Synopses & Reviews
"Tilford exposes the generals' tunnel-vision. . . . He demolishes the myth that the 1972 ‘Christmas bombing' brought Hanoi to its knees . . . . His controversial thesis is that the bombing of the North and the interdiction campaign against the Ho Chi Minh Trail were in no way decisive and that USAF leadership obtusely failed to perceive that North Vietnam, an agricultural nation, was simply not susceptible to strategic bombing."—Publishers Weekly ". . . . hard hitting study on the failure of American air power in the Vietnam War . . . . The acute intellectual content of the book and the author's engaging writing style make the book easy to recommend."—Armed Forces Journal International
Review
". . . . a powerful piece of writing, thoroughly researched and convincingly argued . . . . [Tilford's] work is provocative. . . . His conclusions for why air power failed to achieve victory in Vietnam offer today's reader considerable food for thought, especially in light of air power's apparent decisiveness in Desert Storm." -- Mark A. Clodfelter, author of The Limits of Air Power
Description
Includes bibliographical references (p. [230]-239) and index.
About the Author
EARL H. TILFORD JR. was an Air Force officer from 1969 to 1989, serving during the Vietnam War in Thailand as an intelligence officer. A resident of Tuscaloosa, Alabama, he is writing a history of the University of Alabama in the 1960s.