><a href="details.asp?displayID=1593">Volume 3</a>: <I>The Calculus of Consent </i> <br><br><a href="details.asp?displayID=1724">Volume 4</a>: <I>Public Finance in Democratic Process</i> <br><br><a href="details.asp?displayID=1607">Volume 5</a>: <I>The Demand and Supply of Public Goods</i> <br><br><a href="details.asp?displayID=1602">Volume 6</a>: <I>Cost and Choice</i> <br><br><a href="details.asp?displayID=1693">Volume 7</a>: <I>The Limits of Liberty</i> <br><br><a href="details.asp?displayID=1610">Volume 8</a>: <I>Democracy in Deficit</i> <br><br><a href="details.asp?displayID=1722">Volume 9</a>: <I>The Power to Tax</i> <br><br><a href="details.asp?displayID=1731">Volume 10</a>: <I>The Reason of Rules</i> <br><br><a href="details.asp?displayID=1720">Volume 11</a>: <I>Politics by Principle, Not Interest</i> <br><br><a href="details.asp?displayID=1618">Volume 12</a>: <I>Economic Inquiry and Its Logic</i> <br><br><a href="details.asp?displayID=1719">Volume 13</a>: <I>Politics as Public Choice</i> <br><br><a href="details.asp?displayID=1606">Volume 14</a>: <I>Debt and Taxes</i> <br><br><a href="details.asp?displayID=1634">Volume 15</a>: <I>Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory</i> <br><br><a href="details.asp?displayID=1597">Volume 16</a>: <I>Choice, Contract, and Constitutions</i> <br><br><a href="details.asp?displayID=1701">Volume 17</a>: <I>Moral Science and Moral Order</i> <br><b
Synopsis
In his foreword, Geoffrey Brennan states, "The papers in this volume represent a coherent set of pieces focused on aspects of public-expenditure theory and constitute all of Buchanan's papers in this area."
Buchanan's work on the subject of what governments should do and his insistence on Knut Wicksell's ideal that taxation and public expenditure be integrated topics have contributed significantly to the current thinking of most economists on the topic. Geoffrey Brennan summarizes Buchanan's central themes in this way, "There are two messages that emerge from this work: one is that a proper sense of the extent of market failure, rather than its mere presence, is relevant in all cases; the other is that 'correcting' for such market failure is often a complex multidimensional business not captured by direct public provision at zero price and not necessarily involving expansion of market output."
The twenty-nine papers represented in this volume are grouped into these major subject categories:
Public Services and Collective Action
Externalities
Clubs and Joint Supply
Public Goods Theory
Applications--City, Health, and Social Security
Distributive Norms and Collective Action
This volume also includes what are arguably Buchanan's two most famous articles: "Externality," which he wrote with William Stubblebine, and "Economic Theory of Clubs."
James M. Buchanan (1919-2013) was an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and was considered one of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.
Table of Contents
Foreword xi 1.Public Services and Collective Action
The Bases for Collective Action 3
The Evaluation of Public Services (Francesco Forte and James M. Buchanan) 39
‘‘La scienza delle .nanze’’: The Italian Tradition in Fiscal Theory 59 2.Externalities
Externality (James M. Buchanan and Wm. Craig Stubblebine) 109
Public and Private Interaction under Reciprocal Externality (James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock) 126
External Diseconomies in Competitive Supply (Charles J. Goetz and James M. Buchanan )156
External Diseconomies, Corrective Taxes, and Market Structure 169
The Institutional Structure of Externality 174 3.Clubs and Joint Supply
An Economic Theory of Clubs 193
Joint Supply, Externality, and Optimality 210 4.Public Goods Theory
Cooperation and Conflict in Public-Goods Interaction 227
A Note on Public Goods Supply (James M. Buchanan and Milton Z. Kafoglis) 244
Public Goods in Theory and Practice: A Note on the Minasian-Samuelson Discussion 259
Breton and Weldon on Public Goods 265
Convexity Constraints in Public Goods Theory (James M. Buchanan and António S. Pinto Barbosa )271
Public Goods and Natural Liberty 282 5.Applications —City, Health, and Social Security
Public Goods and Public Bads 301
Principles of Urban Fiscal Strategy 321
The Inconsistencies of the National Health Service 340
Technological Determinism Despite the Reality of Scarcity: A Neglected Element in the Theory of Spending for Medical and Health Care 361
The Budgetary Politics of Social Security 376
Social Security Survival: A Public-Choice Perspective 390
Social Insurance in a Growing Economy: A Proposal for Radical Reform 407
Commentary 421 6.Distributive Norms and Collective Action
What Kind of Redistribution Do We Want? 427
Distributive and Redistributive Norms: A Note of Clarification 434
Government Transfer Spending 440
Who Should Pay for Common-Access Facilities? 460
Who Should Distribute What in a Federal System? 471 Name Index 491 Subject Index 495