Synopses & Reviews
andlt;Pandgt;In many countries, monetary policy decisions are made by committees. In the United States, these decisions are made by the Federal Reserve's Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which consists of the seven members of the Board of Governors and the presidents of the twelve district banks. This book examines the process by which the preferences of the FOMC's individual members are translated into collective policy choices. This focus on the aggregation of individual preferences into group decisions is unique and provides an important perspective on the evolution of monetary policy choices.To study decision making by the FOMC, the authors have used both formal voting records and detailed transcripts and summaries of deliberations contained in the committee's Memoranda of Discussion and FOMC Transcripts. The latter sources have been used to construct data sets describing individual committee members' policy preferences for the 1970-1978 and 1987-1996 periods when the FOMC was chaired by Arthur Burns and Alan Greenspan, respectively. These data are used to estimate monetary policy reaction functions for individual Committee members and to explore the role of majoritarian pressures, pressures for consensus, and the power of the chairman in collective decision making. The rich anecdotal evidence found in the Memoranda of Discussion and FOMC Transcripts inspires the narrative approach taken in two chapters, on the influence of political pressure on FOMC deliberations and on the relevance of the time inconsistency problem for the rise of inflation in the 1970s.andlt;/Pandgt;
Review
"Replacing speculation and opinion with powerful empirical results, this book cuts to the heart of the policy making process. It should be required reading for anyone wishing to understand the Federal Open Market Committee and the way in which monetary policy is made."--W. Lee Hoskins, former president, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland The MIT Press
Review
"This book does a great job of combining monetary economics and high-level econometrics, political science, and archival research to produce a compelling account of the political economy of Federal Reserve decision making."--Nathaniel Beck, Department of Politics, New York University The MIT Press
Review
"In this pioneering work, Grossman and Helpman use tools of economic theory to provide new insights into lobbying and special-interest-group-politics. The work is innovative and comprehensive, shedding light on a wide range of questions in a unified treatment. It is a must for anyone interested in special interest groups."--Allan Drazen, Jack and Lisa Yael Professor of Comparative Economics, Tel Aviv University, and Professor of Economics, University of Maryland The MIT Press
Review
"This highly original and intriguing study of Federal Open Market Committee decision making combines analytical insights and anecdotal evidence with extensive use of actual Committee transcripts, a true innovation in studying how policy is actually made. It will no doubt become a standard reference for understanding monetary policy in the United States."--Allan Drazen, Jack and Lisa Yael Professor of Comparative Economics, Tel Aviv University, and Professor of Economics, University of Maryland The MIT Press
Review
andlt;Pandgt;"Replacing speculation and opinion with powerful empirical results, this book cuts to the heart of the policy making process. It should be required reading for anyone wishing to understand the Federal Open Market Committee and the way in which monetary policy is made."--W. Lee Hoskins, former president, Federal Reserve Bank of Clevelandandlt;/Pandgt; The MIT Press The MIT Press
Review
andlt;Pandgt;"This book does a great job of combining monetary and high-level econometrics, political science, and archival research to produce a compelling account of the political economy of Federal Reserve decision making." Nathaniel Beck, Department of Politics, New York Universityandlt;/Pandgt; The MIT Press
Review
andlt;Pandgt;"In this pioneering work, Grossman and Helpman use tools of economic theory to provide new insights into lobbying and special-interest-group-politics. The work is innovative and comprehensive, shedding light on a wide range of questions in a unified treatment. It is a must for anyone interested in special interest groups."--Allan Drazen, Jack and Lisa Yael Professor of Comparative Economics, Tel Aviv University, and Professor of Economics, University of Marylandandlt;/Pandgt; The MIT Press
Synopsis
In many countries, monetary policy decisions are made by committees. In the United States, these decisions are made by the Federal Reserve's Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which consists of the seven members of the Board of Governors and the presidents of the twelve district banks. This book examines the process by which the preferences of the FOMC's individual members are translated into collective policy choices. This focus on the aggregation of individual preferences into group decisions is unique and provides an important perspective on the evolution of monetary policy choices.To study decision making by the FOMC, the authors have used both formal voting records and detailed transcripts and summaries of deliberations contained in the committee's Memoranda of Discussion and FOMC Transcripts. The latter sources have been used to construct data sets describing individual committee members' policy preferences for the 1970-1978 and 1987-1996 periods when the FOMC was chaired by Arthur Burns and Alan Greenspan, respectively. These data are used to estimate monetary policy reaction functions for individual Committee members and to explore the role of majoritarian pressures, pressures for consensus, and the power of the chairman in collective decision making. The rich anecdotal evidence found in the Memoranda of Discussion and FOMC Transcripts inspires the narrative approach taken in two chapters, on the influence of political pressure on FOMC deliberations and on the relevance of the time inconsistency problem for the rise of inflation in the 1970s.
Synopsis
An examination of how the policy preferences of individual members of the Federal Open Market Committee are translated into monetary policy decisions.
In many countries, monetary policy decisions are made by committees. In the United States, these decisions are made by the Federal Reserve's Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which consists of the seven members of the Board of Governors and the presidents of the twelve district banks. This book examines the process by which the preferences of the FOMC's individual members are translated into collective policy choices. This focus on the aggregation of individual preferences into group decisions is unique and provides an important perspective on the evolution of monetary policy choices.
To study decision making by the FOMC, the authors have used both formal voting records and detailed transcripts and summaries of deliberations contained in the committee's Memoranda of Discussion and FOMC Transcripts. The latter sources have been used to construct data sets describing individual committee members' policy preferences for the 1970-1978 and 1987-1996 periods when the FOMC was chaired by Arthur Burns and Alan Greenspan, respectively. These data are used to estimate monetary policy reaction functions for individual Committee members and to explore the role of majoritarian pressures, pressures for consensus, and the power of the chairman in collective decision making. The rich anecdotal evidence found in the Memoranda of Discussion and FOMC Transcripts inspires the narrative approach taken in two chapters, on the influence of political pressure on FOMC deliberations and on the relevance of the time inconsistency problem for the rise of inflation in the 1970s.
Synopsis
To study decision making by the FOMC, the authors have used both formal voting records and detailed transcripts and summaries of deliberations contained in the committee's Memoranda of Discussion and FOMC Transcripts. The latter sources have been used to construct data sets describing individual committee members' policy preferences for the 1970-1978 and 1987-1996 periods when the FOMC was chaired by Arthur Burns and Alan Greenspan, respectively. These data are used to estimate monetary policy reaction functions for individual Committee members and to explore the role of majoritarian pressures, pressures for consensus, and the power of the chairman in collective decision making. The rich anecdotal evidence found in the Memoranda of Discussion and FOMC Transcripts inspires the narrative approach taken in two chapters, on the influence of political pressure on FOMC deliberations and on the relevance of the time inconsistency problem for the rise of inflation in the 1970s.
Synopsis
In many countries, monetary policy decisions are made by committees. In the United States, these decisions are made by the Federal Reserve's Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which consists of the seven members of the Board of Governors and the presidents of the twelve district banks. This book examines the process by which the preferences of the FOMC's individual members are translated into collective policy choices. This focus on the aggregation of individual preferences into group decisions is unique and provides an important perspective on the evolution of monetary policy choices.
Synopsis
An examination of how the policy preferences of individual members of the Federal Open Market Committee are translated into monetary policy decisions.
Synopsis
andlt;Pandgt;An examination of how the policy preferences of individual members of the Federal Open Market Committee are translated into monetary policy decisions.andlt;/Pandgt;
About the Author
Michael L. Bennish, M.D., is Director of the Africa Centre for Health and Population Research in Mtubatuba South Africa and Professor of Pediatrics and Infectious Diseases at Tufts-New England Medical Center and Visiting Professor in the Nuffield Department of Clinical Medicine at the University of Oxford. His training is in pediatric infectious diseases, and he has worked for 20 years in the area of international health, including six years at the International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease in Dhaka, Bangladesh.