Synopses & Reviews
It is tempting to think that, if a person's beliefs are coherent, they are also likely to be true. Indeed, this truth-conduciveness claim is the cornerstone of the popular coherence theory of knowledge and justification. Hitherto much confusion has been caused by the inability of coherence theorists to define their central concept. Nor have they succeeded in specifying in unambiguous terms what the notion of truth-conduciveness involves. This book is the most extensive and detailed study of coherence and probable truth to date.
Erik Olsson argues that the value of coherence has been generally overestimated; it is severely problematic to maintain that coherence has a role to play in the process whereby beliefs are acquired or justified. He proposes that the opposite of coherence, i.e. incoherence, can still be the driving force in the process whereby beliefs are retracted, so that the role of coherence in our enquiries is negative rather than positive. Another innovative feature of Olsson's book is its unified, interdisciplinary approach to the issues at hand. The arguments are equally valid for coherence among any items of information, regardless of their sources (beliefs, memories, testimonies, and so on). Writing in accessible, non-technical language, Olsson takes the reader through much of the history of the subject, from early theorists like A. C. Ewing and C. I. Lewis to contemporary figures like Laurence BonJour and C. A.J. Coady. Against Coherence will make stimulating reading for epistemologists and anyone with a serious interest in truth.
Synopsis
It is tempting to think that, if a person's beliefs are coherent, they are also likely to be true. This truth conduciveness claim is the cornerstone of the popular coherence theory of knowledge and justification. Erik Olsson's new book is the most extensive and detailed study of coherence and probable truth to date. Setting new standards of precision and clarity, Olsson argues that the value of coherence has been widely overestimated. Provocative and readable, Against Coherence will make stimulating reading for epistemologists and anyone with a serious interest in truth.
About the Author
anyone wishing to keep abreast of that literature."--Charles B. Cross, Mind
"Poses a powerful challenge to coherence theories of justification, from the standpoint of probabilistic epistemology. Anyone interested in the coherence theory or in probabilistic approaches to epistemology needs to attend closely to Olsson's careful and extremely important work."--Michael Huemer, INotre Dame Philosophical Reviews
"Dr. Olsson has produced a very interesting, substantial and instructive book. It takes important elements of epistemological coherence theories to a higher level of clarity, thus making it possible to explore in a precise manner vague considerations that were all too often based on faulty intuitions. Central parts of the book can even be described as provocative, since they attack crucial parts of prototypical coherence theories. Undoubtedly this book represents a very significant advance in this field of philosophical research."--Hans Rott, Editor-in-Chief of Erkenntnis
"Olsson uses modern techniques from probability theory and modeling to examine whether the coherence theory of justification is tenable. Olsson takes us through much of the history and major figures in the coherence theory of justification. This work is well-written, well-informed by the existing literature and there is an interesting mix of formal argument and philosophical argumentation."--Luc Bovens, Editor-in-Chief of Economics and Philosophy
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
Part I: Does coherence imply truth?
2. Coherence, truth, and testimony
3. C. I. Lewis's radical justification of memory
4. Laurence BonJour's radical justification of belief
5. C. A. J. Coady's radical justification of natural testimony
Part II: Does more coherence imply higher likelihood of truth?
6. Making the question precise
7. A negative answer
Part III: Other views
8. How not the regain the truth connection: a reply to Bovens and Hartmann
9. Other coherence theories
Part IV: Scepticism and incoherence
10. Pragmatism, doubt, and the role of incoherence
Appendix A: Counterexample to the Doxastic Extension Principle
Appendix B: Proof of the Impossibility Theorem
Appendix C: Proofs of Observations