Synopses & Reviews
With the end of the Cold War and the erosion of the Soviet threat, the United States is reevaluating its defense policy and its acquisition of weapons. James Lebovic shows that, although current military missions are adapted to post–Cold War realities, the self-defeating bias of bureaucrats and military services toward Cold War weaponry is still prevalent. He examines the impact of this bias on the armed services as they assess threat, generate requirements, develop and change weapon concepts, set production rates, and engage in testing. The author asserts that bias compromises service interests and broader military objectives, and he offers general policy recommendations to put U.S. weapons acquisition on a more effective track.
Includes bibliographical references (p. -187) index.
About the Author
James H. Lebovic is associate professor of political science and international affairs at The George Washington University and author of Deadly Dilemmas: Deterrence in U.S. Nuclear Strategy (1990).