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Other titles in the National Bureau of Economic Research Conference Report series:
Concentrated Corporate Ownership (National Bureau of Economic Research Conference Report)by Randall K. Morck
Synopses & Reviews
Standard economic models assume that many small investors own firms. This is so in most large U.S. firms, but wealthy individuals or families generally hold controlling blocks in smaller U.S. firms and in virtually all firms in most other countries. Given this, the lack of theoretical and empirical work on tightly held firms is surprising.
What corporate governance problems arise in tightly held firms? How do these differ from corporate governance problems in widely held firms? How do control blocks arise and how are they maintained? How does concentrated ownership affect economic growth? How should we regulate tightly held firms?
Drawing together leading scholars from law, economics, and finance, this volume examines the economic and legal issues of concentrated ownership and their impact on a shifting global economy.
Book News Annotation:
Scholars of law, economics, and finance ponder the legal and economic implications of a small number of wealthy individuals and families owning controlling interest in many small companies, which is at odds with the economic theory and consequent public policy that assumes many, atomistic owners. In 11 papers from conferences in Toronto in January and Banff in May 1998, they consider the origins of ownership structure as well as topics such as trust and opportunism in close corporations, and whether inherited wealth, corporate control, and economic growth comprise The Canadian Disease.
Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)
About the Author
Randall K. Morck is the Stephen A. Jarislowsky Distinguished Professor of Finance at the University of Alberta and has published extensively on corporate governance.
Table of Contents
The determinants of corporate venture capital success: organizational structure, incentives, and complementarities — Ownership structures and the decision to go public: private versus social optimality — Some of the causes and consequences of corporate ownership concentration in Canada — Corporations and taxation: a largely private matter? — Constraints on large-block shareholders — Trust and opportunism in close corporations — Waiting for the omelette to set: match-specific assets and minority oppression — Adverse selection and gains to controllers in corporate freezouts — Emerging market business groups, foreign intermediaries, and corporate governance — Stock pyramids, cross-ownership, and dual class equity: the mechanisms and agency costs of separating control from cash-flow rights — Inherited wealth, corporate control, and economic growth: the Canadian disease?
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