Synopses & Reviews
Among the five nations authorized under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to possess nuclear weapons, China has the smallest nuclear force and maintains the most restrained nuclear posture. In The Minimum Means of Reprisal, Jeffrey Lewis examines patterns in Chinese defense investments, strategic force deployments, and arms control behavior to develop an alternative assessment of China's nuclear forces.
The Minimum Means of Reprisal finds that China's nuclear deployment and arms control patterns stem from the belief that deterrence is relatively unaffected by changes in the size, configuration, and readiness of nuclear forces. As a result, Lewis argues, Chinese policy has tended to sacrifice offensive capability in favor of greater political control and lower economic costs.
The future of cooperative security arrangements in space will depend largely on the U.S.-Chinese relationship. Lewis warns that changes in U.S. defense strategy, including the development of new strategic forces and the weaponization of space, will prevent the United States from reassuring China in the event that its leaders begin to lose confidence in their restrained deterrent. The result may further damage the already weakened arms control regime and increase the threat to the United States and the world. Lewis provides policy guidance for those interested in the U.S.-Chinese security relationship and in global security arrangements more generally.
Review
"*The Minimum Means of Reprisal* reveals the unique nature of the Chinese nuclear philosophy and provides rigorous and convincing evidence on China's approach to nuclear deterrence. Lewis offers a fresh, informative, and valuable perspective on China's nuclear and arms control behaviors. Anyone interested in the US-China relationship should read this book."--Li Bin, Professor and Director of the Arms Control Program at the Institute of International Studies, Tsinghua University, Beijing The MIT Press
Review
"Jeffrey Lewis builds his analysis of the U.S.-China strategic relationship on solid historical data. His theoretically grounded work is certain to spark debate and valuable discussion in the political science and policy communities. A valuable read for anyone interested in security issues, China, and U.S.-China relations."--Joan Johnson-Freese, Chair of the National Security Decision Making Department, Naval War College, and author of *Space As A Strategic Asset* The MIT Press
Synopsis
An analysis of China's nuclear and space capabilities, deployment strategies, and stance in arms control negotiations, and the implications for U.S. defense strategy.
In The Minimum Means of Reprisal, Jeffrey Lewis examines China's nuclear and space capabilities and deployment strategies, as well as the Chinese government's stance in arms control negotiations. Lewis finds that Chinese officials hold a "restrained view" about the role of nuclear weapons in national security and maintain a limited nuclear capacity sufficient to deter attack but not large enough for control of these weapons to be compromised.
The future of cooperative security arrangements in space will depend largely on the U.S.-Chinese relationship, and Lewis warns that changes in U.S. defense strategy, including the weaponization of space, could signal to China that its capabilities are not sufficient to deter the United States from the use of force. Such a shift could cause China to reconsider its use of restraint in nuclear strategy, further damaging the already weakened arms control regime and increasing the nuclear threat to the United States and the world.
Synopsis
An analysis of China's nuclear and space capabilities, deployment strategies, and stance in arms control negotiations, and the implications for U.S. defense strategy.
Synopsis
Among the five nations authorized under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to possess nuclear weapons, China has the smallest nuclear force and maintains the most restrained nuclear posture. In
Synopsis
In The Minimum Means of Reprisal, Jeffrey Lewis examines China's nuclear and space capabilities and deployment strategies, as well as the Chinese government's stance in arms control negotiations. Lewis finds that Chinese officials hold a "restrained view" about the role of nuclear weapons in national security and maintain a limited nuclear capacity sufficient to deter attack but not large enough for control of these weapons to be compromised.The future of cooperative security arrangements in space will depend largely on the U.S.-Chinese relationship, and Lewis warns that changes in U.S. defense strategy, including the weaponization of space, could signal to China that its capabilities are not sufficient to deter the United States from the use of force. Such a shift could cause China to reconsider its use of restraint in nuclear strategy, further damaging the already weakened arms control regime and increasing the nuclear threat to the United States and the world.
About the Author
Jeffrey Lewis is a Research Fellow at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy's Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland.