Synopses & Reviews
Review
"At a time when charlatans of every stripe are rushing to publish the latest 'secrets' from the Russian archives, and the most grotesque fantasies of Stalinist and Khrushchevist flunkeys, David Holloway's unassailably professional, honest account of how the Soviets got the bomb comes like a gift from on high. With access not only to the Soviet archives but also to many of the most important survivors of the team that built the Soviet weapon, Holloway tells what actually happened, why it happened, and who was involved. His book is a magnificent jewel whose brilliance is all the greater set against the muck of the surroundings." Reviewed by Daniel Weiss, Virginia Quarterly Review (Copyright 2006 Virginia Quarterly Review)
Synopsis
For forty years the Soviet-American nuclear arms race dominated world politics, yet the Soviet nuclear establishment was shrouded in secrecy. Now that the Cold War is over and the Soviet Union has collapsed, it is possible to answer questions that have intrigued policymakers and the public for years. How did the Soviet Union build its atomic and hydrogen bombs? What role did espionage play? How did the American atomic monopoly affect Stalin's foreign policy? What was the relationship between Soviet nuclear scientists and the country's political leaders? This spellbinding book answers these questions by tracing the history of Soviet nuclear policy from developments in physics in the 1920s to the testing of the hydrogen bomb and the emergence of nuclear deterrence in the mid-1950s.
In engrossing detail, David Holloway tells how Stalin launched a crash atomic program only after the Americans bombed Hiroshima and showed that the bomb could be built; how the information handed over to the Soviets by Klaus Fuchs helped in the creation of their first bomb; how the scientific intelligentsia, which included such men as Andrei Sakharov, interacted with the police apparatus headed by the suspicious and menacing Lavrentii Beria; what steps Stalin took to counter U.S. atomic diplomacy; how the nuclear project saved Soviet physics and enabled it to survive as an island of intellectual autonomy in a totalitarian society; and what happened when, after Stalin's death, Soviet scientists argued that a nuclear war might extinguish all life on earth.
This magisterial history throws light on Soviet policy at the height of the Cold War, illuminates a central but hitherto secret element of the Stalinist system, and puts into perspective the tragic legacy of this program today--environmental damage, a vast network of institutes and factories, and a huge stockpile of unwanted weapons.
Synopsis
A distinguished authority tells the spellbinding story of the people and politics behind the development of the Soviet atom bomb. Based on interviews with participants and research in newly opened Soviet archives, the book reveals how the American atomic monopoly affected Stalin's foreign policy, the role of espionage in the evolution of the Soviet bomb, and the relationship between Soviet nuclear scientists and the country's political leaders. 'An indispensable contribution to our knowledge of the modern world.' Robert Conquest, 'London Review of Books' 'A perceptive, highly informative, and altogether excellent book.' Rudolf Peierls, 'New York Review of Books' 'A masterful account of the arms race from the Soviet side.' Gregg Herken, 'Washington Post Book World' 'A superb history that gives fresh insights into the cold war and, even more, into the conditions of intellectual life in Stalin's Russia. This study is a work on the largest scale, one that advances our understanding and is likely to remain definitive for years to come.' Priscilla Johnson McMillan, 'New York Times Book Review' Winner of the 1995 Vucinich Prize given for the best book in the field of Slavic studies and the Shulman Prize for the best book on Soviet and Post-Soviet Foreign Policy, both awarded by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. David Holloway was born in Ireland and taught at Edinburgh University before becoming professor of political science and co-director, Center for International Security and Arms Control, at Stanford University. He is also the author of 'The Soviet Union and the Arms Race'.