Synopses & Reviews
The political and social predicates that make the large firm possible and that shape its form are not always taken into account, despite the fact that variation in the political and social environment can deeply affect which firms, which ownership structures, and which governance arrangements survive and prosper. Focussing on the US, the larger nations in continental Europe, and Japan, Mark Roe uses statistical and qualitative analyses to explore the relationship between politics, history, and business organization.
Review
"Mark J. Roe's compact but probing study investigates a previously overlooked variable in the development of corporate governance structures: political cultureProfessor Roe supports his provocative thesis with empirical data as well as rich qualitative descriptions of the interactions between corporate governance and politics in eight economically advanced nations."--Harvard Law Review
Synopsis
Includes bibliographical references (p. [207]-219) and index.
About the Author
Mark J. Roe is Berg Professor Law at the Harvard Law School. He has previously held positions at Columbia University School of Law; University of Pennsylvania School of Law; and Rutgers University School of Law. His publications include
Corporate Reorganization and Bankruptcy: Legal and Financial Materials (Foundation Press, 2000) and
Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance (Princeton University Press, 1994).
Table of Contents
List of Graphs and Figures
List of Tables
Introduction
Part I: Political Conflict and the Corporation
1. Peace as Predicate
2. The Wealthy West's Differing Corporate Governance Structures
3. A General Theory
Part II: Social Conflict and the Institutions of Corporate Governance
4. Social Democracies and Agency Costs: Raising the Stakes
5. Reducing Shareholders' Power to Control Managers
Part III: Left-Right Politics and Ownership Separation: Data
6. Data and Confirmation
Part IV: Nation by Nation
7. France
8. Germany
9. Italy
10. Japan
11. Sweden
12. United Kingdom
13. United States
14. Extending the Sample?
Part V: The Direction of Causality
15. Alternative Formulations of the Thesis
16. Backlash
17. Contract as Metaphor
18. Rents
19. Rents and Politics
20. Rents and Ownership Concentration
21. Political Change in Continental Europe
22. Alternative Formulations: Data
Part VI: Corporate Law's Limits
23. Corporate Law as the Foundation for Securities Markets: The Theory
24. Its Limits: Theory
25. Its Limits: Data
26. The Quality of Corporate Law and Its Limits
Part VII: Unifying the Political Theories
27. Populism and Socialism in Corporate Governance
Conclusion
Acknowledgements
Bibliography
Index