Election Timing

Endogenous election timing allows leaders to schedule elections 'when the time is right'. The author proposes and tests an informational theory of endogenous election timing that explains when leaders call for elections and the consequences of their decisions. In particular, he argues that, if all else is equal, leaders announce elections when they anticipate a decline in their future performance. As a consequence, early elections signal a leader's lack of confidence in future outcomes. The earlier elections occur, relative to expectations, the stronger the signal of demise. Using data on British parliaments since 1945, the author tests hypotheses related to timing of elections, electoral support and subsequent economic performance. Leaders who call elections early (relative to expectations) experience a decline in their popular support relative to pre-announcement levels, experience worse post-electoral performance, and have shorter campaigns.

Most parliamentary systems have endogenous election timing, a system where the Prime Minister is free to call elections when he or she thinks the time is right. Despite the huge advantage one might expect this creates, Prime Ministers frequently lose. The author proposes an informational theory that explains when leaders call for elections and the consequences of their decisions. The author explains why leaders find it difficult to profit from their ability to call elections when they are popular and the opposition is weak.

The author explains when leaders call for elections and the consequences of their decisions.

1. Calling elections; 2. An informational theory of election timing; 3. The timing of elections; 4. The consequences of election timing; 5. Early and late election in Britain; 6. Conclusions.