Synopses & Reviews
When the Supreme Court in 2003 struck down a Texas law prohibiting homosexual sodomy, it cited the right to privacy based on the guarantee of "substantive due process" embodied by the Constitution. But did the court act undemocratically by overriding the rights of the majority of voters in Texas? Scholars often point to such cases as exposing a fundamental tension between the democratic principle of majority rule and the liberal concern to protect individual rights. Democratic Rights challenges this view by showing that, in fact, democracy demands many of these rights.
Corey Brettschneider argues that ideal democracy is comprised of three core values--political autonomy, equality of interests, and reciprocity--with both procedural and substantive implications. These values entitle citizens not only to procedural rights of participation (e.g., electing representatives) but also to substantive rights that a "pure procedural" democracy might not protect. What are often seen as distinctly liberal substantive rights to privacy, property, and welfare can, then, be understood within what Brettschneider terms a "value theory of democracy." Drawing on the work of John Rawls and deliberative democrats such as Jürgen Habermas, he demonstrates that such rights are essential components of--rather than constraints on--an ideal democracy. Thus, while defenders of the democratic ideal rightly seek the power of all to participate, they should also demand the rights that are the substance of self-government.
Review
"Brettschneider has produced an innovative, imaginative new perspective on judicial review." A.D. Sarat, Choice
Review
"[B]rettschneider has produced an innovative, imaginative new perspective on judicial review. He makes a persuasive case that democracy itself demands the legal recognition of certain substantive rights....[N]o one interested in rights or democratic theory can afford to ignore this book."--A.D. Sarat, Choice
Review
"Develops a 'value theory of democracy' grounded in political autonomy, equality of interests, and reciprocity."--Nina C. Ayoub, Chronicle of Higher Education
Review
Develops a 'value theory of democracy' grounded in political autonomy, equality of interests, and reciprocity. Nina C. Ayoub
Review
One of Choice's Outstanding Academic Titles for 2007
Review
"Princeton University Press's decision to issue a paperback edition of Corey Brettschneider's ambitious Democratic Rights, three years after the book's initial appearance, is one that students of democratic theory and political theorists in general should applaud. . . . Democratic Rights is not only ambitious but distinctive, then, and marked by virtues that one does not always find in such books, being clearly written, carefully argued, and admirably concise. It is a book, in short, that is well worth the attention of democratic theorists and anyone who wants to know how far contractualism can take us in political and legal philosophy."--Richard Dagger, Criminal Law and Philosophy
Synopsis
When the Supreme Court in 2003 struck down a Texas law prohibiting homosexual sodomy, it cited the right to privacy based on the guarantee of "substantive due process" embodied by the Constitution. But did the court act undemocratically by overriding the rights of the majority of voters in Texas? Scholars often point to such cases as exposing a fundamental tension between the democratic principle of majority rule and the liberal concern to protect individual rights.
Democratic Rights challenges this view by showing that, in fact, democracy demands many of these rights.
Corey Brettschneider argues that ideal democracy is comprised of three core values--political autonomy, equality of interests, and reciprocity--with both procedural and substantive implications. These values entitle citizens not only to procedural rights of participation (e.g., electing representatives) but also to substantive rights that a "pure procedural" democracy might not protect. What are often seen as distinctly liberal substantive rights to privacy, property, and welfare can, then, be understood within what Brettschneider terms a "value theory of democracy." Drawing on the work of John Rawls and deliberative democrats such as Jürgen Habermas, he demonstrates that such rights are essential components of--rather than constraints on--an ideal democracy. Thus, while defenders of the democratic ideal rightly seek the power of all to participate, they should also demand the rights that are the substance of self-government.
Synopsis
"No problem of democratic theory is more formidable than how to reconcile majority rule with respect for individual rights.
Democratic Rights is an original and compelling contribution to this debate--one that will affect the course of democratic theory for years to come. Among its most provocative and ingenious arguments is its case for the illegitimacy of the death penalty and the political parity of property and welfare rights under a democratic constitution. The prose is a model of compact lucidity."
--Eamonn Callan, Stanford University"First-rate. In a consistently accessible style, Corey Brettschneider presents a clear, innovative argument that he sustains in an elegant and economical way throughout."--Simone Chambers, University of Toronto
"This ambitious book establishes its author as a scholar setting out a distinctive and credible position within liberal democratic theory. Clear and accessible, it reaches eminently reasonable conclusions on a range of policy issues, and develops a theoretical structure that can be used to apply the author's recommended 'middle course' (between 'pure proceduralist' democrats and 'nondemocratic' liberals) directly to constitutional law and matters of basic justice."--Leif Wenar, University of Sheffield
Synopsis
"No problem of democratic theory is more formidable than how to reconcile majority rule with respect for individual rights. Democratic Rights is an original and compelling contribution to this debate--one that will affect the course of democratic theory for years to come. Among its most provocative and ingenious arguments is its case for the illegitimacy of the death penalty and the political parity of property and welfare rights under a democratic constitution. The prose is a model of compact lucidity."--Eamonn Callan, Stanford University
"First-rate. In a consistently accessible style, Corey Brettschneider presents a clear, innovative argument that he sustains in an elegant and economical way throughout."--Simone Chambers, University of Toronto
"This ambitious book establishes its author as a scholar setting out a distinctive and credible position within liberal democratic theory. Clear and accessible, it reaches eminently reasonable conclusions on a range of policy issues, and develops a theoretical structure that can be used to apply the author's recommended 'middle course' (between 'pure proceduralist' democrats and 'nondemocratic' liberals) directly to constitutional law and matters of basic justice."--Leif Wenar, University of Sheffield
Synopsis
When the Supreme Court in 2003 struck down a Texas law prohibiting homosexual sodomy, it cited the right to privacy based on the guarantee of "substantive due process" embodied by the Constitution. But did the court act undemocratically by overriding the rights of the majority of voters in Texas? Scholars often point to such cases as exposing a fundamental tension between the democratic principle of majority rule and the liberal concern to protect individual rights.
Democratic Rights challenges this view by showing that, in fact, democracy demands many of these rights.
Corey Brettschneider argues that ideal democracy is comprised of three core values--political autonomy, equality of interests, and reciprocity--with both procedural and substantive implications. These values entitle citizens not only to procedural rights of participation (e.g., electing representatives) but also to substantive rights that a "pure procedural" democracy might not protect. What are often seen as distinctly liberal substantive rights to privacy, property, and welfare can, then, be understood within what Brettschneider terms a "value theory of democracy." Drawing on the work of John Rawls and deliberative democrats such as Jürgen Habermas, he demonstrates that such rights are essential components of--rather than constraints on--an ideal democracy. Thus, while defenders of the democratic ideal rightly seek the power of all to participate, they should also demand the rights that are the substance of self-government.
Synopsis
"No problem of democratic theory is more formidable than how to reconcile majority rule with respect for individual rights.
Democratic Rights is an original and compelling contribution to this debate--one that will affect the course of democratic theory for years to come. Among its most provocative and ingenious arguments is its case for the illegitimacy of the death penalty and the political parity of property and welfare rights under a democratic constitution. The prose is a model of compact lucidity."--Eamonn Callan, Stanford University
"First-rate. In a consistently accessible style, Corey Brettschneider presents a clear, innovative argument that he sustains in an elegant and economical way throughout."--Simone Chambers, University of Toronto
"This ambitious book establishes its author as a scholar setting out a distinctive and credible position within liberal democratic theory. Clear and accessible, it reaches eminently reasonable conclusions on a range of policy issues, and develops a theoretical structure that can be used to apply the author's recommended 'middle course' (between 'pure proceduralist' democrats and 'nondemocratic' liberals) directly to constitutional law and matters of basic justice."--Leif Wenar, University of Sheffield
About the Author
Corey Brettschneider is assistant professor of political science and public policy at Brown University.
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments ix
INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER ONE
The Value Theory of Democracy 7
I. Introduction 7
II. Procedural Democractic Theories 11
III. Procedure-Independent Theories: Epistemic and Democratic 17
IV. Conclusion 26
CHAPTER TWO
Paradigmatic Democratic Rights and Citizens as Addressees of Law 28
I. Introduction 28
II. Citizens as Authors and Addressees: Co-Originality and Citizens' Status 29
III. Rule of Law 38
IV. Freedom of Expression and Conscience 44
V. Conclusion 52
CHAPTER THREE
Democratic Contractualism: A Framework for Justifiable Coercion 54
I. Introduction 54
II. A Lexicon of Citizenship 55
III. The Principle of Democracy's Public Reason 61
IV. The Inclusion Principle 64
V. Conclusion 69
CHAPTER FOUR
Public Justification and the Right to Privacy 71
I. Introduction 71
II. Situating Democratic Privacy: A Critique of Liberal and Republican Accounts 73
III. Relevance and the Boundaries of Privacy 78
IV. Privacy, Equality, and Democratically Justifiable Coercion 85
V. Conclusion 94
CHAPTER FIVE
The Rights of the Punished 96
I. Introduction 96
II. The Need for Justification to Criminals qua Citizens: The Problem with Punishment as War 98
III. State Punishment as an Issue of Political Morality: Punishing Criminals qua Persons versus Criminals qua Citizens 101
IV. Democratic Rights Against Punishment 105
V. Capital Punishment 108
VI. Conclusion 112
CHAPTER SIX
Private Property and the Right to Welfare 114
I. Introduction 114
II. The Right to Private Property and State Coercion 115
III. Democratic Contractualism and the Right to Private Property 119
IV. Democratic Proposals for Welfare Rights 126
V. Objections 132
VI. Conclusion 135
CHAPTER SEVEN
Judicial Review: Balancing Democratic Rights and Procedures 136
I. Introduction 136
II. The Limits of a Pure Outcomes-Based Theory 140
III. The Failure of Pure Procedural Theories 145
IV. Impure Procedural and Outcomes-Based Theories 146
V. The Flaws with Formal Democratic Arguments and the Need for Examples in a Theory of Democracy 150
VI. The Objection from Benevolent Dictatorship 157
VII. Conclusion 158
Conclusion: Democratic Rights and Contemporary Politics 160
Bibliography 163
Index 169