Synopses & Reviews
Colonel Gian Gentiles 2008 article Misreading the Surge” in
World Politics Review first exposed a growing rift among military intellectuals that has since been playing out in strategy sessions at the Pentagon, in classrooms at military academies, and on the pages of the
New York Times. While the past years of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan have been dominated by the doctrine of counterinsurgency (COIN), Gentile and a small group of dissident officers and defense analysts have questioned the necessity and efficacy of COIN—essentially armed nation-building—in achieving the United States limited core policy objective in Afghanistan: the destruction of Al Qaeda.
Drawing both on the authors experiences as a combat battalion commander in the Iraq War and his research into the application of counterinsurgency in a variety of historical contexts, Wrong Turn is a brilliant summation of Gentiles views of the failures of COIN, as well as a searing reevaluation of the current state of affairs in Afghanistan.
As the issue of Americas withdrawal from Afghanistan inevitably rises to the top of the national agenda, Wrong Turn will be a major new touchstone for what went wrong and a vital new guide to the way forward.
Note: the ideas in this book are the authors alone, not the Department of Defenses.
Review
"Based on his personal experience in Baghdad as well as some fine historical scholarship, Colonel Gentile takes aim at Americas current COIN doctrines and shows how ineffective they really are. An exceptionally courageous book, clearly and forcibly written."
—Martin van Creveld, author of The Transformation of War
"Gentile finds the common flaw in our failed strategy as evidenced in our last three military misadventures… We did not lose the Vietnam War—it was never ours to win. Is Afghanistan becoming a repeat performance?"
—Volney Warner, general (ret.), U.S. Army
"A learned and experienced professional soldier, Gentile has filed a passionate and convincing brief against the theory and practice of the counterinsurgency school of modern American war, arguing that in search of the better war, the military establishment has misread the lessons of the past and taken a wrong turn toward the future. A counterbalance against the breathless hero-worship that has framed our thinking about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan."
—Roger Spiller, George C. Marshall Professor of Military History, emeritus, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
"How I wish wed had this telling critique of counter-insurgency warfare before Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. It would have been far harder to make those tragic mistakes. A must read for our national security experts, and U.S. citizens."
—Leslie H. Gelb, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations and former columnist for the New York Times
Review
"Here in this timely, incisive, and unflinchingly honest volume, the essential task of dismantling the myths already enshrouding Americas wars in Iraq and Afghanistan begins. . . . An important book that will give Washingtons war-mongers and militarists fits."
Andrew J. Bacevich, author of Breach of Trust: How Americans Failed Their Soldiers and Their Country
"Colonel Gentile asks us to confront some blisteringly urgent questions. Have COIN tactics ever worked the military magic their proponents claim? Or have they merely provided cover for beating exits from wars that never should have been fought in the first place? . . . Wrong Turn deserves a wide readership by all who must make these supremely important strategy decisionsas well as those who will live with the consequences."
David M. Kennedy, professor of history, Stanford University, and editor of The Modern American Military
"Counterinsurgency rises over and over again from the ashes of defeat. It is Gian Gentiles ambition to 'drive a stake through its heart,' and in Wrong Turn he has succeededbrilliantly."
Marilyn Young, professor of history, New York University
"A brilliant and persuasive book . . . offers by far the most convincing explanation extant of why America has not succeeded recently with COIN.”
Sir Colin Gray, professor of international relations and strategic studies at the University of Reading
"A lively, provocative and readable book . . . never misses its mark."
Hew Strachan
"Based on his personal experience in Baghdad as well as some fine historical scholarship, Colonel Gentile takes aim at Americas current COIN doctrines and shows how ineffective they really are. An exceptionally courageous book, clearly and forcibly written."
Martin van Creveld, author of The Transformation of War
"Gentile finds the common flaw in our failed strategy as evidenced in our last three military misadventures. . . . We did not lose the Vietnam Warit was never ours to win. Is Afghanistan becoming a repeat performance?"
Volney Warner, General (Ret), U.S. Army
"How I wish wed had this telling critique of counterinsurgency warfare before Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. It would have been far harder to make those tragic mistakes. A must-read for our national security experts, and U.S. citizens."
Leslie H. Gelb, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations and former columnist for the New York Times
Review
“Dr. Richard Rubright brings a soldiers outlook and necessary expertise to bear on the vital question of new military technology for enhanced firepower in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. His melding of theory with granular knowledge of practice makes a most valuable contribution to understanding.”—Colin S. Gray, director of the Centre for Strategic Studies in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Reading and author of
Perspectives on StrategyReview
“The size of the academic literature addressing counterinsurgency has increased exponentially in recent years. Unfortunately, its overall quality has not, with most works parroting tired clichés about ‘winning hearts and minds. Richard Rubrights work is a bracing exception—a rare work that insightfully addresses the difficult trade-offs inherent in counterinsurgency warfare. If it is read widely by tomorrows American policymakers, perhaps the COIN failures of recent years will not be repeated in the future.”—C. Dale Walton, author of Grand Strategy and the Presidency: Foreign Policy, War and the American Role in the World
Synopsis
Although the United States plays a leading role in the development of technology, particularly that used by militaries around the world, the U.S. military nonetheless continues to find itself struggling against lower-tech foes that conduct warfare on a different scale. Emerging technology is indeed available and is regularly employed in American counterinsurgency efforts; however, since it is also constantly in flux, strategies for its use must continually evolve to ensure that available resources are put to best use against disparate enemies.
Counterinsurgency operations are inherently political conflicts, and in The Role and Limitations of Technology in U.S. Counterinsurgency Warfare, Richard W. Rubright addresses the limits and constraints of technology in enhancing American military capability. Analyzing the confines and self-imposed restrictions on the use of technology as well as current military doctrine, he develops a new rubric for guiding the military in modern warfare.
Drawing on textual analysis, personal interviews with international military professionals, and firsthand experience on the ground in Iraq, this book is the first to address the role of technology in counterinsurgency operations within operational, tactical, and strategic contexts.
About the Author
Colonel Gian Gentile is an army colonel, a former Iraq War commander, and a professor of history at West Point; he was also a 2010 Visiting Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Gentile is a contributor to the
Washington Post,
The Atlantic,
Foreign Policy,
Small Wars Journal, and the
World Politics Review. He lives in West Point, New York.